Chapter 3: Overview of implementation of ADF Review recommendations

The ADF Review contained 21 recommendations. The Chiefs of Service Committee (COSC) agreed to 15 of these, with the further six agreed ‘in principle’. The Chief of the Defence Force stated that ‘in principle’ agreement indicates that the COSC unanimously agreed to the concept and intent of the recommendations, but practical implementation considerations require that a more detailed implementation plan be developed’.4

The ADF Review’s recommendations were extensive, grounded not only in a human rights framework, but also a capability imperative. The recommendations were based on the ADF Review’s findings that the recruitment, retention and promotion of women were critical to the future operational effectiveness of the Australian Defence Force (ADF).

Though enduring cultural change is built on values and behaviours, it must also be supported by all aspects of an organisation. The ADF Review’s recommendations addressed these elements specifically in relation to leadership, management and accountability; structure, systems and processes; policies and supporting technologies; transparency and reporting. Its recommendations also addressed attraction, retention, postings, promotion, gender representation across occupations and work practice and most critically, addressed responses to sexual harassment and sexual abuse.

Significant effort will continue to be required to implement, manage and monitor the ADF Review’s recommendations. In some instances, the recommendations challenged some of the most deeply held ‘sacred cows’ of the ADF’s culture, such as ideas that ‘to be equal is to be the same’; that senior leadership must be drawn from the arms corps; and that promotion on merit should have no regard to the question of gender. The recommendations also challenged the notion that service in the ADF must come above all else – above family and relationships; above personal wellbeing – regardless of the inevitable impact on individual lives.

While some of the ADF Review’s recommendations challenged long held customs and traditions,5 others required significant attention to changing or redesigning organisational infrastructure and information systems.6 Others sought better and more strategic use of information.7

The Audit appreciates that cultural change takes time and, as such, was not looking for evidence that recommendations had been ‘done’ and could be ‘ticked off’, but for evidence of progress on implementation as well as removal of barriers to success. Changes generated through the development of new policies or directives take time to have impact in any organisation, as well as to shift practices and behaviours. Throughout the Audit process therefore, particularly when visiting bases, the team was not surprised to encounter a ‘disconnect’ between the intent of leadership on the one hand and understanding or practice ‘on the ground’ on the other. Where these issues were identified, they informed the ‘outbriefs’ undertaken with command teams at the conclusion of each visit. These ‘disconnects’ are also included in this Report to inform leadership of where communication may be lacking or where – and in what form – resistance to achieving cultural reform exists.

In particular, where relevant, the Audit will draw on the results of the UB Survey which was administered in 2013. These results provide evidence of the current ‘climate’ within Defence, particularly in relation to the prevalence of unacceptable behaviour; the perceived organisational tolerance for these behaviours; and the likelihood that members will seek advice or report such an experience.

The ADF’s approach to implementation

On receiving the report of the ADF Review, the ADF established an Organisational Development Unit (ODU) within the Defence People Group. The ODU is a small unit tasked with coordinating the implementation of the ADF Review’s recommendations across the ADF.

In support of the Audit, the ODU coordinated the collection of documentation to provide evidence of the implementation of the ADF Review’s recommendations. Evidence was provided against every recommendation from each Service perspective, as well as from the ODU itself. Folders of information were provided to the Audit during the week commencing 2 September 2013. This timely provision of information enabled the Audit team to see evidence of progress and key initiatives which informed visits and discussions.

Each Service in the ADF has its own distinct culture and way of doing business, meaning that what works in one Service may not work in another. Accordingly, the Audit observed that each Service approached the implementation of the recommendations in its own way, employing its own processes, systems and structures.

Integrating change into well-established processes is a way of ensuring the sustainability of any reform, while Services can also learn from each other by sharing information across organisational boundaries.

Certainly, the Audit was impressed at how the ADF Review’s recommendations had been strengthened through inclusion in existing reform processes. However, it reiterates that gender must remain a focus, especially where it is not already specified in these processes.

The Audit also encountered some frustration where accountability for progress on an action was assigned as an enterprise wide, corporate responsibility, rather than sitting inside a particular Service:

any of the tasks that went to [my Service] I think...we’ve given it our best shot... Where there has been organisational malaise are the tasks or recommendations that weren’t able to be implemented by [my Service] and they were to be implemented by someone in the Defence People Group, whether it be the ODU or whether it be someone else. But the levers that [we] didn’t control were the ones that are still, I think, hollow.8

The tension between the Services and the broader, enterprise wide entities are a recurring theme in bringing about cultural change within the ADF.

Navy has substantially employed its existing cultural reform strategy, New Generation Navy (NGN):

...The fact that people don’t see the change as a result of the Broderick Review is not so important... It’s more important that they see Navy’s cultural change through the NGN prism, and for that reason aspects of Broderick, aspects of Pathway to Change for example, are embedded within the NGN cultural change program.9

If Broderick hadn’t occurred, we would still be wrestling with this change.10

Some of it is just the way Navy does business and, in part, I think some of it is to not put fuel on the fire as well. So there are some things where CN11 deliberately uses NGN as the tool by which he intends to have cultural change because that’s what the troops understand.12

NGN certainly is broader than Broderick but I think it’ll be more readily accepted when it’s part of a cultural reform, not necessarily a specific gender strategy.13

Army described a phased approach where the initial announcements by the Chief of Army were followed up by explicit changes in policy:

There’s no denying the Chief of Army’s YouTube piece... You could not have even imagined that impact...and it was in soldier-speak. They got it very clearly.14

The Chief...made his decision, he made the impact statement that we have to do something different. Now we’ve actually got past that point. It was a very conscious plan.15

That’s the great thing with David Morrison, he’s come out and said: ‘yes, you are in the Army, you earn the right to wear the Rising Sun badge, your standards of behaviour are above and beyond what we expect of normal citizens, because you are not a normal citizen anymore’.16

A specific and explicit focus on women was also integrated into some of the centrepiece responses to the recommendations. For example, in relation to Army’s career management system:

The current system was fundamentally designed for, and is optimised to support an overwhelmingly male workforce. While the system reflected societal norms and serviced Army in the past, unless modified to attract and retain more women, it cannot sustain Army as a respected, robust and capable land force into the future... Army must position itself to be an employer of choice for women.17

The current [career] model has a bias towards generalist male, combat corps, regimental soldiers, whose partner is normally the primary carer of children. The future land operating environment challenges this model, and bias towards male generalist combat corps is no longer valid nor appropriate.18

This has now been followed by the ‘capability argument’:

I think two years ago when we started looking at all the issues and you did your initial work, it was actually an eye opener to a lot of people. A few of us intuitively knew, okay, we’ve got some issues, but we didn’t know why, but more importantly we didn’t know what positive impact we could make. So the journey that we’ve come on now is...a genuine understanding that it’s actually a capability. We now have really moved in Army in the last probably nine months to phrase it in terms of a capability enhancement.19

It’s capability. I frame it like that. And some people say this is the first time we’ve ever heard it like that, now I get it... There’s one fundamental difference from Army to the other two services which allow us to understand it in those terms. That is, in the personnel domain Army is generally all about people; that is our capability. Whereas Navy and Air Force, their capability is seen in terms of their platforms... So where we talk about a battalion, whether it be a medical hospital or an infantry battalion or whatever, it’s people, it’s not a fixture.20

It comes down to capability really. This whole premise of ECM21, FWA22, retention of high performing individuals, male and female, being more flexible with breaks in service is all about [addressing] the dropping capability of Army.23

Air Force has built its commitments under Pathway to Change and the Review into its new cultural reform strategy, New Horizon:

All the recommendations from all of the reviews and the Defence’s whole of enterprise approach for execution, which is Pathway to Change, and then Air Force’s interpretation and internal strategies for delivery is New Horizon.24

Air Force has also supplemented New Horizon with particular initiatives as a direct response to the recommendations:25

They’ve both been running in tandem...so there’s been the intervention to really shift hearts and minds and that’s New Horizon. And New Horizon creates an environment where...you can get the women in, you can create policy and opportunities. But if it’s a shit place to work the women won’t stay, so you’ve got to have all of the stuff that Broderick recommended and then you need to have an environment that actually fosters and makes them feel like they want to stay.26

Air Force is also focussed on ensuring the sustainability of these reforms:

...each process that Air Force has undertaken, they have tried to put in the quality of the project wedge at the end so that we don’t fall backwards. So I think, absolutely, this stuff is sustainable.27

I often make the point that behaviour is genderless but we’re very upfront about the capability linkage as a workforce issue – in the conversation we would tie behaviour to capability through retention. So if you’re not comfortable and happy in your workplace, you won’t stay – you will leave. That’s a loss and, not only that, you go out and you tell people what it was like and that’s a double loss. That’s reputational loss.28

Notwithstanding these successes, each Service pointed to particular challenges they have faced in terms of implementation.

Navy

Navy identified challenges with regard to attitudes, workforce shortages and structures:

Navy’s been doing this for a long time in terms of the integration of women and trying to create better opportunities for them. But there are still some pockets where the traditional beliefs and ideas...prevent us from perhaps getting the best outcome... The area that I see where we need our greatest effort is in the career management space...and the other areas are the women themselves. There are many women out there who have done it the hard way...and who still are ascribed to the view that it’s a binary choice between family and career and you make your choice...so in many respects the women are the toughest audience out there.29

In relation to progress on career management reform and what has changed since the recommendations were accepted:

The answer is not very much...The problem that we have is that we’re undermanned... So we’ve got a gap of about 1500 positions between the workforce we want to have [and] the employment requirement in the workforce that we have right now. What that does is fundamentally preclude the career managers from doing anything other than managing crises.30

In relation to progress on retention related recommendations:

Female participation won’t be driven solely by increased recruiting; it will be driven by increased retention. Navy’s employment paradigm is perhaps a little different to the other two services. Sea service is intrinsic for Navy business... It’s intrinsic to progress, to advancement, at each stage, for most categories, for most employment groups. Thirty five percent of Navy’s people serve at sea at any one time. The bias of that service is towards junior officer and sailors. Fifty percent of Navy people are employed in categories where the ratio of sea to shore employment is one to one, which means that you have either served at sea very recently, you are at sea, or you’re about to go to sea.31

That is our fundamental challenge, and that’s the one that we’re wrestling with. We’ve got the senior leadership onside, we found there’s a paradigm that we need to shift or that we need to work through if we’re going to make it possible for women to serve in the Navy in increased numbers...to provide more flexibility to adjust the sea service component. But the bit that won’t change, sea service for an able officer or sailor is like a screwdriver to an electronic technician... It’s about when you serve, it’s about the timing of the service... We don’t have that solution yet. We’re working to fix that. We’ve set ourselves a task to resolve that issue so that we can significantly increase the number of females who participate across Navy.32

Army

Army faces particular challenges in relation to the movement of women into combat positions both in terms of the take up and in terms of the underlying rationale.

From our position we’re a little bit surprised at the lack of [internal] transfer; we thought we’d have a bit more. But the messaging that we’ve got back from the young ladies that have moved now...is, don’t force anyone, let it be volunteer.33

Personally, I’m open to the idea [of women in combat roles] but in saying that it’s a change. It may be able to work, but personally I don’t agree with it only because I don’t think that there’s a need for change.34

The particular response to women in combat roles is explored later in the Report.

Specifically, however, Army is challenging the view that setting targets undermines merit:

It comes down to David Morrison saying the standard that you walk past is the standard that you accept. So whether you’re a Corporal, a Sergeant, a Lieutenant, a Captain, a Colonel, when you hear someone say, ‘She got that just because she’s a chick’, you go, ‘Really? I don’t think so; I think she got it because she was the best person for the job’... So it’s killing the negativity one molecule at a time.35

Air Force

Air Force raised challenges about messaging, communications and response to targets:

Sweeping Broderick up under New Horizon, I’m still not sure. So part of me thinks that’s a really smart thing to do and let’s make it all about our culture and our values... Another part of me thinks sweeping it under New Horizon almost takes the focus off gender as a specific intervention.36

New Horizon has two personnel aspects: inclusion and behaviour. One is genderless, behaviour is completely genderless... And then the other part of it is inclusion which is about capability and to do that I talk on the journey about attraction, retention, what it’s about. I kill the mythology around [women getting preferential] promotion. It is the most damaging piece in the whole thing.37

Implementation risks

Organisational pressures

The ADF is a complex, diverse and dispersed organisation. The ADF and each Service face day to day pressures arising from operational imperatives; Government requirements; tight fiscal and budgetary environments; workforce shortages; and the demands of managing a highly distributed workforce.

Many functional and operational units, as well as multiple levels of authority, are involved in progressing change. The ADF is based on a rank hierarchy which serves it well in relation to its operational imperatives, but this structure can pose challenges to communicating swiftly and directly to personnel on matters such as organisational change and cultural reform. With a high reliance on the various levels of hierarchy to communicate to personnel, the Audit found that uneven or mixed messaging can result.

In communicating the cultural change resulting from implementation of the ADF Review recommendations, there was a high reliance on sending information through DEFGRAMs, or on placing information on the Defence Restricted Network (DRN), with the expectation that this will be read and understood. The Audit found that this was not always the case.

The rationale for, and nature of, cultural reform is better communicated directly and then accompanied by an opportunity to discuss the issues openly. In bases where staff had benefited from the opportunity for interactive discussion there was a much higher level of awareness of the rationale and imperative for change and, accordingly, far less misinformation being circulated.

Awareness and response to change

During consultations, the Audit asked participants whether they were aware of the ADF Review and its recommendations. As expected, the Review’s recommendations had both supporters and detractors among ADF personnel. A number were not aware of the recommendations until participating in one of the Audit’s focus groups.

The following responses represent the range of views that the Audit encountered. These comments provide insight into the cultural context in which the ADF Review’s recommendations are being implemented.

Many people had heard of the ADF Review and some were aware of its recommendations:

I heard some key points; I can’t remember what they were...There was certainly a lot of information put out from CDF and [my Chief of Service]. I would be honest and say I never read your report.38

The problem is there are so many reviews, changes, whatever is going on... They just blur into one and it’s hard to pick one out above the other... We know from within our own organisation we’ve seen things change, but whether that was because of this or because of [my Service’s cultural reform program] or anything else, we couldn’t tell you.39

I knew that there was a review going on but I didn’t understand until now that there’s an action outcome from that.40

I knew there was a review. I didn’t know it was a Human Rights one though. I didn’t know specifically who was running it. That’s interesting to me.41

I hear the messages all the time, however, I don’t see it in practice.42

Others knew where to find it if they wished, but their day to day workload meant that it was not a priority:

If you want to read it, it’s there...but it was one of those things where you’d get side-tracked and you can only get into it when you can.43

It’s a case of in the 15 things you’ve got to do today it’s probably 17 ...so then it just drops off the perch and then you forget about it.44

Some personnel could see the value and inevitability of change, as encapsulated by these comments:

I think that it will change for the better but at the moment there’s such a stalemate because there’s such a big focus on it and it’s a big deal... But I think that everyone will get used to it and it’s something that will change over time but you can’t force it to change.45

We all see this as a good thing, as an opportunity to stay in [this Service] but a lot of people just see it as making it easier [for women].46

When I came through it was all about integration and it was not sticking your head up above the radar. We didn’t want the media attention, we didn’t want special treatment, we just wanted to slip by quietly and continue to be recognised by the men as adding value. But in actual fact what we did was probably lose a bit of our identity.47

As a woman I just felt that you were celebrated for acting like a man. You were not ridiculed but you weren’t celebrated for leading as a woman. So there’s that very cookie cutter sort of type of effective leader... and if you were a little bit different to that then it was difficult for them to have an open mind.48

Are women lowering standards?

The Audit heard repeatedly that women were welcome in the ADF ‘as long as they can do the job’ and ‘as long as they don’t lower the standards’:

I don’t think anyone in this room would be against having as many women as possible wanting to come in the door, come and work... I’ve never seen anything where it’s like ‘hey, this is a boys’ club’ and I don’t think anyone in this room has, ever.49

I understand opening up (the combat roles for women) but as long as they don’t drop the standards.50

There’s some boys out there that probably shouldn’t be doing the job that maybe got through because there weren’t the women there to compete against. So I think, as long as they’re prepared to work hard, do the same things as the boys and not ask for any special treatment or special favours then give them a chance and see how they go.51

A backlash

The Audit encountered a significant degree of backlash from both men and women:

Even though a lot of the [ADF Review’s] recommendations are non-sexist and as a supervisor I implement it across the board, whether it’s male or female, especially flexible working plans... there is definitely perception out there that there is now a favouritism towards females and that is causing some resentment in the male population.52

I reckon they’ll definitely have to drop the standards for a female coming through.53

[Women are] the favourite child at the moment... All the focus is on us and [men] are asking the question why?54

We get told that we’re not going to be promoted purely as a result of gender, but we’ve been in [this Service] long enough to know how the system works.55

Women have got ultimate power and they pretty much know it.56

They’re trying to bring it back up to an equal playing field but then they’ve...pretty much just overshot the mark in some areas in some ways.57

I think there’s a greater buy-in from leadership. On the other side of a coin, I can see that there is a little resistance in the middle management areas... Cynicism probably is the best word to use.58

The idea of gender targets often evoked a strong reaction:

Personally I think the idea of gender targets specifically in the military is ridiculous... The person who’s supposed to be standing on the bridge is supposed to be there as a result of merit and ability. Quite frankly...we don’t give a rat’s arse what gender they are.59

We’ve got females in our category who have been in but haven’t reached the seniority and they’ve been promoted... You’ve got males that have...got more experience, but they’re not getting it. We’re just pushing the females through.60

Some women in particular did not support some of the recommendations:

As a female I believe that we’re degrading our expertise...to meet a quota.61

I hate to say there are some of my own gender...that utilise those weaknesses and those uncertainties and play the female card...Which doesn’t help for those that 100% want to be here and do the right thing.62

The organisational culture has female officers running around saying, ‘I was promoted before Broderick so my promotion is valid’. If you’ve got female officers saying that, what chance do we have?63

It’s a two-edged sword... These reviews are trying to help. I’m sure they do and they bring ideas into the table, but by the same token you will get flak just for trying to help women in the [Service].64

I’m being promoted next year and comment was made to me... ‘Aren’t you lucky you got promoted before Broderick came’. [And I replied] ‘I know what you’re angling at by making that comment. And no, I got promoted on my merit’. That’s what everyone is thinking now and that is so unfair.65

...you get tarred with the Broderick brush - you only got something because you’re a chick.66

People are getting kept in their positions because they don’t want to be seen to dismiss someone because they’re female.67

Communicating change

Given the cultural tensions reflected above, the importance of accurate, timely and targeted messaging and communication cannot be overstated. All Services indicated that communication and filtering change through to all levels of the organisation was a major challenge.

Few people with whom the Audit spoke were aware that the ADF Review’s recommendations were underpinned by the aim of building sustainable Defence capability and operational effectiveness. Others were not aware that the recommendations were largely gender neutral and were designed to benefit the ADF as a whole. However one officer stated:

It’s about making the workplace fairer and...moving along with the times, making it more family [friendly]...and for people to want to come and stay.68

The following statements are typical of the feedback the Audit received on the messaging about change and cultural reform:

Canberra is very good at producing policy, but then actually pushing it down to the lowest levels is something that we don’t do well.69

[My Service’s] sales pitch since this has begun appears very shallow...It feels like in our organisation, ‘send an email, mate, she’ll be right’. That’s what it feels like.70

I don’t even know that we’ve even talked about a communication strategy for the COSC outcomes.71

I think the problem for me and I’m not sure whether anyone else feels the same is [cultural reform] has not been explained to us well at all...even after sitting there for two hours, with someone rabbiting on, we still have no idea what it’s about, what they’re actually trying to achieve.72

I think we have some resistance out there [from people] in key positions who are not necessarily pro the strategic direction, who therefore filter it and apply their own views or messaging.73

Deep in that Broderick Review somewhere there was a very small mention made of suggested targets for women... Before we’d even given the presentation here, I had 300 trainees going through the roof: ‘Oh, so we’re not going to be merit based promoted now?’ Now, that was never the intention, but poorly sold, poorly communicated, and we’ll just find the one little black thing in there we don’t like.74

Once you talk them through the rationale, the logic base, it’s amazing how the heat goes out very quickly.75

They’re going to have to spend money to communicate, do road shows to all the bases to put things into context. That will stop all the rumours. There are so many rumours out there, it’s not funny.76

There continues to be a divide between those who are motivated, informed and understand the need for change and others less convinced and informed who will yet have to carry the burden of military action. The latter group, which includes many members who occupy positions in the mid ranks, who by their positions are cultural ambassadors, need to be more deeply engaged in the reform process. Combatting some of the prevailing myths and gender stereotypes will ensure that remedies that emerge at the mid-level are adopted to significantly improve the sustainability of reform.

Unacceptable behaviour

The administration of the revised UB Survey in late 2013 provided the Audit, and the ADF, with rich data on unacceptable behaviour in the current Defence environment.

As 2013 was the first year the redesigned Survey was administered Defence wide, comparisons to previous years was not possible. However, in the future, subsequent administrations of the Survey will provide insights into the progress of cultural change.

Some of the key survey findings are provided here in order to describe the context in which the cultural reform program is being implemented.

‘Unacceptable behaviour’ for the purpose of the Survey comprises 13 different types of behaviours.77 The Survey found that when looking at each of the 13 categories of unacceptable behaviour individually, prevalence was higher for females than males across all categories.78 In particular, there was a greater incidence of female respondents reporting experiences of crude behaviour79 and unwanted sexual attention.80

The Survey found that the majority of respondents who reported experiencing unacceptable behaviour did not seek advice or assistance, nor did they make a formal report or complaint.81 Alarmingly, respondents were even less likely to report or seek assistance in relation to unacceptable behaviours if it related to sexual misconduct or sexual offences.82

Overall, respondents’ perceptions of tolerance of unacceptable behaviour were largely positive, with over 80% of respondents reporting that their leadership had clearly indicated unacceptable behaviour would not be tolerated in the workplace.83 This strong perception of a zero tolerance environment is hard to reconcile, however, with actual reporting rates. Certainly, the Survey found that female respondents, trainee respondents and respondents who had experienced unacceptable behaviours were ‘less likely to have a positive view on the efforts put into stopping unacceptable behaviours and had a more negative view of the formal reporting process’.84

In fact, the Survey found that approximately three quarters of respondents who experienced unacceptable behaviour of a sexual nature did not make a complaint or a report about their experience.85 The most common reasons respondents would not make a complaint were:

  • ‘It would not change things’
  • ‘I took care of the problem myself’
  • ‘I didn’t think it was serious enough’
  • ‘It was easier to just keep quiet’.86

While respondents were most likely to seek assistance from or make a report to their Chain of Command / Supervisor,87 the Survey found that respondents who had done so were least satisfied with this process.88

The Survey was administered shortly after the launch of the SeMPRO and, as such, the Survey cannot provide an accurate picture of the levels of awareness or impact of this service. DSPR provided in its Report that ‘(t)he effect of SeMPRO’s launch on reporting behaviour will be clear following subsequent administrations of the Whole of Defence Unacceptable Behaviour Survey’.89

Conclusion

The ADF Senior Leadership is to be commended for establishing the ODU to coordinate the implementation of the ADF Review’s recommendations within each of the Services. The Audit recognises that bringing together the three Services to implement a universal recommendation can be a challenge and congratulates the ODU on its efforts in this regard.

The Audit also welcomes the Services’ efforts to implement the recommendations and embed them into strong existing reform processes. On occasion, the Audit identified genuine challenges to full and proper implementation – challenges that, if not addressed, will limit the success of the reform agenda. Also clear from the recent UB survey is the fact that much needs to be done to reduce the incidence of unacceptable behaviour, to encourage reporting and to improve members’ experiences of their workplaces.

Common themes emerge in terms of meaningful organisational change and ensuring that reform is sustainable. These include:

  • Clear and consistent leadership
  • Relevant, timely and regular organisational communication which uses all available channels, including opportunities for engagement and discussion
  • Transparency and accountability
  • The collection and use of reliable data to inform action and strategic decision making.

In order to be sustainable, strategies to achieve cultural reform require significant planning, clear support through organisational policy, communication and education strategies, close monitoring and well defined accountability. In seeking evidence of implementation, the Audit examined all these factors. The result of this analysis is contained in the following sections of this Report.

________________________________________________________________

Chapter 3: Endnotes

  1. Chief of Defence Force, GEN D Hurley, letter to the Sex Discrimination Commissioner, 24 October, 2012.
  2. For example, reviewing and redesigning ‘the custom and practice of selecting the most senior strategic leadership positions in the ADF from combat corps’ (Recommendation 5).
  3. For example, workforce management systems (Recommendation 15), monitoring flexible work arrangements (Recommendation 14).
  4. For example, publishing the ‘Women in the ADF’ Report (Recommendation 3).
  5. Interview 112.
  6. Meeting 6.
  7. Meeting 6.
  8. Chief of Navy.
  9. Meeting 9.
  10. Meeting 9.
  11. Meeting 8.
  12. Meeting 8.
  13. Interview 112.
  14. Chief of Army, Army Officer Enhanced Career Management (ECM) model – Implementation, CA Directive 05/13, AB11730022, 19 December 2012 at [1].
  15. Chief of Army’s Senior Advisory Committee, Chief of Army’s Senior Advisory Committee Submission: Enhanced Career Management – Army (Soldiers), June 2013, p 35.
  16. Meeting 8.
  17. Meeting 8.
  18. Enhanced career management.
  19. Flexible work arrangements.
  20. Meeting 16.
  21. Meeting 4.
  22. For example, the Graduate Pilots Scheme.
  23. Meeting 4.
  24. Meeting 5.
  25. Meeting 5.
  26. Meeting 9.
  27. Meeting 6.
  28. Meeting 6.
  29. Meeting 6.
  30. Meeting 8.
  31. Interview 127.
  32. Interview 112.
  33. Meeting 4.
  34. Meeting 5.
  35. Focus group 7.
  36. Focus group 8.
  37. Focus group 3.
  38. Focus group 3.
  39. Focus group 5.
  40. Focus group 1.
  41. Focus group 2.
  42. Focus group 3.
  43. Focus group 3.
  44. Meeting 9.
  45. Focus group 15.
  46. Focus group 10.
  47. Focus group 4.
  48. Interview 107.
  49. Interview 4.
  50. Interview 52.
  51. Focus group 3.
  52. Focus group 1.
  53. Focus group 14.
  54. Focus group 14.
  55. Interview 70.
  56. Focus group 1.
  57. Focus group 1.
  58. Focus Group 2.
  59. Focus Group 2.
  60. Interview 112.
  61. Focus Group 3.
  62. Focus Group 2.
  63. Focus Group 2.
  64. Focus Group 2.
  65. Interview 4.
  66. Interview 112.
  67. Focus Group 2.
  68. Meeting 9.
  69. Focus Group 10.
  70. Meeting 9.
  71. Focus Group 2.
  72. Meeting 5.
  73. Focus Group 2.
  74. Work-related harassment; person-related harassment; physical-related harassment; bullying; discrimination; abuse of power; crude behaviour; unwanted sexual attention; sexual coercion; acts of indecency; sexual assault (minor); sexual assault (major); and other acts/harassment.
  75. The Report found that 55% of female respondents (n = 845) and 37% of male respondents (n = 1522) experienced some form of unacceptable behaviour, (Directorate of Strategic People Research, Whole of Defence 2013 Unacceptable Behaviour Survey Report, DSPR Report No. 11/2013, Department of Defence, December 2013, p 3).
  76. Women were more likely to report experiencing crude behaviour (10%) than men (4%) (Directorate of Strategic People Research, Whole of Defence 2013 Unacceptable Behaviour Survey Report, DSPR Report No. 11/2013, Department of Defence, December 2013, p 23).
  77. Women were more likely to report experiencing unwanted sexual attention (8%) than men (1%) (Directorate of Strategic People Research, Whole of Defence 2013 Unacceptable Behaviour Survey Report, DSPR Report No. 11/2013, Department of Defence, December 2013, p 23).
  78. Directorate of Strategic People Research, Whole of Defence 2013 Unacceptable Behaviour Survey Report, DSPR Report No. 11/2013, Department of Defence, December 2013, p 4.
  79. For bullying, physical-related harassment, work-related harassment and person-related harassment, between 36-42% of respondents reported or made a complaint. Conversely, 23% to 30% of respondents reported or made a complaint about sexual coercion, acts of indecency, sexual assault (minor) and sexual assault (major) (Directorate of Strategic People Research, Whole of Defence 2013 Unacceptable Behaviour Survey Report, DSPR Report No. 11/2013, Department of Defence, December 2013, p 173).
  80. Directorate of Strategic People Research, Whole of Defence 2013 Unacceptable Behaviour Survey Report, DSPR Report No. 11/2013, Department of Defence, December 2013, p 174.
  81. Directorate of Strategic People Research, Whole of Defence 2013 Unacceptable Behaviour Survey Report, DSPR Report No. 11/2013, Department of Defence, December 2013, p 5.
  82. Crude behaviour (82%); unwanted sexual attention (83%); sexual coercion (77%); acts of indecency (76%); sexual assault (minor) (77%); and sexual assault (major) (70%) did not make a complaint or report (Directorate of Strategic People Research, Whole of Defence 2013 Unacceptable Behaviour Survey Report, DSPR Report No. 11/2013, Department of Defence, December 2013, p 75).
  83. Directorate of Strategic People Research, Whole of Defence 2013 Unacceptable Behaviour Survey Report, DSPR Report No. 11/2013, Department of Defence, December 2013, p 4.
  84. The Report found 78% of respondents were most likely to seek advice or assistance from their Chain of Command / Supervisor, followed by ‘friends or family’ (51%) (Directorate of Strategic People Research, Whole of Defence 2013 Unacceptable Behaviour Survey Report, DSPR Report No. 11/2013, Department of Defence, December 2013, p 70, Figure 68). Respondents were most likely to formally report or make a complaint to their Chain of Command / Supervisor (87%), followed by ‘Military support service’ (15%) (Directorate of Strategic People Research, Whole of Defence 2013 Unacceptable Behaviour Survey Report, DSPR Report No. 11/2013, Department of Defence, December 2013, p 76, Figure 72).
  85. The Survey Report provided male and female respondents’ evaluations of the complaint process by unacceptable behaviour categories, and as such it is not possible to provide a total proportion (Directorate of Strategic People Research, Whole of Defence 2013 Unacceptable Behaviour Survey Report, DSPR Report No. 11/2013, Department of Defence, December 2013, pp 105-109, Figures 109-116).
  86. Directorate of Strategic People Research, Whole of Defence 2013 Unacceptable Behaviour Survey Report, DSPR Report No. 11/2013, Department of Defence, December 2013, p 6.