Social Justice Report 2003
Chapter two: Reconciliation and government accountability
In the Social Justice Report 1999, my first report as Social Justice Commissioner, I identified four key themes and challenges that existed in the approach of the federal government to Indigenous policy making at the time. These were moving beyond welfare dependency, accountability, participation and reconciliation.[1] Since the release of that report approximately four years ago, the key themes and challenges facing the government have remained relatively constant. The fundamentals of the government's approach to Indigenous affairs have not changed substantially, with only subtle refinements and a locking down of their approach across all program and policy areas and at the inter-governmental level. These refinements have taken place through the consistent use of coded language such as 'practical reconciliation', 'mutual obligation', 'agreement making' and 'partnerships', and more recently 'shared responsibility'.[2]
To the phrase 'moving beyond welfare dependency' we could now add 'sustainable development', 'capacity building' and 'mutual obligation'. For 'accountability' we could add 'governance reform', 'shared responsibility', 'whole of government approach' and 'changing the way we do business with Indigenous communities'. For 'participation' we could add 'self-management', 'agreement making' and 'partnerships'. For 'reconciliation' we can directly substitute 'practical reconciliation' and divide issues into so-called real and symbolic ones.
The next two chapters examine current progress in addressing a range of issues in relation to these four themes. They consider the adequacy of the structures and processes that have been put into place at the national level to progress programs and services to Indigenous peoples; and ultimately, based on this analysis, identify an agenda for change with recommendations to improve Indigenous policy and program design. This chapter focuses on developments relating to reconciliation and mechanisms for government accountability. Chapter 3 then focuses on the participation (and accountability) of Indigenous organisations and peoples in government activity and developments relating to the objective of moving Indigenous peoples beyond welfare dependency. The subject matter of the two chapters is inter-related and together they constitute my annual progress report on reconciliation.
Reconciliation
In 2003, there have been three main sets of developments in relation to the government's approach to reconciliation. First, there has been continuity in the implementation of programmes and in the policy direction of the federal government towards reconciliation. The primary focus of activity during the year has been on advancing initiatives that were announced or committed to in either 2002 or previous years (such as through the Council of Australian Governments' Communiques on Reconciliation in 2000 and 2002).
There has been a high level of commitment by the federal government to continuing to implement programmes in accordance with its 'practical reconciliation' agenda. There have been significant developments in implementing the commitments of the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) to conduct a number of whole-of-government community trials across Australia and to establishing an annual reporting framework on Indigenous disadvantage. There has also been an increased focus on debilitating problems affecting Indigenous communities such as family violence, with the convening of a national summit by the Prime Minister and the announcement of new funding for programs to address it (these were described as a 'down-payment' and are expected to be backed up with further funding in the 2004 Budget).
Second, and concurrent to this continuation of the existing approach, has been public debate about the adequacy of accountability mechanisms for government service delivery to Indigenous peoples and for reconciliation. Specifically in relation to reconciliation, this debate has taken place through the Senate Legal and Constitutional References Committee's inquiry into national progress towards reconciliation and through the commencement of the second reading debate in the Senate on the Reconciliation Bill 2001 (which seeks to introduce monitoring and evaluation processes for reconciliation, in accordance with the recommendations of the final report of the Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation). Through both of these processes the government has revealed that it considers it unnecessary to introduce formal legislative monitoring mechanisms for progress towards reconciliation at the national level.
In more general terms, this debate has taken place through the review of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC). The review process saw a clear expression of dissatisfaction with progress in addressing the disadvantage experienced by Indigenous peoples and in government service delivery to Indigenous peoples, as well as at the perceived failure of ATSIC to effectively represent Indigenous peoples. The findings and recommendations of this review are discussed in detail in the next chapter. Of note here, however, is that while the review was intended to review mechanisms for service delivery to Indigenous peoples (i.e., not to be solely focused on ATSIC) its ultimate focus from an accountability perspective was on the role of ATSIC. It provided only limited focus on accountability mechanisms and the responsibilities of the rest of government.
The third main set of developments in relation to the government's approach to reconciliation has been that the limits of practical reconciliation were exposed through a number of processes and events during the year. These included the Senate Legal and Constitutional References Committee's inquiry into national progress towards reconciliation, the release of data from and analysis of the 2001 Census, the release of the first national report on overcoming Indigenous disadvantage by the Steering Committee for the Review of Government Service Provision, and the public debates about service delivery to Indigenous peoples that took place as part of the ATSIC Review.
The Social Justice Report 2002 had noted that the dominant feature of the government's approach to reconciliation and Indigenous affairs the previous year was the refinement and bedding down of its 'practical reconciliation' approach.[3] The report expressed the concern that 'by continually reinforcing that its commitment is to addressing key issues of Indigenous disadvantage and nothing else' the government had 'developed a tunnel vision that renders it incapable of seeing anything that falls outside the boundaries that it has unilaterally, and artificially, established for relations with Indigenous peoples'[4] . It also expressed the concern that as a consequence of this, the limited processes that existed for accountability were not directed to those issues with which the government did not agree or which fell outside of its limited approach.
In the remainder of this chapter, I examine key developments relating to reconciliation at the national level during 2003. The focus of this progress report is on the adequacy of processes for accountability of the government for reconciliation, particularly as they relate to 'practical' reconciliation.
National progress towards reconciliation in 2003 - Key developments
This section considers developments over the past year relating to reconciliation under the following headings:
- A 'highly controlled' commitment to 'practical' reconciliation;
- Progress in addressing Indigenous disadvantage; and
- Implementing the commitments of the Council of Australian Governments.
a) A 'highly controlled' commitment to 'practical' reconciliation
On 27 November 2003, the Senate began the second reading debate on the Reconciliation Bill 2001. The Bill was identical to that included in the final report of the Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation and which the Council had recommended should be passed by the Parliament in order to provide a legislative framework to deal with the unfinished business of reconciliation. The Bill was first introduced by Senator Ridgeway on 5 April 2001, with debate on the Bill adjourned that same day. It has taken more than two and a half years for the Bill to be reconsidered and reach the second reading stage in the Senate.[5]
As Senator Ridgeway noted in his second reading speech, the Bill provided 'an opportunity to debate essentially what the Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation recommended'.[6] It was the first extensive debate to take place directly on reconciliation in the Senate chamber since the Council released its report in December 2000 (notwithstanding the debates that took place through the parliamentary committee system with the Senate Legal and Constitutional References Committee's inquiry into reconciliation and estimates processes).
The debate on the Bill was acrimonious. The opposition parties stated that 'there has been a clear lack of responsibility on the part of the government which ...seems to be intent on destroying the spirit of what reconciliation is about by putting forward a policy of practical reconciliation';[7] that reconciliation 'is clearly an issue that has fallen off the Howard government's agenda';[8] and that the government has a 'record of not performing when it comes to reconciliation in this country'. [9]
Government Senators responded angrily to these comments. One government minister interjected that criticisms of the government's performance were 'sanctimonious rubbish' and that 'you could be a bit gracious and comment on some of the positive things'.[10] Another member of the government accused a fellow Senator of being 'one of the phoney people ... There is a lot of phoniness in this debate. People come in here and make symbolic speeches and then go home and forget about it. You want to live it'.[11]
A striking feature of the debate is the deeply impassioned nature of the speeches made by members of the government and their outrage at the suggestion that the government is not committed to reconciliation. Senator Ferris put the position of the government as follows:
If one were to listen to the contribution of (the Opposition) ... one would believe that reconciliation is dead in this country. Nothing could be further from the truth. Reconciliation between Indigenous Australians and the wider community is an objective that the federal government is fully committed to, and all of us on this side of the chamber are fully committed to. The Australian government strongly reaffirms its support for reconciliation, as expressed in the historic motion of reconciliation that was passed by both houses of the federal parliament on 26 August 1999 ... [T]his motion confirmed a whole-hearted commitment to reconciliation as an important national priority for all Australians.'[12]
There is a subtle but important factor illustrated by comments such as these that must be acknowledged about the government's approach to reconciliation. Members of the government are committed to achieving reconciliation. Analyses of how the government is performing on reconciliation, such as this report, do not seek to present the government's position as if it were opposed to achieving reconciliation. Instead, the crucial issue is the nature of the commitments made by the government and whether they are sufficient (or in other words, do they progress reconciliation or instead impede progress, either through commission or omission?).
Senator Ferris explained what the government means by reconciliation in the debate on the Reconciliation Bill as follows:
Of course, the concept of reconciliation is one that means different things to different people ... But there is one common thread to people's view of reconciliation in this country and that is that all Australians are entitled to equal life chances, to equality of opportunity, and that true reconciliation will not exist until Indigenous disadvantage has been eliminated. The very sad truth is that Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people in Australia still remain the most disadvantaged group in our society ... despite the best efforts of hundreds, perhaps thousands of individuals in this country over many years ...
The federal government believes that the best way it can act to achieve reconciliation is through the provision of practical and effective measures that address the legacy of profound economic and social disadvantage that are experienced by many Indigenous Australians, particularly in those crucial areas of health, education, housing and employment. Practical measures in these key areas have a positive effect on the everyday lives of Indigenous Australians.'[13]
I have extensively criticised this approach to reconciliation in the Social Justice Reports for 2000-2002.'[14] At core, concerns about the government's approach to reconciliation focus on the limited scope of the commitments that they make; the lack of a process for dealing with issues that fall outside the parameters set by the government; the derisive and somewhat arbitrary way that the government discards issues which it does not agree with as 'symbolic' and then simply ignores them; and the lack of a rigorous monitoring framework to hold the government accountable for its commitments and for any lack of progress in areas which it has chosen to ignore.
The government's approach to reconciliation is also malleable. In 2003, for example, the design and wording for a memorial on the stolen generations for inclusion at Reconciliation Place in Canberra was agreed between the government and the National Sorry Day Committee.'[15] While there is a clear preference for 'practical' measures of assistance rather than 'symbolic' measures, the government's approach does involve and recognise the importance of such symbolic measures. It is often not clear, however, why particular issues are acceptable and fall within the parameters of practical reconciliation while others do not.
These concerns about the government's approach do not, however, suggest that there is an absence of a commitment to reconciliation. Instead they identify that this commitment is to a particular type of reconciliation around which the boundaries are tightly proscribed by the government.'[16]
Jackie Huggins has effectively addressed the issue of the nature of the government's commitment to reconciliation as follows:
There is little doubt that the current Government in Canberra would like to make an impact in Indigenous affairs, though its vision of a reconciled Australia would be very different to that of many of us ... Although, there are strong indications that Ministers across a number of Commonwealth portfolios are becoming more open to looking at creative solutions to persistent problems.
But the bottom line for this Prime Minister and his governmental has always been the compartmentalising of reconciliation and Indigenous affairs into so-called practical and symbolic measures, the latter having been rejected as unacceptable to mainstream Australia ...
In this highly controlled context ... it is true to say that many in the community have been left with the impression that the reconciliation agenda in Australia has run into the sand. Others have been basking in the mistaken belief that reconciliation has already arrived. The truth is somewhere in between ...'[17]
The continuity over several years of this 'highly controlled' approach of the government towards reconciliation has inevitably seen policy debates shift towards the government's framework. This was increasingly the case in 2003. Progressively each year has seen less focus on issues that do not fall within the government's approach, such as an apology, the plight of the stolen generations, the treaty debate and native title. As Reconciliation Australia notes, these issues 'have not gone away however those involved in reconciliation have chosen to engage with the government where constructive progress can be made'.'[18] This reflects political reality rather than an embracing or endorsement of the government's position. As Jackie Huggins has noted:
Those of us involved in reconciliation and Indigenous affairs have had to make a choice about whether to keep beating our heads against a wall on ... issues (of unfinished business) ... or whether we look to what can be achieved in the political context in which we find ourselves, and try to move forward. And that is the choice we have made. We have a responsibility to keep the rest of the agenda alive but we also have a duty to engage and to continue to progress things that can be progressed.'[19]
Similarly, processes for sustaining and monitoring progress towards reconciliation are increasingly focused on 'practical' reconciliation. In 2003, the Senate Legal and Constitutional References Committee concluded its inquiry into national progress towards reconciliation and made several recommendations to implement a broader approach to reconciliation which incorporates all aspects of reconciliation that were identified by the Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation'[20] A similarly based debate also commenced in the Senate on the Reconciliation Bill 2001. The government has indicated that it does not consider the mechanisms in either of these processes as necessary, on the basis that it already has mechanisms in place for progressing practical reconciliation. Consequently, it is unlikely that there will be mechanisms introduced which will enable issues that do not fit exactly within the government's framework to be advanced.
b) Progress in addressing Indigenous disadvantage
The government has emphasised time and again that the key focus of reconciliation should be on practical and effective measures that address the legacy of profound economic and social disadvantage that is experienced by many Indigenous Australians. As quoted above, the government's position is that 'true reconciliation will not exist until Indigenous disadvantage has been eliminated'.
Newly released data in 2003 provided the opportunity to establish whether we are progressing towards this ultimate goal of the government's reconciliation agenda and to determine whether the pace of such progress is adequate.
The Social Justice Reports for 2000 through to 2002 raised a number of challenges for the government in order to determine whether they are meeting their commitment to address the social and economic inequality experienced by Indigenous Australians. These challenges include the establishment of benchmarks and targets which commit to a rate of progress in improving the socio-economic conditions of Indigenous peoples and improved data collection to enable such progress to be more accurately measured. There have been some developments over the past year relating to data collection and reporting, such as the establishment of the national reporting framework on key indicators of Indigenous disadvantage (which is discussed more fully in the next section of this chapter).
However, the long-standing commitment of governments to develop benchmarks and action plans for key areas of Indigenous disadvantage through the various inter-governmental ministerial councils remains largely unfulfilled. Accordingly, it is not possible to determine whether government efforts to address Indigenous disadvantage have progressed at a rate that meets the expectations (and targets) of governments and Indigenous peoples. There are no publicly reported goals setting out what is an acceptable rate of improvement against which we can determine whether current progress is adequate and fully matches the potential of available resources and programs. This is a critical issue of lack of accountability of government and I return to it later in this chapter.
Despite the lack of publicly reported benchmarks and action plans, we can still evaluate progress in addressing Indigenous disadvantage from the following three perspectives.
First, we can see whether there have been improvements in the circumstances of Indigenous peoples on a number of key indicators over the past five and ten years. Generally, due to difficulties in comparing data over time periods the Australian Bureau of Statistics recommends that such comparisons be made on the basis of changes in percentages over time rather than raw figures.[21]
Second, we can see whether there have been improvements in the situation of Indigenous peoples compared to non-Indigenous people over the past five and ten years. In other words, given the prime goal of the government of eliminating the inequality in socio-economic conditions experienced by Indigenous peoples, is there relative improvement in the situation of Indigenous peoples compared to the rest of Australian society? If the government's approach is working then we can reasonably expect a continual closing of the gap between the two groups.
Third, we can make comparisons between the situation of Indigenous peoples in Australia and Indigenous peoples in other similar countries, as well as to people in less developed countries. By doing so we can establish whether we are progressing at a rate comparable to that in other countries or whether we are lagging behind in the improvements being achieved.
The government's view is that it is making progress in addressing Indigenous disadvantage. In October 2003 the Minister for Indigenous Affairs stated:
The wellbeing of Indigenous people is improving under this Government. Record amounts of money and effort are now being spent on trying to solve the problem of Indigenous disadvantage. Since coming to Government, real steps forward have been made. Between the 1996 and 2001 censuses, many indicators of Indigenous disadvantage show real improvement. For example:
- Indigenous unemployment rate fell from 22.7 per cent to 20.0 per cent, and there were an additional 18,000 Indigenous people in employment
- the proportion of Indigenous people employed in the private sector rose from 46.3 per cent to 48.5 per cent
- the proportion of Indigenous adults who had left school before their 15th birthday fell from 44.2 per cent to 33.4 per cent, and
- the proportion of Indigenous adults with post school qualifications rose from 23.6 per cent to 27.9 per cent
- the proportion of Indigenous children who stayed on at school through to Year 12 increased from 29.2 per cent in 1996 to 38 per cent in 2002
- there were 5566 Indigenous students enrolled in a bachelor's level degree or higher degree course in 2002, 24.3 per cent more students than were enrolled in 1996
- there were 59 763 Indigenous people who undertook post-secondary vocational and educational training in 2002, nearly twice the number of Indigenous students registered for training in 1996.
While things are getting better, I am not saying everything is good or that we can sit back and be complacent. This Government will remain committed to building an Australia where Indigenous people enjoy the same standards of living as other Australians while maintaining their unique cultural identities.[22]
In the debate on the Reconciliation Bill 2001 in November 2003, Senator Ferris also stated the government's position as follows:
Despite (the opposition's) claims of economic failure and government policy failure, let us have a look at some of the improvements that have taken place in Indigenous affairs since this government came to office in 1996.
In terms of education, from 1996 to 2002 the proportion of Indigenous children who stayed on at school increased from a very poor 29.2 per cent to 38 per cent. I know that 38 per cent is still very low, but an improvement of 10 per cent since this government came to office is very significant. More importantly, the number of Indigenous students registered for post-secondary vocational and educational training has nearly doubled from 1996 to 2002 ... to a total of 59,763... if that is failure of government policy, one can only imagine what would be determined to be successful. The number of young Indigenous Australians who are undertaking post-secondary training has almost doubled. Over the same period of time, there was a 32 per cent increase in the number of Indigenous men and women involved in bachelor-level degree courses or higher degree courses in Australian universities. I know that those figures are still low, but we are starting to build a base of economic advantage through higher education and training for young Indigenous men and women ...
In terms of unemployment, the unemployment rate for Indigenous people actually fell from 22.7 per cent to 20 per cent between the 1996 census and the 2001 census. Again, I am the first to say that we have a long way to go before we can honestly in this place say that there is equality of opportunity for jobs for young Indigenous people. However, between 1996 and 2001 the number of Indigenous people in employment increased from 82,346 to 100,348, an increase of 22 per cent...
In terms of health, the Australian government has substantially increased its spending on Indigenous-specific health programs. Such spending is now at record levels. So much for failure ... Our total spending on specific Indigenous health services this year will rise to more than $258 million-more than has ever been spent before. Again I say that we know this does not indicate we are going to solve this problem, but it is a significant first step. This is a real increase of nearly 90 per cent since this government took office in 1996... how can you say that this is a failure of government policy? We have increased real spending on Indigenous-specific health by more than 90 per cent since 1996. In the last five years, 46 remote communities have gained access to primary health care for the very first time. Indigenous infant and perinatal death rates have fallen by a third over the last decade...
Commonwealth spending on Indigenous programs has increased by one-third in real terms since 1996 and is now at record levels. In 2003-04, the Commonwealth government will spend $2.7 billion on Aboriginal affairs, on Aboriginal policies-more than has ever been spent by any government in this nation's history. There is still much that we can do and still much that state governments can do to help with the practical measures that improve the day-to-day lives of Indigenous Australians, but, as we all know, many of those problems will not be solved with money. You cannot continue to just throw money at the issue without looking at some of the other measures ...
This government is committed to seeing that every policy initiative is carried out to reconcile Indigenous Australians and the broader community. Improvements are being made, and the statistics that I gave to this chamber earlier indicate that. We are making steps forward. There is a long way to go.[23]
These statements have been reproduced here at length to ensure that I have authentically represented the government's position on the rate of progress in addressing Indigenous disadvantage.
There are a number of notable features about these statements. First, the government's position on reconciliation clearly states that the ultimate test of success is whether the inequality experienced by Indigenous peoples compared to non-Indigenous people is eliminated. Despite this, in its claims to success above there is not a single reference to progress in reducing the gaps that exist between Indigenous and non-Indigenous Australians.
The only reference by the Minister to this inequality gap can be found in a press release dated 12 November 2003, which comments on the release of the first national report on national indicators for overcoming Indigenous disadvantage.[24] The Minister stated: 'While there has been improvements in many key indicators, greater rates of improvement for non-Indigenous people, tend to mask the gains that have been made.' [25]
In my progress report on reconciliation in the Social Justice Report 2002, I noted a tendency of the government to misrepresent progress towards reconciliation through the way that it presents statistics.[26] This statement by the Minister is a further example of this. Greater rates of improvement in key indicators for non-Indigenous Australians do not 'mask the gains that have been made' for Indigenous people. Instead, they indicate that the gains made have not been sufficient to reduce the level of inequality or that improvements for Indigenous peoples are not keeping pace with the rest of society. There is a substantial difference between presenting information in this way and the way that it has been presented by the government.
Second, there are significant omissions in the indicators that the government presents as demonstrating 'real improvement'. This is most obvious in relation to indicators of health status, where the only achievement listed above is that the government has 'substantially increased its spending on Indigenous-specific health programs to record levels'. There are also no indicators cited relating to contact with criminal justice processes or care and protection systems, for example.
At no stage does the government state that there are areas where the situation is not improving. The Minister's statement above, for example, is unequivocal that 'the wellbeing of Indigenous people is improving under this Government'. The only qualification, that there is still a way to go, also does not admit lack of progress in key areas: 'While things are getting better, I am not saying everything is good or that we can sit back and be complacent'. It is hardly a frank assessment of the actual situation.
Third, some of the measures of success are presented purely as raw numbers and as percentages of increases in raw numbers (for example, 5566 Indigenous students enrolled in a bachelor's level degree or higher degree course in 2002, 24.3 per cent more students than in 1996). As noted above, the ABS cautions against such presentation of statistics as they do not account for changes in the accuracy of data collection or increased rates of identification of people as Indigenous. This can result in the presentation of the level of progress being misleading. Indeed, as discussed shortly, there are significant concerns being expressed about poor rates of achievement by the government in education over the past five years, particularly in relation to higher education.
Taking these factors into account, and examining the statistics on Indigenous well-being from the different perspectives listed above (namely, on the basis of absolute change in the situation of Indigenous peoples; relative change compared to the non-Indigenous population; and where available, international comparisons), it can be seen that the claim of the government that 'the wellbeing of Indigenous people is improving under this Government' cannot be verified across many core areas of practical reconciliation. There are undoubtedly some areas where improvements are being realised. Overall, however, there is no consistent forward trend in improving the well-being of Indigenous peoples, and particularly no forward trend towards a reduction in the disparity between Indigenous and non-Indigenous Australians.
Appendix one of this report provides a statistical profile of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander population. It includes information on the current status of Indigenous peoples on key measures of socio-economic well-being including health status, employment, income, education, housing, and contact with criminal justice and care and protection systems. The main findings in the Appendix in terms of progress in addressing Indigenous disadvantage across these areas are summarised below.
Progress in addressing Indigenous disadvantageIncome
Employment
Education
Housing
Contact with criminal justice system
Contact with care and protection system
|
Of particular concern is the lack of achievement in relation to improving the health status of Indigenous Australians. Appendix One illustrates the following.
Progress in addressing Indigenous disadvantage - Health statusLife Expectancy
Median death age
Infant health
|
These figures indicate that there are clear disparities between Indigenous and non-Indigenous people, and limited progress in reducing these disparities across many key areas of socio-economic status.
These findings are confirmed by significant research published by the Centre for Aboriginal Economic Policy Research (CAEPR) in late 2003. CAEPR released analysis by Professor Jon Altman and Dr Boyd Hunter of 2001 Census data which sought to monitor progress towards reconciliation by measuring absolute and relative changes in Indigenous peoples' labour force status, income, housing, education and health over the period 1991-2001.
As the authors of the study noted, for the first time ever there was a relatively close correlation between the conduct of the five-yearly national census and political cycles:
The change in government shortly before the 1996 Census means that the 1996 data reflect the Labor legacy rather than the effect of early policy initiatives of the new government. While arguably there are various types of policy lags ... the second inter-censal period (1996-2001) can be readily interpreted as the policy domain (and legacy) of the Howard government. [27]
The research aimed to answer the following question:
How do the outcomes in the period 1991-1996, represented by the Federal government and many conservative commentators as a period when symbolic reconciliation was too dominant, compare with those in the period 1996-2001 when a change in government saw greater policy focus on practical reconciliation? [28]
The research concluded that in the period 1996-2001, labour force status for Indigenous people worsened relative to the rest of the population when measured by labour force participation rates, unemployment rates, the employment to population ratio, and rate of full time employment. There was, however, a slight improvement in employment of Indigenous people in the private sector. The authors expressed concern about this general worsening in Indigenous labour force status as it moved 'against the trend for the rest of the population'.[29] They noted:
Unemployment rates fell by less for the Indigenous population than for other Australians, despite rapid economic growth over the five year period and growth in numbers participating in the CDEP scheme. There is little evidence of trickle down improving Indigenous economic participation and reducing the significance of non-employment (welfare) income. Given that low skilled workers are often the first to lose work in an economic downturn, the lack of improvement is worrying, especially if there is any significant deterioration in the Australian and international economies in the near future. [30]
In terms of income, the research noted a continued relative decline in income for Indigenous individuals, but a slight improvement in the relativity in median family income between Indigenous and non-Indigenous families. [31] In terms of housing, the research also noted marginal improvements in the relativity between Indigenous and non-Indigenous people for both home ownership rates and household size.
The research expressed significant concern about the lack of improvement in relation to both health and education. The authors expressed concern at the 'substantial inertia in Indigenous health'[32] as indicated in the lack of improvement in relativities relating to life expectancy and proportion of the population aged over 55 years. In relation to education, the research notes a slight reduction in the disparity in the proportion of adults who have never gone to school, but a worsening in the comparative rate of early school leavers. There was a slight improvement in the proportion of Indigenous adults with post-school qualifications, but a significant decline in the comparative rate of Indigenous youth currently attending a tertiary institution. The authors commented that:
it is an indictment of current education policy that there was a large decline in the Indigenous to non-Indigenous ratio between 1996 and 2001 ... future prospects for improved socio-economic outcomes for the Indigenous population are not good when attendance of Indigenous youth at tertiary institutions fell by 2.2 percentage points ... Even in its own terms the government is failing in the education arena. [33]
When these results are compared to the results achieved by the previous government in the period from 1991-1996, the research revealed that:
in absolute terms, it is difficult to differentiate the performance of governments pre-1996 and post-1996. However, in relative terms - that is when comparing the relative wellbeing of Indigenous people as a whole with all other Australians - there is some disparity between the periods, with the early period 1991-1996 clearly outperforming the more recent period ...[34] Of particular concern was relative decline over the period in educational and health status. [35]
As a consequence, the authors offered the following appraisal of the achievements of practical reconciliation in addressing Indigenous disadvantage:
Despite the policy rhetoric of three Howard governments, there is no statistical evidence that their policies and programs are delivering better outcomes for Indigenous Australians, at the national level, than those of their political predecessors ...[36] It is of particular concern that some of the relative gains made between 1991 and 1996 appear to have been offset by the relative poor performance of Indigenous outcomes between 1996 and 2001[37] ... This intractability is worrying in part because it is evident during a time when (in) Australia the macro-economy is growing rapidly. This suggests, in turn, that problems are deeply entrenched - it is not just a matter of choosing between practical and symbolic reconciliation. [38]
There is one further issue of grave concern relating to progress in addressing Indigenous disadvantage. As CAEPR note:
A major problem for both Indigenous Australians and the nation is that other research suggests that the situation described using the latest 2001 Census statistics is likely to get worse, rather than better, over the next decade. [39]
This is due to the demographic characteristics of the Indigenous population. As I noted in the Social Justice Report 2002, there is 'a well-documented, emerging crisis facing Indigenous policy design'. Not only is the Indigenous population growing at a faster rate than the non-Indigenous population (2.3 per cent compared to 1.2 per cent annually), but the Indigenous population's median age is younger (20 years compared to 35 years) and nearly twice as many Indigenous compared to non-Indigenous people are under 15 years of age (almost 40 per cent compared to just over 20 per cent). Similarly, only 2.8% of the Indigenous population are aged over 65 compared to 12.5% of the non-Indigenous population. [40] The consequence of this age structure and rate of population growth is that there will be a significant increase in the number of Indigenous people entering the age group where they will be seeking employment.
Based in this demographic profile, research by CAEPR forecasts that there will be a further widening of the disparity between Indigenous and non-Indigenous employment rates over the next decade:
Because the rate of employment growth is anticipated to be slower than population growth, the overall employment rate is expected to fall from 40 per cent to 36 per cent over the projection period (2001-2011). Assuming no change in the labour force participation rate, the reverse side of this equation will see unemployment numbers rise from an estimated 32,808 in 2001 to 58,565 by 2011, with a consequent increase in the unemployment rate from 22.5% to almost 31% of those in the labour force.
These projections point clearly to a worsening in the labour force status of Indigenous adults. Moreover it should be noted that they are based on the inclusion of working CDEP scheme participants in the estimates of persons employed. If these were excluded, and instead counted as unemployed ... then predicted labour market outcomes for Indigenous people would become far worse, with an unemployment rate of 43 per cent rising to 50 per cent... [41]
It is worth recalling that the equivalent rates for the rest of the Australian population are presently around 6.0 per cent for unemployment ... these are likely to remain relatively unchanged ... The medium term prognosis, then, all other things being equal, is for a substantial worsening of the overall labour force status of Indigenous people both relatively and absolutely. [42]
These figures from CAEPR update analysis that they conducted in 1997 and 1998 into the likely growth in employment disparity for Indigenous peoples. [43] Consequently, the government has been aware of the likelihood of deterioration in employment status for Indigenous peoples since at least 1997. The absence of benchmarks and an action plan to address this potential situation is a serious omission from the 'practical reconciliation' agenda.
These projected high rates of Indigenous unemployment and low rates of Indigenous participation in the labour force have impacts not only on the overall financial wellbeing of Indigenous individuals and communities, but it also has major direct impacts on the Australian economy at large. For example, CAEPR estimates the cost of the current level of Indigenous employment (including unemployment, underemployment, CDEP participation and discouraged workers) to be approximately $700 million in total foregone tax revenue. [44] CAEPR have made the following projections for the situation over the decade to 2011:
If Indigenous unemployment was reduced to a level commensurate with the rest of the population, and assuming that this latter rate remained constant, then the savings to government in payments to the unemployed, in real terms, would be $328 million in 2006 and $450 million in 2011. On the credit side, if all those formerly unemployed were to gain mainstream employment (excluding CDEP scheme employees) with an annual income equivalent ... [similar to reported income of non-CDEP employees in 1994] ... then the estimated tax return to government would approximate $211 million and $290 million in 2006 and 2011 respectively.
These estimates are conservative because they hold the Indigenous participation rate at their 2001 levels. If all the Indigenous people outside the labour force who wanted jobs found them, then the government would save an additional $416 million in 2006 and $472 million in 2011 on government payments. That is, the additional welfare cost of not finding work for discouraged workers is even greater than that for the unemployed. The cost of lost tax revenue from discouraged workers will be as much as $345 million by 2011. [45]
CAEPR have summarised this situation as follows: 'the current fiscal cost of this failure to eradicate Indigenous employment disparity is massive - in 2001, it was estimated to be around 0.5 per cent of Australian GDP. Findings from this new analysis indicate that the cost will be even higher in the future.' [46]
Overall, the statistics across key areas of Indigenous disadvantage for the past five years indicate that there is no consistent forward trend in reducing the extent of disadvantage experienced by Indigenous peoples, and limited progress in eradicating the disparities between Indigenous and non-Indigenous Australians. There is some evidence that in relation to key measures, this situation may deteriorate further in the coming decade. The outcomes being achieved by governments are not adequate on any measure of success and despite the investment of significant resources by governments. This situation needs to change.
c) Implementing the commitments of the Council of Australian Governments
An area where there has been significant progress in advancing the reconciliation process over the past year is the efforts of governments, lead by the federal government, in implementing the commitments made by the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) towards reconciliation.
In its communique of 3 November 2000, COAG agreed to take a leading role in driving change to address Indigenous disadvantage. COAG agreed to focus on three priority areas: community leadership; reviewing and re-engineering programs and services to support families, children and young people; and forging links between the business sector and indigenous communities to promote economic independence. As part of this process, Ministerial Councils were to develop 'action plans, performance reporting strategies and benchmarks' with COAG to review progress regularly.
In its communique of 5 April 2002, COAG agreed to conduct a number of whole-of-government community trials across Australia and to commission an annual reporting framework on key indicators of Indigenous disadvantage. This reporting framework had its genesis in the efforts of the Ministerial Council on Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs in progressing COAG's communique of November 2000.
This section reviews developments in relation to the disadvantage reporting framework, COAG trials and Ministerial action plans over 2003.
i) Overcoming Indigenous disadvantage - Annual report against key indicators
In his capacity as Chairman of COAG, the Prime Minister wrote to the Steering Committee for the Review of Commonwealth/State Service Provision[47] on 3 May 2002 to request the Committee to develop a framework for reporting to COAG against key indicators of indigenous disadvantage. COAG had agreed to the production of such a regular report at its April 2002 meeting.
The Steering Committee developed a draft reporting framework in 2002 and consulted with Indigenous organisations and governments about it in 2002 and 2003. This draft framework was the subject of a workshop convened by the Social Justice Commissioner in November 2002, and was discussed in detail in Chapter 4 of the Social Justice Report 2002.
On 22 August 2003, the Prime Minister wrote to the Steering Committee on behalf of COAG to formally endorse the Committee's proposed framework for reporting progress in addressing indigenous disadvantage. The finalised framework is reproduced in Figure 1 below.
Figure 1 - COAG Framework for reporting on Indigenous disadvantage
Click here to view a larger version of this figure.
COAG and the Prime Minister nominated two core objectives for the Report: namely, to identify indicators that 'are of relevance to all governments and indigenous stakeholders' and 'demonstrate the impact of programme and policy interventions'. [48]
As the Chair of the Steering Committee has stated about the report:
The ... commissioning (of this report by COAG) demonstrates a new resolve, at the highest political level, not only to tackle the root causes of Indigenous disadvantage, but also to monitor the outcomes in a systematic way that crosses jurisdictional and portfolio boundaries. In doing so, the Report will henceforth also raise the transparency of government's performance.
This report's purpose, therefore, is to be more than just another collection of data. It seeks to document outcomes for Indigenous people within a framework that has both an agreed vision of what life should be for Indigenous people and a strategic focus on key areas that need to be targeted if that longer term vision is to be realised. [49]
The vision of the reporting framework is that 'Indigenous people will one day enjoy the same overall standard of living as other Australians. They will be as healthy, live as long, and participate fully in the social and economic life of the nation.' [50] This vision is encapsulated in the three, inter-related priority outcomes of the reporting framework, namely:
- Safe, healthy and supportive family environments with strong communities and cultural identity;
- Positive child development and prevention of violence, crime and self-harm;
- Improved wealth creation and economic sustainability for individuals, families and communities. [51]
The report also seeks to present the statistics within a strategic framework. There are two key features to this framework. First, it seeks to report on Indigenous disadvantage on a holistic and whole-of-government basis. As the Committee has explained:
[T]he report is predicated on the view that achieving improvements in the wellbeing of Indigenous Australians in a particular area will generally require the involvement of more than one government agency, and that improvements will need preventative policy actions on a whole-of-government basis ...[52]
Without detracting from the importance of individual agencies being responsible and accountable for the services they deliver, the structure of this Report seeks to facilitate interaction between sectors and between governments on programs that are delivered to Indigenous people. Furthermore, it can assist agencies to consider how they can strategically develop programs which have the capacity to deliver outcomes outside of their traditional sphere of action. [53]
A recurring theme of the framework is acknowledgement that areas such as health, education, employment, housing, crime and so on are inextricably linked. Disadvantage or involvement in any of these areas can have serious impacts on other areas of well-being. Acknowledgement of, and action based on, these interconnections is therefore critical in assisting COAG to inform policy development with respect to Indigenous peoples.
Second, the framework is premised on a realisation that there are a range of causative factors for Indigenous disadvantage. This necessitates reporting on progress in addressing both the larger, cumulative indicators (such as life expectancy, unemployment and contact with criminal justice processes) which reflect the consequences of a number of contributing factors, as well as identifying progress in improving these smaller, more individualised factors.
To reflect these strategic considerations, the framework seeks to present progress in addressing Indigenous disadvantage at two levels. The first level is a series of twelve 'headline indicators' that provide a snapshot of the overall state of Indigenous disadvantage. The twelve indicators are:
- Life expectancy at birth;
- Rates of disability and/or core activity restriction;
- Years 10 and 12 retention and attainment;
- Labour force participation and unemployment;
- Household and individual income;
- Home ownership;
- Suicide and self-harm;
- Substantiated child protection notifications;
- Deaths from homicide and hospitalisations for assault;
- Victim rates for crime; and
- Imprisonment and juvenile detention rates.
These 'headline indicators' are measures of the major social and economic factors that need to be improved if COAG's vision of an improved standard of living for Indigenous peoples is to become reality. But as the Chairman of the Steering Committee notes, these headline indicators:
reflect desired longer term outcomes and therefore are themselves only likely to change gradually. Because most of the measures are at such a high level and have long lead times (eg life expectancy) they do not provide a sufficient focus for policy action and are only blunt indicators of policy performance.
Indeed, reporting at the 'headline' level alone can make the policy challenges appear overwhelming. The problems observed at this level are generally the end result of a chain of contributing factors, some of which may be of long standing. These causal factors almost never fall neatly within the purview of a single agency of government, or indeed a single government. [54]
Hence, the Steering Committee has devised a second level of reporting which breaks down these broader, longer term measures. The Committee has identified seven 'strategic areas for action' and a number of supporting 'strategic change indicators' to measure progress in these. The particular areas and change indicators have been chosen for their 'potential to respond to policy action within the shorter term ... (and to indicate) intermediate measures of progress'[55] while also having the potential in the longer term to contribute to improvements in overall Indigenous disadvantage (as reflected through the 'headline indicators'). [56] The seven strategic areas and related indicators are set out in the following table.
Table 1: COAG Overcoming Disadvantage framework: Strategic areas for action and strategic change indicators[57]
| Strategic areas for action | Strategic change indicators |
| 1. Early child development and growth (prenatal to age 3) |
|
| 2. Early school engagement and performance (preschool to year 3) |
|
| 3. Positive childhood and transition to adulthood |
|
| 4. Substance use and misuse |
|
| 5. Functional and resilient families and communities |
|
| 6. Effective environmental health systems |
|
| 7. Economic participation and development |
|
The Steering Committee published its first report against this framework, titled Overcoming Indigenous Disadvantage - Key Indicators 2003, in November 2003. The report confirms that Indigenous disadvantage is broadly based, with major disparities between Indigenous and other Australian in most areas. As the Chairman of the Steering Committee has commented on the findings of the report:
[The report] confirms the pervasiveness of Indigenous disadvantage. It is distressingly apparent that many years of policy effort have not delivered desired outcomes; indeed in some important respects the circumstances of Indigenous people appear to have deteriorated or regressed. Worse than that, outcomes in the strategic areas identified as critical to overcoming disadvantage in the long term remain well short of what is needed. [58]
The presentation of information within the strategic areas also highlights the inter-related nature of the challenges faced in improving Indigenous well-being. As the Chairman of the Committee notes, 'in the three strategic areas that focus on young Indigenous people, the potential for cumulative disadvantage is plain to see.' [59] The presentation of what are generally well known statistics in this way under the strategic areas of action 'are not rocket science'[60] but the ability to highlight cumulative disadvantage factors is a significant breakthrough which should assist policy making in relation to Indigenous peoples.
There are, however, two main issues relating to the framework which have a bearing on how influential it will be in promoting change to policy and program approaches by governments and ultimately in improving the well-being of Indigenous peoples.
First, a critical issue for the reporting framework is the availability of adequate and regular data. The Social Justice Report 2000 identified limitations in data collection as a critical problem that must be addressed in order to ensure government accountability for progress towards reconciliation. [61] This has been an issue that the Steering Committee has had to grapple with in establishing the framework and in reporting against it.
The Committee has noted that the existence of data sets or ease of developing them was a practical consideration that influenced the choice of indicators in the framework:
In many cases, the selected indicators are a compromise, due not only to the absence of data, but also to the unlikelihood of any data becoming available in the foreseeable future ... In some cases, however, an indicator has been included even when the data are not available on a national basis, or are substantially qualified. These are indicators where there is some likelihood that data quality and availability will improve over time. In two cases where there were no reliable data available, the indicators were nevertheless considered to be so important that qualitative indicators have been included in the report. [62]
In reporting against each of the headline indicators and strategic change indicators in the first report, the Steering Committee has noted limitations in data availability and quality. Each chapter of the report contains a section titled 'future directions in data' which notes current developments which will contribute to addressing the difficulties in data availability and quality in future years, and how exactly specific initiatives will do this. It also identifies major deficiencies and areas where there is an urgent and outstanding need for improved statistical collection methods. [63]
I envisage that in future years the Committee is also going to face additional issues relating to the regularity of data availability and hence the ability to report progress over time. In this regard, I have previously recommended that the Indigenous General Social Survey (IGSS) should be conducted on a triennial basis, alongside the General Social Survey, to ensure the regularity of comparable data on the unique issues covered in that survey. Currently, the IGSS is intended to occur every 6 years, with the results of the first IGSS conducted in 2002 due to be released in early 2004.
On the positive side, it was announced in the federal budget for 2003 that a national longitudinal study on Indigenous children will be conducted. This study will track the development of 4,000 Indigenous children over a nine year period and will be a rich source of ongoing data for the Steering Committee. The study, however, is not due to commence until at least 2005 in order for extensive consultations to be conducted with Indigenous peoples and communities prior to its introduction.
There may also be issues in future years relating to the ability to disaggregate available data from the national and state or territory level, down to a regional level.
It is critical that the recommendations and suggestions of the Steering Committee in relation to improved data collection are addressed as a matter of urgency in order to ensure that the reporting framework is able to fully realise its potential and to be viable into the longer term. As the Chairman of the Steering Committee notes:
[the] immediate contribution [of the report] is constrained by serious gaps and deficiencies in data. For example, we know that hearing impediments in young children can seriously undermine their ability to succeed at school, yet we have little basis for knowing whether this problem is getting better or worse. We know that attendance at school is critical to lifelong achievement, but we have inadequate data to monitor it. Substance abuse is blighting young lives, but we have little systematic information on it. Data on the extent of disabilities among Indigenous people is almost non-existent. The Review documents these and a range of other data priorities that will need to be addressed if the Report is to realise its potential and meet COAG's needs. [64]
In producing this report I am mandated to make recommendations on actions which should be taken to secure the enjoyment and exercise of the rights of Indigenous peoples. In light of the crucial nature of this issue, I have chosen to make the following recommendation about improving data collection in the context of the Steering Committee's report.
Recommendation 1 on reconciliation: Data collection1. That the federal government request the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) to provide to COAG information on the actions that need to be taken in order to improve Indigenous data collection. The ABS should respond to the suggestions made by the Steering Committee for the Review of Government Service Delivery in the Overcoming Indigenous Disadvantage Report 2003, as well as identify actions that they consider necessary to ensure the availability of relevant data on a regular basis. In providing this information, the ABS should:
|
The second main issue that impacts on the potential of the Steering Committee's report is how it is incorporated into policy design and programmes across governments and between government departments. As the Chairman of the Steering Committee notes:
The Report's contribution to this important national endeavour is essentially informational. It does not (and cannot) in itself provide policy answers. But it can (and hopefully will) help governments and Indigenous people to identify where programs need to deliver results, and to assess whether they are succeeding. For it to be effective in this, it will be important that governments integrate elements of the reporting framework into their policy development and evaluation processes. [65]
This is the most critical issue relating to the report - ultimately it does not matter how refined the statistics that are reported are if the report is not utilised by governments to inform and change the way they go about delivering services to Indigenous peoples.
In the Social Justice Report 2002, I expressed the concern that the Steering Committee's framework 'currently exists in isolation from any other form of performance monitoring, particularly on identifying progress on important goals such as capacity building and governance reform, as well as identifying the unmet need and accordingly whether policy approaches are moving forward or in fact regressing.' [66] If the reporting framework is not integrated into policy development then the Steering Committee's report risks becoming, in the words of the Chairman of the Steering Committee, 'an annual misery index'[67] which simply reminds us on an annual basis of continuing Indigenous disadvantage without action to change this situation.
At this stage, it is not clear how the report will inform policy development and how governments will use the report to review their approach to Indigenous issues. This is in part because COAG has not yet formally considered and responded to the first report of the Steering Committee. It is anticipated that further guidance will be provided when COAG next meets.
It is clear, however, that the other two main activities of COAG relating to reconciliation have a vital role to play in drawing lessons from the reporting framework and connecting the framework to day to day policy development processes. As the Chairman of the Steering Committee has noted:
One important national vehicle for this is the Action Plans that are being developed by Ministerial Councils in such areas as health, education, employment, justice and small business. The whole-of-government, outcomes orientation of the framework also complements the coordinated service delivery trials in eight different regions across Australia that was initiated by COAG. [68]
It is notable that when developing the framework for reporting it was debated whether there should be a third level of indicators added to the framework which could report on service delivery. Ultimately, this was seen as a role for the Ministerial Council action plans, which are intended to link service delivery with the reporting framework. These action plans form the vital link in drawing lessons from the reporting framework. Progress in developing these action plans is discussed in the next section of this report.
Overall, as I noted in the Social Justice Report 2002, the Steering Committee's framework is a 'significant institutional development in measuring progress for Indigenous peoples' and the 'only positive form of monitoring and evaluation that the Government has provided for practical reconciliation'.[69]
The endorsement of the framework by COAG in August 2003 and the production of the first report by the Steering Committee in November 2003 are both substantial achievements. And as the Chairman of the Steering Committee has stated, one of the most significant contributions of the reporting framework is that it 'challenges us to do better. It also vindicates COAG's decision to give new impetus to the development and coordination of Indigenous policies and programs.' [70]
ii) Developing Ministerial Council action plans and benchmarks
The COAG Communique on reconciliation of 3 November 2000 commits to an integrated framework for addressing Indigenous disadvantage. As the former Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs notes:
Under the aegis of the Framework to Advance Reconciliation agreed by the Council of Australian Government s(COAG) in November 2000, all Australian governments are collectively establishing a comprehensive regime of performance monitoring and reporting that supports (the government's) overarching performance benchmark and objective of... a society where Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples enjoy comparable standards of social and economic wellbeing to those of the wider community, especially in the areas of education, health, employment, and law and justice, while maintaining their unique cultural identities ...
This regime has two key elements:
- regular national report on Indigenous disadvantage; and
- a series of sectoral performance monitoring strategies and benchmarks oversighted by the responsible Commonwealth/State Ministerial Council.
The purpose of this regime is to enable governments, community organisations, indigenous people and other Australians to monitor progress of the nation in overcoming Indigenous disadvantage. The regime is still in its development phase and the government anticipates that it will be firmly in place by the third quarter in 2003. [71]
Each Ministerial Council is to develop action plans, performance reporting strategies and benchmarks for addressing Indigenous disadvantage. In its action plan, the Ministerial Council on Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs (MCATSIA) resolved to review all of the other Ministerial Council action plans, performance reporting strategies and benchmarks in order to identify gaps to COAG and comment on those gaps. [72] Progress under the action plans would then be regularly reviewed by COAG.
The COAG communique of 5 April 2002 admits that progress by the Ministerial Councils in developing action plans and benchmarks in the year and a half after this commitment was made has been 'slower than expected'.[73] The communique indicates that COAG will continue to review progress and that a report on the state of the action plans would be submitted by MCATSIA to COAG for consideration no later than the end of 2003.
In his submission to the Senate Legal and Constitutional References Committee inquiry into national progress towards reconciliation, the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs noted that MCATSIA had provided its initial report of comments on the action plans to the Prime Minister (in his role as the Chair of COAG) in June 2003. [74] At the time of writing, MCATSIA's report had not been made public and a number of action plans were still not finalised. It has now been three years since COAG agreed to the production of these action plans and benchmarks.
The federal government noted in November 2002 that:
Already a number of Ministerial Councils have performance monitoring strategies and benchmarks in place. A leading example is the annual performance report against the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander health indicators. Other ministerial councils also have specific data agreements that will support the development of performance monitoring strategies and benchmarks. [75]
The government noted that the following Ministerial Councils have, or had prior to COAG's decision in 2000, developed action plans:
- Community Services Ministers Conference;
- Ministerial Council on Mineral and Petroleum Resources;
- Australian Transport Council;
- Sport and Recreation Ministerial Council;
- Standing Committee of Attorneys-General;
- The Online Council;
- Primary Industries Ministerial Council;
- Ministerial Council for Education, Employment, Training and Youth Affairs;
- Australian Health Ministers Conference;
- Cultural Ministers Conference;
- Housing Ministers Conference; and
- Small Business Ministerial Council. [76]
Examples of Ministerial Council action plans, performance reporting strategies and benchmarks include the following:
Community services and juvenile justice: The central aspect of the community services action plan is the National Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Community Services Information Plan. This implements the report Principles and Standards for Community Services Indigenous Population Data and aims to improve data collection across this sector, with a key focus on child protection and welfare, juvenile justice, the Supported Accommodation Assistance Scheme and agencies funded under the Commonwealth / State Disability Agreement.
Housing: In 2001, state and territory Housing Ministers and relevant federal Ministers committed to new directions in housing through Building a better future: Indigenous Housing to 2010.[77] An agreement on national housing information was also signed by all jurisdictions in 1999. All jurisdictions have agreed to a performance monitoring system through improving the availability of reliable data; developing reporting systems which will enable performance appraisal at the national, state / territory and regional levels; and reporting annually to relevant ministers at the federal and state/territory level against outcomes identified in Building a better future. A reporting framework has also been developed by ATSIC and the Department of Family and Community Services to facilitate this performance reporting.
Employment: Indigenous specific employment data is collected at the federal level. Quarterly reports of outcomes data are published by the Department of Workplace Relations.
Justice related areas: The Standing Committee of Attorneys-General have agreed to performance indicators in five areas, namely prevent crime and community safety; improve access to justice related services; improved access to bail; improved access to diversionary schemes; and enhanced participation of Indigenous peoples in justice administration systems.
Health: Processes have been in place since 1998 for reporting on national performance indicators, although 'data required to report on some indicators are either unavailable, of poor quality, or require substantial development'.[78] Indigenous health care agreements with the states and the Commonwealth/State Australian Health Care Agreements also have requirements relating to data collection. The National Strategic Framework for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Health was endorsed by health ministers in July 2003. It includes reporting on three 'key result areas' which relate largely to reforming the structure of the health system to increase its accessibility to Indigenous people.
Education: The Ministerial Council on Education, Employment, Training and Youth Affairs (MCEETYA) has agreed on national performance indicators for all students (not just Indigenous). The main measures are national literacy and numeracy benchmarks for years 3 and 5 (with benchmarks for year 7 still under development). The objective is that all students meet the standards. Under the National Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Education Policy (NATSIEP), all governments have made commitments 'to bring about equity in education for Indigenous Australians'.[79] The main goals of the policy are improved Indigenous participation in educational decision-making; equality of access to education services; equity of educational participation; and equitable and appropriate educational outcomes. These goals are enshrined in the Indigenous Education (Targeted Assistance) Act 2000 (Cth).
One of the main federal programs under the NATSEIP is the Indigenous Education Strategic Initiatives Programme (IESIP). IESIP funding is provided on a quadrennial basis and States/Territories are required to acquit the spending of IESIP funds against negotiated indicators which include numeracy and literacy, Indigenous workforce, retention rates and attrition. Service providers are required to submit annual reports against annual targets. This information is tabled, along with progress in addressing other performance indicators, in Parliament through the National Report to Parliament on Indigenous Education and Training by the federal Department of Education Science and Training. The first report was tabled in 2002. Programs under the IESIP, such as the National Indigenous English Literacy and Numeracy Strategy, also have targets for improving literacy and numeracy rates of Indigenous people to levels comparable to other Australians. [80]
The federal government admits that these action plans 'vary in their sophistication'.[81] In fact, many of these action plans are rudimentary in scope and deal almost exclusively with data collection and performance monitoring issues. Very few have any benchmarks or targets.
The Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation defined a 'benchmark' as 'an agreed standard or target that reflects the community aspirations that either have been met or are desirable to be met'.[82]
Benchmarking is a critical aspect of ensuring human rights compliance and accountability. This is in accordance with the guiding principle of 'progressive realisation' under international human rights law (and as reflected in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights). The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and United Nations Development Programme has explained this obligation as follows:
The idea of progressive realization has two major strategic implications. First, it allows for a time dimension in the strategy for human rights fulfilment by recognizing that full realization of human rights may have to occur in a progressive manner over a period of time. Second, it allows for setting priorities among different rights at any point in time since the constraint of resources may not permit a strategy to pursue all rights simultaneously with equal vigour ...
The recognition of a time dimension is accompanied by certain conditions aimed at ensuring that the State does not take it as a licence either to defer or to relax the efforts needed to realize human rights. In particular, the State is required to do the following.
First, the State must acknowledge that with a serious commitment to poverty reduction it may be possible to make rapid progress towards the realization of many human rights even within the existing resource constraint ... Second, to the extent that the realization of human rights may be contingent on a gradual expansion in the availability of resources, the State must begin immediately to take steps to fulfil the rights as expeditiously as possible by developing and implementing a time-bound plan of action. The plan must spell out when and how the State hopes to arrive at the realization of rights.
Third, the plan must include a series of intermediate - preferably annual - targets. As the realization of human rights may take some considerable time, possibly extending well beyond the immediate term of a Government in power, it is with regard to these intermediate targets (or benchmarks) rather than the final target of full realization that the State will have to be held accountable.
Fourth, as a prerequisite of setting targets, the State will have to identify some indicators in terms of which targets will be set... Realistic time-bound targets will have to be set in relation to each indicator so as to serve as benchmarks.[83]
The Social Justice Report 2000 described the key attributes of a benchmark as that it is:
- specific, time bound and verifiable;
- set with the participation of the people whose rights are affected, to agree on what is an adequate rate of progress and to prevent the target from being set too low; and
- re-assessed independently at their target date, with accountability for performance.[84]
In relation to benchmarking, the Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation's national strategy to overcome Indigenous disadvantage also recommended that governments and ATSIC:
- set national, state, territory and regional outcomes and output benchmarks that are measurable, include time-lines and are agreed in partnership with Indigenous peoples and communities;
- ensure that they have appropriate methods to enable accurate and consistent output and outcome reporting for mainstream and Indigenous specific programs; and
- publicly and annually present an outputs and outcomes based report to their parliaments, on a whole-of-government basis, against these agreed benchmarks. [85]
Even the most sophisticated of these action plans, in education, does not meet the attributes necessary for adequate benchmarking. Like the Steering Committee's framework, a target of statistical equality between Indigenous and non-Indigenous Australians can be implied into some of these action plans. But the establishment of benchmarks requires more than the identification of this ultimate goal. It requires an identification of an agreed rate of progress towards this goal, within a short, medium and longer term context, and an evaluation of issues relating to the prioritisation, resourcing and re-engineering of programs and services that will be needed in order to achieve this. The action plans and strategies adopted at the inter-governmental level to date do not contain critical elements for benchmarking.
The absence of appropriate benchmarks is perhaps the most significant failure of governments in implementing practical reconciliation since the year 2000. On this basis, I make the following recommendations to improve government accountability for reconciliation.
Recommendations 2 -5 on Reconciliation: Ministerial Council Action Plans2. That the federal government, through its leadership role in the Council of Australian Governments, ensure that all Commonwealth / State Ministerial Councils finalise action plans on addressing Indigenous disadvantage and reconciliation by 30 June 2004. These action plans must contain benchmarks, with specific timeframes (covering short, medium and long term objectives) for their realisation. Where appropriate, these benchmarks should correlate with the strategic change indicators and headline indicators reported annually by the Steering Committee for the Provision of Government Services. 3. That the federal government, through its leadership role in the Council of Australian Governments, request the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC) to advise COAG whether it endorses these action plans and the benchmarks contained within, following consultations through its Regional Councils. ATSIC should be required to advise COAG of its endorsement or any concerns about the action plans within a maximum period of six months after being furnished with the action plans. 4. That the federal government ensure that all Commonwealth / State Ministerial Council Action Plans are made publicly available as a compendium of national commitments to overcoming Indigenous disadvantage. 5. That COAG publicly report on progress in meeting the benchmarks contained in each Commonwealth / State Ministerial Council Action Plan on an annual basis. |
iii) The COAG whole-of-government community trials
In its communique of 5 April 2002, COAG agreed to trial a whole-of-government cooperative approach in up to ten communities or regions of Australia. It was subsequently decided that there will be eight trial sites, one in each state or territory of Australia. The eight trial sites are:
- Murdi Paaki region (New South Wales);
- Wadeye (Northern Territory);
- Shepparton (Victoria);
- Cape York (Queensland);
- Anangu Pitjantjatjara Lands (South Australia);
- Northern Tasmania;
- East Kimberley region (Western Australia); and
- The Australian Capital Territory.
Appendix two of this report provides a detailed overview of the trials, the mechanisms that have been put into place for inter-agency and inter-governmental coordination, monitoring and evaluation mechanisms for the trials, as well as progress in each of the trial sites.
The COAG Communique of April 2002 recognised that outcomes and management processes in Indigenous policy and service delivery need to be improved. The COAG initiative is intended to trial a different approach as current and past approaches have not achieved the desired outcomes. As the Indigenous Communities Coordination Taskforce notes:
Many people are saying that the relationship between the community and the governments has got to change. It is clear that some of the ways that governments and communities approach their responsibilities needs to be done differently if we are going to move forward together.
Recently, Commonwealth and State and Territory governments have agreed to improve their approach. They have agreed to work together .... And they have agreed to work in partnership with Indigenous communities to support them find and manage sustainable solutions to local problems. This means government have agreed to learn new ways of doing business with Indigenous communities. [86]
It is intended that the trials will be flexible in approach in order to reflect the specific needs of each community trial site, to build on existing initiatives and to improve the compatibility of the approaches currently undertaken by the federal and state or territory governments in order to achieve better outcomes. COAG will be looking for transferable outcomes from the trials, to be applied more broadly in service delivery to Indigenous peoples.[87]
The objectives of the COAG trials are to:
- tailor government action to identified community needs and aspirations;
- coordinate government programmes and services where this will improve service delivery outcomes;
- encourage innovative approaches traversing new territory;
- cut through blockages and red tape to resolve issues quickly;
- work with Indigenous communities to build the capacity of people in those communities to negotiate as genuine partners with government;
- negotiate agreed outcomes, benchmarks for measuring progress and management of responsibilities for achieving those outcomes with the relevant people in Indigenous communities; and
- build the capacity of government employees to be able to meet the challenges of working in this new way with Indigenous communities. [88]
It is anticipated that the trials will encourage governments to modify the way they conduct their program and service delivery responsibilities, including by encouraging the pooling of funding, breaking down internal administrative barriers and improving the way government manages and awards contracts. [89]
Overall, the broader policy context for the COAG trials is the federal government's emphasis on mutual obligation and the responsibility of all players (government, communities, families and individuals) to address issues of social and economic participation. It is a continuation of the approach adopted by the government in its welfare reform package as well as through practical reconciliation.[90]
The philosophy that underpins the trials is 'shared responsibility - shared future'. The ICCT has stated that the 'Shared Responsibility approach will involve communities negotiating as equal parties with government'[91] and asserts that the wellbeing of Indigenous communities is shared by individuals, families, communities and government. All parties must work together and build their capacity to support a different approach for the economic, social and cultural development of Indigenous peoples. This partnership approach is formalised in each trial site through the negotiation of a Shared Responsibility Agreement (SRA) between governments and Indigenous peoples.
The Minister for Immigration, Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs has overall federal responsibility for the trials. A federal government department is also identified for each trial site to lead the federal government's involvement in that particular trial. It is then responsible for coordinating all federal government input into the trial.
Federal government involvement in the trial is also coordinated through three main processes. First, meetings are held every three to four months by federal Ministers with program responsibilities for Indigenous affairs. Second, monthly meetings are held of federal government departmental secretaries (the Secretaries Group). Third, a coordinating taskforce (known as the Indigenous Communities Coordination Taskforce or ICCT) has been established, located within the Department of Immigration, Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (DIMIA) to implement the directives of these groups. The ICCT is comprised of senior officers seconded from each of the government departments participating in the trials.
As demonstrated by the descriptions of current progress in the eight trial sites in Appendix Two, there are significant differences between the selected sites. These differences include the location of the trials (across urban, regional and remote areas), the representative structures for involvement of Indigenous peoples and communities (varying from heavy involvement of ATSIC Regional Council structures through to traditional governance models), and the priority areas for action identified in each site.
While the trials remain in the preliminary stages of development, rapid progress has been made during 2003. At this initial stage, this progress has involved the selection of appropriate trial sites and consultations with Indigenous communities in those sites to determine their willingness to participate in the trials and the key issues that the trials will focus on. For three of the sites, Shared Responsibility Agreements have also been finalised.
In meetings and correspondence about the trials, I have noticed an air of enthusiasm and optimism among government departments about the potential of the trials. Government departments are embracing the challenge to re-learn how to interact with and deliver services to Indigenous peoples. There are no illusions among government departments that the trials are as much about building the capacity of governments as they are about building the capacity of Indigenous communities.
Through the active involvement of Ministers and secretaries of federal departments in the trials, a clear message is being sent through mainstream federal departments that these trials matter and that government is serious about improving outcomes for Indigenous peoples. Even at this preliminary stage, this is a significant achievement for the trials. ATSIC have stated that to date 'there has been clear success through improved relationships across governments at trial sites'.[92]
Governments have not turned up in Indigenous communities with pre-determined priorities and approaches. This has been of great symbolic value. The ICCT has noted that much of the initial stages have involved building up trust between governments and Indigenous peoples. This has in turn had an impact on relationships within Indigenous communities in some of the trial sites, with an increased focus from Indigenous communities on organising themselves in ways that facilitate dialogue with governments.[93]
It is too early to determine whether the trials will have a positive impact in improving government service delivery to communities in each trial region in the longer term or whether transferable lessons will be learnt which are able to more broadly benefit other Indigenous communities. At this stage, I have the following observations and concerns about the conduct of the trials and their potential.
First, it appears that the Indigenous Communities Coordination Taskforce is inadequately funded and supported to complete its ever-expanding role in coordinating federal government involvement in the trials.
As the trials have progressed, the ICCT has become an integral, indeed the central, coordinating agency for the trials. While the day to day operation of governmental activities in each of the trial sites is the responsibility of the respective lead federal government agencies, the ICCT has taken on a vital role in oversighting developments in each trial. This has allowed lessons from individual trial sites to be applied to other trial sites and ensured a level of consistency in the approach of different federal agencies to the trials.
Examples of how the ICCT has fulfilled this role is the development of a template Shared Responsibility Agreement from which negotiations can commence in each trial site (and be customised to local circumstances), the development of a information database on the indicators for each trial, and a performance and monitoring framework for the trials. The role of the ICCT continues to evolve, and expand, as the trials develop.
At present, the federal government appears to be equivocal as to the longer term future of the ICCT. It is not clear that the ICCT will exist for the full five years of the trials and if it does, in what form.
This uncertainty is compounded by the recommendations of the report of the ATSIC Review team. While the review does not explicitly consider the role of the ICCT, it recommends that the Office of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs (currently located within DIMIA) be replaced by a small office within the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet to provide a whole of government approach to Indigenous issues.[94] The proposed roles of this group would include progressing COAG initiatives, achieving the cooperation of all spheres of government in addressing Indigenous needs and achieving whole of government approaches to addressing Indigenous needs. [95] These are roles that the ICCT fulfils specifically in relation to the COAG trials. It is not clear whether implementation of this recommendation would involve disbanding or substituting the role of the ICCT.
Related to this uncertainty in the future of the ICCT for the full five year period are uncertainties in staffing of the ICCT. It is my clear impression that the ICCT is understaffed to complete the large task that it has been set. In part this is because the role of the ICCT has evolved and expanded as the trials have developed. It is understandable that no one envisaged the full extent of the resources required to implement the trials, nor the central role that the ICCT would assume in the trials.
There is a clear need for the Commonwealth to commit to the existence of the ICCT for the full five years of the COAG trials and to increase staffing levels to ensure that the ICCT is able to be fully responsive and continue to make high quality contributions to the COAG trials. I note that, currently, officers are placed in the ICCT's Secretariat from a variety of federal departments who are participating in the trials. The costs of these officers are met by the participating departments as a contribution to the trials. It is feasible that the cost of expanding the number of staff on the ICCT, perhaps by doubling it, could easily be absorbed within existing departmental budgets.
From discussions with the ICCT, it was noted that despite the eight trial sites having already been announced, they continue to receive requests from other departments as to whether there will be an expansion of the trials beyond the eight sites or for assistance and advice in new initiatives that these departments are considering. An increased staffing capacity would contribute greatly to the ability of the ICCT to provide advice and assistance more generally on approaches to improving government coordination across government. The cost of this increased capacity would be insubstantial, particularly in light of the potential for transferring the lessons learnt from the trials more broadly across government.
On the basis of these concerns, I make the following recommendations.
Recommendations 6 - 7 on reconciliation: COAG Whole-of-government community trials6. That the federal government, through the Department of Immigration, Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, commit to the existence of the Indigenous Communities Coordination Taskforce for a minimum of the five year duration of the COAG whole-of-government community trials and accordingly commit resources to the Taskforce until 2007. 7. That federal government departments participating in the COAG whole-of-government trials increase their staffing commitments to the Indigenous Communities Coordination Taskforce by placing additional officers in the Taskforce's Secretariat. |
Second, there are concerns relating to the use of the Flexible Funding Pool that has been established to support the trials. This Funding Pool consists of $3million for each of the 2003-04 and 2004-05 years. The ICCT have explained the purpose of this funding pool as follows:
The idea of this flexible funding pool was that it would only be a short term mechanism to kick-start some whole of government activity on the basis that the whole of government or joined-up activity had to come from mainstream and big Indigenous specific programs already in operation. The government was not trying to create a superficial mechanism to take the place of joining up existing programs and services ... The trials were not about new money. The COAG decision was actually more about more effective use of existing government expenditure. [96]
There is no commitment to any funding pool for the final two years of the trials. The ICCT expects that funding will ultimately be provided in 'a more informal way'[97] through the joining up of existing programs and changes to program approaches. This is an important goal for the trials and a way of ensuring that the outcomes of the trials are sustainable and able to be more broadly applied to other Indigenous communities. There will, however, need to be close attention paid in the implementation of the trials to the reality of this goal and a degree of flexibility from the government to allocate funding to the ICCT for the final two years of the trials should such funding ultimately prove necessary.
ATSIC has expressed concern about how funding from this Funding Pool is allocated. [98] They state:
Generally, proposals to use the Flexible Funding Pool [FFP] are developed by Lead Agencies and should be consistent with the relevant Regional Council plan. However, concerns remain regarding the manner in which the requirement for FFP proposals take account of, and are informed by, Regional Council plans. Greater engagement of Regional Councils in the submission and evaluation of FFP proposals will provide valuable opportunities to progress ATSIC's involvement in the FFP process at a regional and national level. [99]
Third, there is concern from ATSIC that it is not being sufficiently engaged in the trials. The matching of the use of the Flexible Funding Pool with ATSIC Regional Council plans is a specific example of this concern. More broadly, the acting Chairman has stated that:
While the Commission believe that the most important level of Indigenous engagement in this initiative is the local community, it should be recognised that the Commission and ATSIC Regional Councils have significant responsibilities to these particular communities and, for this reason, have sought to improve their involvement in the initiative. As the initiative has enormous relevance and potential implications for all Indigenous communities across the country, the Commission does not want its roles and responsibilities in this regard overlooked or ignored. In particular, Commissioners are concerned that Indigenous representation is both welcomed and supported especially in political interaction at the most senior levels. [100]
The acting Chairman has noted that ATSIC-ATSIS are considering ways to strengthen their engagement in the trials to promote national discussions, informed by an Indigenous perspective, regarding the utility of the trials. The acting Chairman identifies the following issues as needing to be addressed:
- the fragmented involvement of Regional Councils in both the signing of Shared Responsibility Agreements and selection of trial sites;[101]
- the status of relationships between Commissioners, ATSIC Regional Councils, ATSIS staff, Lead Agencies and the ICCT; and
- a lack of engagement of and by Regional Councils with Lead Agencies and other government partners. [102]
Fourth, it is not clear at this stage that the performance monitoring framework for the trials will be sufficiently rigorous. It is anticipated that the first two years of the trial will be reviewed in mid-2004 and a further review conducted at the end of the 5 year trial phase. It is not clear at this stage how these reviews will be conducted, by whom or whether the results of the reviews will be made public.
The lack of a clear evaluation strategy is of great concern. It may be that the uncertainty in this regard is largely the product of the evolving nature of the trials and that there will be much greater clarity during 2004. I have previously, however, expressed concern at reliance by COAG on internal monitoring and evaluation strategies. In particular, I have expressed concerns about the lack of information that is publicly reported about such evaluations (thus limiting government accountability), the lack of appropriate consultation with Indigenous peoples and lack of independence in the monitoring process. [103]
My concern about such processes is reinforced by the failure in recent years of the Ministerial Council on Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs to complete two significant evaluations on COAG's behalf and in a timely manner. The first is the review of progress by all levels of government in implementing the recommendations of the Bringing them home report. The second is an audit of family violence programmes to guide the response of COAG to this crisis issue. Approximately three years after these reviews were announced, neither has been presented to COAG nor made public.
ATSIC has also expressed significant concern about the monitoring framework for the trials. It states:
The Commission is particularly concerned that a comprehensive national evaluation strategy is not in place. This is likely to lead to unclear judgements later on, as the starting point for assessing change has not been clearly established. In addition, the Commission is concerned that there is no commitment to an independent evaluation of the initiative. The reliance on a systems-based internal evaluation strategy might not provide the most objective perspective on the successes and failures of the initiative, and may produce an inadequate basis upon which to make long term policy and program reforms. [104]
A related issue is the existence of adequate data to contribute to the monitoring and evaluation process.
In the initial stages of the trials, there has been a significant focus on developing local level priorities, outcomes and benchmarks. The 'Indigenous Communities Coordination Taskforce Database' has been developed to capture this information across the eight trial sites. A number of government agencies have informed me that it is intended that this local level information will be able to be aggregated into a national level analysis. The intention is that this information will be able to be aligned with the headline and strategic change indicators developed by the Steering Committee for the Provision of Government Services, and that data will able to be compared 'against existing portfolio budget statements and other cross-government frameworks at the national level'.[105]
It is not, however, clear how the local level data will be able to be matched up to the national level in these ways. There is very little ability to disaggregate, on a regional or local basis, the statistics which form the basis of the headline indicators and strategic change indicators in the national reporting framework. The emphasis of the trials to date has also, quite rightly, not been on improving data collection at this local level. Hence, existing systems of data collection are very poor at identifying the status of Indigenous people in a particular locality or region across a broad range of social and economic indicators. Accordingly they are also ill equipped to measure change in such indicators.
It is quite likely that it will not be possible to match up local level indicators with the national reporting framework, other than through the provision of case studies which can illustrate links between particular types of policy interventions and outcomes. This will, of itself, be valuable information. The concern is that the trials have set objectives for data analysis and performance monitoring that will not be able to be achieved because of the existing limitations in data quality and collection.
On the basis of these concerns, I make the following recommendations.
Recommendations 8 - 9 on reconciliation: COAG Whole-of-government community trials8. That the Indigenous Communities Coordination Taskforce request the Productivity Commission (as Chair of the Steering Committee for the Review of Government Service Provision) to provide advice on aligning the benchmarks and outcomes agreed at the local level with COAG's National Framework for Reporting on Indigenous Disadvantage. This advice should include any recommendations for adapting the Indigenous Communities Coordination Taskforce Database to enable reporting of outcomes against this National Framework. 9. That COAG agree and fund an independent monitoring and evaluation process for the whole-of-government community trials initiative. The Productivity Commission, Commonwealth Grants Commission or ATSIC's National Office of Evaluation and Audit would be suitable agencies to conduct this review. |
Fifth, it is not clear how the lessons learnt from the trials will be transferable and contribute to broader reform of program design and service delivery for Indigenous peoples. The adequacy of the performance monitoring framework, as discussed above, will be one of the key determinants of such lessons.
ATSIC have expressed some preliminary concerns about the conduct of the trials and the transferability of lessons learned. Their concerns relate to three broad factors. The first is limited experimentation of new approaches by Lead Agencies in the trials. ATSIC argue that to date:
there has been little progress in doing 'business' differently ... Silos continue to characterise government relationships and the way in which funds are provided and accounted for, leading to restrictions in the experimentation of interventions. Lead Agencies are struggling to balance different priorities with trial partners leading to difficulties in progressing joined-up projects on the ground. As little obvious progress has been made in re-engineering programs, Lead Agencies are tending to use existing programs in the trial sites with little flexibility or creativity.[106]
They note, significantly, that 'programs that are used more flexibly tend to be Indigenous-specific rather than mainstream'.[107]
The second concern identified by ATSIC is that there has been a blurring in some instances of Commonwealth and state responsibilities, 'attracting the possibility of cost shifting between parties' compounded by the 'inexperience of Lead Agencies and their personnel when engaging with Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander communities'.[108] ATSIC sees a need for 'clearer mechanisms ... to facilitate a more cohesive joined-up approach accompanied by greater flexibility in the availability of fund to improve outcomes' combined with 'effective and timely evaluation'.[109]
The third concern identified by ATSIC relating to transferability of outcomes is a perception that initiatives in one trial are not being identified as having potential application in other trials. They state:
One of the strengths of the initiative is the opportunity to develop locally based solutions to meet locally identified needs. It seems reasonable therefore, that where a Lead Agency has proceeded to implement a program differently, such as increasing the provision of housing to one of the communities in the trial site, then that initiative should be considered for the other trial sites. This would address basic needs that are common to most of the sites. [110]
It is clear that there are many common issues across trial sites that could be advanced more quickly if each trial can work from the experiences in other trial sites. This has been identified as a critical issue by the ICCT. As noted earlier, a mechanism for coordinating state and territory activity could also be of great value in addressing this significant issue.
Ultimately, the transferability of outcomes from the trials in the longer term will depend on whether the trials are able to more broadly change the status quo of service delivery and program guidelines. A significant challenge will be ensuring that the adoption of more holistic, whole-of-government approaches is not a transient feature and that departments do not simply slip back into their usual ways of doing things once the trials have ended. Factors that will need to be addressed to ensure that this is not the case include the following:
Continued engagement of mainstream departments and programs: It is clear that a significant factor in the early success of the trials has been the high level involvement and commitment of ministers and departmental secretaries at the federal level in taking responsibility for particular communities (as the lead agency) and harnessing the services and programs of mainstream departments. The lead agency approach is not sustainable beyond a limited number of communities in its current format. Mechanisms such as the Minister's group and the Secretaries group may be more sustainable, so long as departments continue to have a significant investment in promoting improved coordination of services.
Coordinating funding of proposals in non-trial sites: Similarly, the identification of a region or community as a trial site has naturally elevated the priority with which the service delivery needs of that community or region are dealt with. Governments and departments have been able to look to how they can relax program guidelines or join up funding from different programs and areas for more holistic solutions. A significant challenge is identifying how proposals in non-trial sites can also benefit from this approach where such proposals do not enjoy such priority attention.
Resource constraints: While the emphasis of the trials is not on new money but on better coordinating and getting value from existing money, there is a broader context of significant under-funding of key areas of Indigenous disadvantage. The focus on a limited number of communities, and the availability of a short term funding pool, shields the trials from this broader issue. Funding restrictions will become a significant issue when seeking to more broadly implement the lessons learnt from the trials. This will be complicated further by an emphasis on addressing relative need and reallocating funding towards those areas and issues of greatest disadvantage.
Capacity development of Indigenous communities: Each of the trials has built on local Indigenous initiatives that were already under development to improve service delivery to their communities. For example, processes such as the ATSIC Murdi Paaki Regional Council initiatives of community working parties, the incorporation of the Tharmarrurr Regional Council under local government legislation in the Northern Territory, and the Cape York Partnerships in Queensland were relatively developed when the decision was made to make each of these areas a trial site. The trials have undoubtedly greatly advanced processes that were previously underway in these and other trial areas.
However, the broader concern is how transferable lessons will be drawn from the trials for those communities which experience a high degree of dysfunction and which are not, at least at this stage, capable of organising themselves so that they can better interact with governments.[111] In other words, how do we avoid the situation where governments focus their attention on improved coordination of service delivery to those communities that are relatively organised? Even in the trial sites, where there has been a great deal of activity by communities to address these issues, it has taken a long time to develop the capacity of the communities to the point where they can determine what the priorities of the community are and the approaches that should be adopted. It is critical that in the longer term other communities do not get left behind because they do not have such capacity.
There are also a number of processes available to ATSIC and Indigenous peoples to build on the achievements of the trials and more broadly inform policies and programs.
There are three significant processes which ATSIC currently utilises which provide ATSIC with some leverage for advancing inter-governmental coordination and improved service delivery.
ATSIC has also negotiated agreements and compacts with federal government departments such as the Department of Workplace Relations (DEWR), the Department of Education, Science and Training (DEST) and the Department of Health and Ageing. [112]
Second, is through the operation of ATSIC's Regional Councils and the development of their regional plans. As ATSIC have stated about their approach to the COAG trials:
ATSIC-ATSIS' approach has been to promote the Regional Councils as the pre-eminent source of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander advice in all trial sites. This is easier in regions where Regional Councils are the main source of leadership but it has proved difficult where other organisations compete for this role or the trial boundary differs from the Regional Council boundary.[113]
The better utilisation of ATSIC Regional Councils and the capacity of ATSIC's regional planning process is discussed in detail in the next chapter. Regional plans offer a significant opportunity for coordinating government activity within regions. Recent agreements between ATSIC, DEWR and DEST, for example, commit these departments to using the regional planning process to better coordinate their activities regionally.
Third, ATSIC leads the Community Participation Agreements (CPA) initiative under the Australians Working Together package. The CPA process provides ATSIC with a significant tool for advancing the objectives of Indigenous communities or regions as they relate to aspects of government service delivery.
The CPA initiative was announced in the 2001-02 Federal Budget, with $30.5 million allocated to ATSIC over four years to develop and implement agreements in remote Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander communities. The agreements involve the community identifying practical ways people can contribute to their families and communities in return for their income support payments. To date, ten CPA initiatives have commenced in the Northern Territory, Queensland, South Australia, Western Australia and New South Wales. These ten processes cover a mix of individual communities and regional negotiations, and involve the following 27 communities:
- Mutitijulu (NT);
- West Macdonnell Ranges (NT) - covering the communities of Papunya, Ikuntji, Kintore and Mt Leibig;
- Tennant Creek (NT) - involving the communities of Ali Curung, Elliot and Mungkarta;
- Canteen Creek (NT) - involving the communities of Kunlinjara, Canteen Creek, Epenarra and 10 Mile communities;
- Barrow Creek (NT) - involving the communities of Tara, Barrow Creek and Wilora;Coen (Qld);
- Aurukun (Qld);
- Tjurabalan (WA) - involving the communities of Yagga Yagga, Billiluna, Mulan, Ringers Soak and Balgo;
- New South Wales - involving the communities of Bourke, Brewarrina, Walgett and Wilcannia; and
- Oodnadatta (SA).
CPA initiatives are underway in a number of COAG whole of government trial sites. This includes Tjurabalan (WA) which corresponds to the west Kimberley trial, and a number of specific communities in the Murdi Paaki region and Cape York respectively. CPA negotiations are occurring on a community-by-community basis and in remote COAG regions their potential is being explored as a subsidiary measure to support the COAG shared responsibility approach. In addition to the aforementioned COAG sites, preliminary discussions are occurring in Wadeye (NT) and the Anangu Pitjantjatjara (AP) Lands in South Australia about their interest in implementing a CPA agreement.
A further tool which is available to Indigenous communities to build on the advances of the COAG trials are the Indigenous Land Use Agreement provisions of the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth). In discussions with government officers concerning the trials it was noted that there are similarities between the issues raised in some native title agreement negotiations and the negotiation of Shared Responsibility Agreements in the COAG trials. It was noted that while native title issues have not emerged as central issues in the initial stages of the trials, it is anticipated that these issues will become more prominent in some trial sites as the trials progress.
My Native Title Report 2003 provides a detailed analysis of how federal, state and territory government policies and approaches to native title negotiations promote the utilisation of native title as a tool for economic and social development within a cultural context. It suggests that the full potential of native title as contributing to these processes is not being utilised and in many instances is being actively prevented by the approaches of governments. The report states:
In many cases the role of native title is glaringly absent from States' policy responses to the reconciliation process. Native title negotiations and agreements are not seen as part of the State's policy toolbox directed towards transforming the conditions of Indigenous people's lives ...
The two important policy responses to emerge from the reconciliation process as necessary to facilitate the economic and social development of Indigenous people are, firstly, a whole-of-government approach to Indigenous policy and secondly, partnerships between government and Indigenous communities ... [A] whole-of-government approach, which requires government to integrate the responsibilities and policies of all the agencies concerned with providing services to Indigenous communities, is a very important element of achieving the sustainable development of these communities. However the application of this approach is very limited and fails to ensure that Indigenous policies in all their manifestations are underpinned by consistent objectives. In particular it fails to ensure that native title programs are brought within or are consistent with strategies for achieving economic social and cultural development.
The second policy response to reconciliation, the establishment of partnerships between Indigenous communities and governments, is also an important element of sustainable development ... government plays an important role in the group achieving its development objectives: it facilitates the group in identifying its development goals; it assists the group to build upon its assets, skills and knowledge so as to achieve its development goals; it assists the group to identify which aspects of its asset skills and knowledge base may need to be supplemented, and it facilitates the group to monitor and evaluate the strategies it adopts to achieve its goals. This policy framework can be summed up as a partnership approach. It is a partnership, however, with special characteristics.
First, for the approach to achieve sustainable development of the community, the dominant partner is the Indigenous side. It is the community that must determine its policy objectives and strategies and control the way they are achieved. Decisions to this effect must be conducted through processes and institutions which the community respects and which reflect the group's cultural values ... native title provides a framework to ensure decisions are made in this way.
Second, the government's role in this partnership directed to the sustainable development of the group is to facilitate and assist the group to achieve its goals. The government should not take over the control of the process. Indigenous leader Gerhardt Pearson has put the situation thus:
It is easy for government bureaucracies to accept so-called "whole-of-government" approaches, coordinated service delivery and so on. It is much harder for them to let go of the responsibility. On one hand we have the almost complete failure on their part to lead and facilitate social and economic development in Indigenous Australia. On the other hand, our experience is that the government bureaucracies are resistant to the transfer of responsibility to our people.[114]
Despite the limitations in the way the whole-of-government and partnership approaches have been applied these two responses to reconciliation have provided an important foundation for economic and social development to occur in Indigenous communities. Yet in many cases States have not included native title in their response to reconciliation.[115]
Overall, the COAG whole-of-government community trials have advanced significantly during 2003 and offer much potential for reforming inter-government and whole-of-government approaches to service delivery to Indigenous peoples. There have already been a number of achievements from the process. There remain a number of challenges and some structural issues (particularly relating to monitoring and evaluation) that remain to be addressed. The long term success of the process will, however, depend on how the trials promote structural change in the way that governments go about delivering services to Indigenous peoples. A number of challenges and options for this have been identified in this section of the report.
Conclusion - Government accountability for reconciliation
During 2003, the government's approach to reconciliation has continued to be restricted to measures that fall within its 'practical' reconciliation approach. The government has rejected the introduction of measures (such as those recommended by the Senate Legal and Constitutional References Committee and contained in the Reconciliation Bill 2001) to progress issues that fall outside the parameters it has set. This has the consequence of there being a partial framework for progressing reconciliation with significant issues of unfinished business left in abeyance.
The focus of this chapter has largely been on processes for government accountability for 'practical' reconciliation. It has sought to evaluate progress of the government on their own terms. It establishes that progress in advancing 'practical' reconciliation over the course of the year has been variable.
The statistical data indicates that there has been limited progress over the past five years in achieving the central purpose of practical reconciliation, namely improved Indigenous well-being. Of particular concern is the fact that the disparities that exist between Indigenous and non-Indigenous Australians have remained substantially the same, or have widened over the past five and ten years. Indigenous Australians also presently endure health standards worse than those in some so-called 'third world' countries. The lack of progress in achieving substantial improvement in Indigenous well-being is also in marked contrast to outcomes in similar settler countries such as the United States of America, Canada and New Zealand.
The Social Justice Report 2000 set out a human rights approach for progressing reconciliation. It identified five integrated requirements to ensure sufficient government accountability for addressing Indigenous disadvantage from a human rights perspective. These five requirements are:
1) Making an unqualified national commitment to redressing Indigenous disadvantage;
2) Facilitating the collection of sufficient data to support decision-making and reporting, and developing appropriate mechanisms for the independent monitoring and evaluation of progress towards redressing Indigenous disadvantage;
3) Adopting appropriate benchmarks to redress Indigenous disadvantage, negotiated with Indigenous peoples, state and territory governments and other service delivery agencies, with clear timeframes for achievement of both longer term and short-term goals;
4) Providing national leadership to facilitate increased coordination between governments, reduced duplication and overlap between services; and
5) Ensuring the full participation of Indigenous organisations and communities in the design and delivery of services.[116]
The year 2003 saw the development of significant measures for advancing reconciliation within the framework of the Council of Australian Governments. The national reporting framework on Indigenous disadvantage and whole-of-government trials under COAG have contributed to meeting aspects of the second, fourth and fifth of these requirements. These initiatives are in fledgling stages and there are a number of issues that remain to be addressed before success is assured.
These initiatives have not, however, been backed up by a range of other commitments and processes that are necessary to ensure the long term sustainability of improvements in the well-being of Indigenous peoples. There remains an absence of an appropriate national commitment to redressing Indigenous disadvantage, sufficiently rigorous monitoring and evaluation mechanisms, and benchmarks with both short term and longer term targets agreed with Indigenous peoples. There are also critical issues relating to the depth of inequality experienced by Indigenous people, the size and growth of the Indigenous population and under-resourcing of services and programs to Indigenous peoples that cannot continue to be ignored if there is to be any genuine improvement in Indigenous peoples' circumstances.
Ultimately, the process of practical reconciliation is hampered by its lack of a substantive action plan for overcoming Indigenous disadvantage in the longer term, with short term objectives to indicate whether the rate of progress towards this goal is sufficient.
The failure of the government to address these factors as part of its practical reconciliation approach reflects a fundamental flaw in the process. By committing to provide full access to citizenship entitlements and nothing more, practical reconciliation is a 'blank cheque' and amounts to a commitment into the foreseeable future to pay the increased economic and social costs associated with Indigenous disadvantage. In relation to employment alone, this cost is estimated by the Centre for Aboriginal Economic Policy Research to rise to the vicinity of 0.5 to 1% of gross domestic product within the decade.
At this stage, it is not possible to foresee a time when 'record levels of expenditure' of the Commonwealth on Indigenous services will not be necessary. It is also not possible to foresee a time when a continuation of the current approach will result in significant improvements in the lives of Indigenous peoples. Practical reconciliation does not have a plan for overcoming rather than simply managing Indigenous disadvantage.
Ultimately, deficiencies in monitoring and evaluating processes for reconciliation indicate that there are problems of accountability of governments for their contribution to reconciliation. This lack of accountability allows governments to unilaterally establish the boundaries of issues that they will address in the first place and then to avoid public scrutiny when material improvements in Indigenous well-being are not achieved and sustained. A number of recommendations have been made throughout the course of this chapter to address this situation.
The focus of this chapter has been on government accountability. This is, however, only half of the story. The next chapter examines initiatives over the past year relating to the role of Indigenous communities and organisations. It also builds on the analysis in this chapter by considering how Indigenous people can play a more meaningful role in setting the priorities of governments in achieving sustainable improvements in Indigenous well-being and in monitoring and evaluating their performance.
1. See: Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner, Social Justice Report 1999, HREOC Sydney 2000, pp 2-24.
2. For an analysis of these themes see: Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner, Social Justice Report 2001, HREOC Sydney 2001, Chapters 2,3,6 and Appendix 2 (Herein Social Justice Report 2001); Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner, Social Justice Report 2002, HREOC Sydney 2002, Chapters 2, 3 and 4 (Herein Social Justice Report 2002).
5. The debate on the Bill was interrupted after 2 ½ hours and it is unclear when it will recommence.
6. Senator Ridgeway, Hansard - Senate, 27 November 2003, p17988.
8. Senator Evans, Hansard - Senate, 27 November 2003, p17988.
9. Senator Brown, Hansard - Senate, 27 November 2003, p17993.
10. Senator Patterson, Hansard - Senate, 27 November 2003, p18003.
11. Senator Heffernan, Hansard - Senate, 27 November 2003, p18008.
12. Senator Ferris, Hansard - Senate, 27 November 2003, p17990.
13. ibid, pp 17990-91. See also: Department of Immigration, Multiculturalism and
Indigenous Affairs, Fact Sheet No.3 - Reconciliation, online
at
www.minister.immi.gov.au/atsia/facts/index.htm,
accessed 10 November 2003.
14. See in particular: Social Justice Report 2001, Chapter 6; Social Justice Report 2002, Chapters 2, 3 and 4.
15. Ruddock, P and National Sorry Day Committee, Recognition of removal practices at Reconciliation Place, Joint Media Statement, 29 June 2003.
16. In the Social Justice Report 2001 I described the consequences of this approach as follows: 'Recent years have seen the emphasis of the reconciliation process shift dramatically. Currently, it is not about mutual accommodation on the basis of equality - it is about whether one group, Indigenous people, are prepared to conform to the rest of society. If not, then the offer is closed.': Social Justice Report 2001, p221.
17. Huggins, J, 'The
figures seem to confirm that practical reconciliation is not enough',
On Line Opinion, 19 November 2003, p2,
18. Reconciliation Australia, 2003 Reconciliation report, Reconciliation Australia, Canberra 2003, p10.
20. Senate Legal and Constitutional References Committee, Reconciliation: Off track, Parliament of Australia, Canberra 2003.
21. See Appendix one of this report for discussion of data collection issues.
22. Senator Vanstone, 'Indigenous wellbeing is a top priority', Media Release, 15 October 2003, www.minister.immi.gov.au/atsia/media/media03/v03002.htm
23. Senator Ferris, Hansard - Senate, 27 November 2003, pp17991-2.
24. This report is discussed in the next section of this chapter.
25. Senator Vanstone, 'Overcoming Indigenous Disadvantage', Media Release, 12 November 2003, www.minister.immi.gov.au/atsia/media/media03/v03003.htm, accessed 12 November 2003.
26. See Social Justice Report 2002, pp85-87.
27. Altman, J and Hunter, B, 'Monitoring 'practical' reconciliation: Evidence from the reconciliation decade, 1991-2001', Discussion Paper 254 / 2003, Centre for Aboriginal Economic Policy Research, Canberra 2003, p1. Available online at: www.anu.edu.au/caepr/discussion2.php.
31. Although note that the Australian Bureau of Statistics produced alternative adjusted figures for household income (as presented in Appendix One of this report) which showed a slight increase in the disparity between Indigenous and non-Indigenous people.
32. Altman, J and Hunter, B, op.cit, p11.
40. Social Justice Report 2002, pp59-60.
41. Hunter, H, Kinfu, Y and Taylor, J, 'The future of Indigenous work: Forecasts of labour force status to 2011', Discussion paper 251/2003, Centre for Aboriginal Economic Policy Research, Canberra 2003, p3. Available online at: www.anu.edu.au/caepr/discussion2.php, p9.
43. Taylor, J, and Altman, J, The job ahead - Escalating economic costs of Indigenous employment disparity, ATSIC, Canberra 1997; Taylor, J, and Hunter, B, The job still ahead: Economic costs of continuing Indigenous employment disparity, ATSIC, Canberra, 1998.
44. Hunter, H, Kinfu, Y and Taylor, J, 'The future of Indigenous work: Forecasts of labour force status to 2011', op.cit, Table 12, p17.
47. The Committee has since been renamed the Steering Committee for the Review of Government Service Provision.
48. Steering Committee for the Review of Government Service Provision, Overcoming Indigenous Disadvantage - Key indicators 2003, Commonwealth of Australia, Melbourne 2003, p xvii (Herein, Overcoming Indigenous disadvantage).
49. Banks, G, 'Indigenous disadvantage: assessing policy impacts', Speech, Pursuing Opportunity and Prosperity conference, Melbourne, 13 November 2003, pp1-2, available online from: www.pc.gov.au. Emphasis added.
50. Overcoming Indigenous disadvantage, pp 1.1, 1.2.
51. ibid, p2.4. The Steering Committee notes that these outcomes were widely supported by Indigenous peoples during their consultations on the draft framework.
56. For a more detailed overview of the rationale for choosing each strategic area and the change indicators underneath these, see: Overcoming Indigenous Disadvantage, pp2.6-2.10
61. Social Justice Report 2000, pp 96-100 and recommendations 6-10, pp131-32.
62. Overcoming Indigenous disadvantage, p2.9.
63. For a summary of these see the overview of the report: ibid, p LII.
66. Social Justice Report 2002, p133.
69. Social Justice Report 2002, pp132-33.
71. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, Submission - Senate Legal and Constitution References Committee Inquiry into national progress towards reconciliation, 26 November 2002, p10.
72. Council of Australian Governments, Communique, COAG, Canberra, 5 April 2002, p18 (contained in Attachment 1: COAG Reconciliation Framework - Report on progress in 2001).
74. Senate Legal and Constitutional References Committee, Reconciliation: Off track, Parliament of Australia, Canberra 2003, p75.
75. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, Submission - Senate Legal and Constitution References Committee Inquiry into national progress towards reconciliation, op.cit, p12.
77. Available online
at: www.facs.gov.au/internet/facsinternet.nsf/aboutfacs/programs/
community_indig_housing_2010.htm.
78. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, Submission - Senate Legal and Constitution References Committee Inquiry into national progress towards reconciliation, op.cit, p15.
79. Department of Education, Science and Training, National Report to Parliament on Indigenous Education and Training 2001, DEST, Canberra 2002, p2.
80. See: www.dest.gov.au/schools/indigenous/nielns.htm.
81. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, Submission - Senate Legal and Constitution References Committee Inquiry into national progress towards reconciliation, op.cit, p12. For details of a number of these action plans see: ibid, pp 13-17.
82. Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation, Towards a benchmarking framework for service delivery to Indigenous Australians, CAR and Centre for Aboriginal Economic Policy Research, Canberra 1998, p16.
83. United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and United Nations Development Programme, Draft Guidelines: A Human Rights Approach to Poverty Reduction Strategies, OHCHR, Geneva 2002, Guideline 4, pp14-15. See also: Social Justice Report 2002, Chapter 4; Social Justice Report 2000, Chapter 4.
84. Social Justice Report 2000, p97; quoting the United Nations Development Programme's Human Development Report 2000.
85. Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation, Overcoming disadvantage, as quoted in Social Justice Report 2000, p99.
86. Indigenous Communities
Coordination Taskforce, Towards better outcomes for Indigenous Australians, DIMIA Canberra 2003,
www.icc.gov.au/publications?MySourceSession=6c119361b7d1a3a6cffc8b581a0eba82,
accessed 15 November 2003.
87. Council of Australian
Governments, Communique, 5 April 2002,
www.pmc.gov.au/docs/coag050402.cfm,
accessed 12 December 2003.
88. Indigenous Communities
Coordination Taskforce, Trial Objectives, online at:
www.icc.gov.au/communities/objectives/,
(29 October 2003).
89. Indigenous Communities
Coordination Taskforce, Imagine What Could Happen if we Worked Together:
Shared Responsibility and a Whole of Governments Approach, Conference
Paper - The Native Title Conference, Alice Springs, 3 June 2003,
www.aiatsis.gov.au/rsrch/ntru/conf2003/papers/hawgood.pdf, 24 December
2003.
90. For a detailed evaluation of mutual obligation in an Indigenous context see: Social Justice Report 2001, Chapter 2 and 3.
91. Hawgood, D, Hansard -House of Representatives Standing Committee on Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs, 13 October 2003, p1294.
92. Quartermaine, L, Correspondence with Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner on COAG trials, 15 January 2004, p4.
93. Discussions with ICCT, November 2003.
94. Hannaford, J, Huggins, J and Collins, B, In the hands of the regions - A new ATSIC. Report of the Review of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra 2003, Recommendation 32, p55.
96. Hawgood, D, Hansard - Senate Legal and Constitution Legislation Committee, (Estimates), 4 November 2003, p8.
98. As noted in Appendix 2, ATSIC has contributed $1million (of the $3million total) per annum to this Flexible Funding Pool.
99. Quartermaine, L, op.cit p6.
101. ATSIC note that 'the involvement of the Commission and Regional Councils in the selection of the trial sites has varied from none to limited, with the exception of the Murdi Paaki Regional Council, which nominated its region as a trial site and since its announcement has been integrally involved in the development of the trial': ibid, p6.
103. Social Justice
Report 2001, p201; and Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social
Justice Commissioner, Submission to the Senate Legal and Constitutional
References Committee inquiry into the stolen generation, HREOC Sydney
2000, online at:
www.humanrights.gov.au/social_justice/senate_submission/index.html.
105. Indigenous Community Coordination Taskforce, Shared responsibility shared future - Indigenous whole of government initiative: The Australian government performance monitoring and evaluation framework, DIMIA Canberra 2003, p3. See Appendix 2 of this report for further information.
106. Quartermaine, L, op.cit, p4.
111. It is the interaction of these factors that is critical - many of the communities in the trial sites would describe themselves as experiencing high levels of dysfunction. It is the determination, and in most cases simply the ability, to address this that is missing in some other communities.
112. See comments on this approach by the CEO of ATSIC in Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission, Annual Report 2002-03, ATSIC Canberra 2003, pp15-16.
113. Quartermaine, L, op.cit, p4.
114. Pearson, G, Man Cannot Live By Service Delivery Alone, Conference Paper, Opportunity and Prosperity Conference, Melbourne November 2003, online at www.capeyorkpartnerships.com, (14/11/2003).
115. Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner, Native Title Report 2003, HREOC Sydney 2004. Note: this quote is from the draft report.
116. Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner, Social Justice Report 2000, HREOC Sydney 2000, p100.
