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Chapter 2: The new arrangements for Indigenous affairs – facilitating Indigenous access to government services

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Chapter 1 << Chapter 2 >> Chapter 3

• Part 1: The challenge of ensuring equal access
  • Background - the new arrangements for the administration of Indigenous affairs
  • Indigenous disadvantage and human rights
  • The challenge of improving Indigenous access to mainstream services
  • The situation of urban Indigenous peoples - a particular concern
  • A case study: withdrawal of CDEP from urban and certain regional centres and abolition of Indigenous Employment Centres
  • The Council of Australian Government (COAG) Trials
  • Post COAG trials - another 'new' approach
  • Summary: The challenges of achieving equitable access to mainstream services for Indigenous peoples
• Part 2: 'Harnessing the mainstream' through the new arrangements for Indigenous affairs
  • Regionally focussed service delivery: Indigenous Coordination Centres, solution brokers, agreement making processes and 'intensive interventions'
  • Issues concerning engagement with Indigenous communities
  • The changing role of the Office of Indigenous Policy Coordination (OIPC)
  • Monitoring and evaluation mechanisms - ensuring accountability for the new arrangements
• Part 3: Conclusions and recommendations

It has now been over two years since the federal government introduced new arrangements for the administration of Indigenous affairs. One of the catchcries of the new arrangements is that they are aimed at ‘harnessing the mainstream.’ This is to be achieved by removing or reducing the barriers that prevent Indigenous peoples from accessing existing mainstream services on an equitable basis. There are two ways of achieving this: first, mainstream departments can improve their service delivery so that existing mainstream services are better able to meet the needs of Indigenous peoples; and second, the whole of government machinery of the new arrangements for Indigenous affairs can be utilised to create better synergies between mainstream programs and Indigenous specific services. The focus of this chapter is primarily on this second aspect of ‘harnessing the mainstream’.

This is the third successive year that the Social Justice Report has considered the impact of the new arrangements. The two previous reports have expressed concerns at the lack of progress in ‘harnessing the mainstream’ and the existence of structural problems within the new arrangements that work against this objective (such as the absence of processes for systemic engagement with Indigenous peoples locally, regionally and nationally; the absence of appropriate monitoring and evaluation mechanisms; and the under-performance of Shared Responsibility Agreements and the new whole of government machinery in ‘unlocking’ mainstream accessibility).

Sufficient time has now passed to identify whether the new arrangements have indeed begun to positively impact on the accessibility of mainstream services for Indigenous peoples, and consequently to demonstrate their potential to impact on the social and economic disadvantage experienced by Indigenous peoples. This chapter focuses on the performance of the new arrangements, with a particular emphasis on this objective of improving access for Indigenous Australians to mainstream services.

Part 1 of the chapter provides a broad overview of the challenges of improving accessibility of mainstream services f or Indigenous peoples, as well as the commitments made to achieve this through the new arrangements. Part 2 then considers the existing potential and current progress in ‘harnessing the mainstream’ through the new arrangements for the administration of Indigenous affairs.

As this chapter demonstrates, a degree of instability appears to characterise the new arrangements in Indigenous affairs with a seemingly endless raft of complex changes to the government’s administrative processes, policies and programs. The rhetoric of the arrangements is strong, but the outcomes remain elusive. The chapter analyses the processes of the new arrangements in some depth and offers suggestions about how existing commitments and processes could be turned into action.

Part 1: The challenge of ensuring equal access to mainstream services for Indigenous peoples

Background – the new arrangements for the administration of Indigenous affairs

New arrangements for the administration of Indigenous affairs were introduced as of 1 July 2004. The arrangements abolished the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC)^[1] and Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Services (ATSIS), and transferred responsibility for ATSIC/ATSIS programs to mainstream agencies. The federal government held high hopes for the new arrangements. ATSIC was seen as the cause of the failure to improve Indigenous disadvantage and therefore abolishing ATSIC would clear the way for effective coordinated programs. The then Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, Senator Vanstone, observed that:

No longer will governments persist with the ATSIC experiment that has achieved so little for Indigenous people.^[2]

Under the new arrangements, the administration of Indigenous-specific programs became the responsibility of mainstream government departments. A brief description and rationale of the new arrangements was provided by Senator Vanstone on 30 June 2004, which stated, inter alia:

More than $1 billion of former ATSIC-ATSIS programmes have been transferred to mainstream Australian Government agencies and some 1,300 staff commence work in the new Departments as of tomorrow.

We want more of the money to hit the ground. We are stripping away layers of bureaucracy to make sure that local families and communities have a real say in how money is spent.

Mainstream departments will be required to accept responsibility for Indigenous services and will be held accountable for outcomes. In future they will work in a coordinated way so that the old programme silos of the past are broken down.

Guiding whole-of-government service delivery with Indigenous representatives will be Partnership Agreements developed at the regional level and shared responsibility agreements at the local and community level. The new approach will require communities to offer commitments such as improved school attendance in return for Government funding initiatives.^[3]

The new arrangements aimed to remove, or at least reduce, barriers that prevent Indigenous peoples from accessing existing mainstream services on an equitable basis.^[4] This objective has been called ‘harnessing the mainstream’.

‘Harnessing the mainstream’ is an evocative phrase suggesting that there is considerable potential for Indigenous advancement by improving access to mainstream programs for Indigenous peoples. This can involve removing barriers and constraints to accessing services, using mainstream programs creatively to work in tandem with Indigenous-specific programs, and delivering mainstream programs in a more flexible and less bureaucratic manner.

The Secretary of the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, Dr Shergold, explained the objective of improving performance of mainstream services through the new arrangements as follows:

complex problems, particularly in public policy, are rarely resolved by structures. Public servants are remarkably good at structures. Put public servants together for half an hour and they can rearrange the boxes very easily... The solution that is required here on Indigenous affairs is necessarily a whole-of-government solution. One of our key failings, I think, in terms of public policy is the failure to have a whole-of-government approach to issues... The key is to change the culture of how public servants deliver public policy. That is my first point.

My second point is that I think mainstreaming has been an enormous failure. If I thought we were returning to mainstreaming in the old sense I would not support it at all. But define mainstreaming. All the literature that I have seen says there are a number of qualities to mainstreaming. The first is that you do not have Indigenous specific programs. The second is that each department and agency makes its own decisions in a non-coordinated way. The third is that you do not have an Indigenous specific agency. The fourth is that you have national programs that are delivered in the same way no matter where they are delivered. Those are the four key ingredients of mainstreaming.

The government’s new approach is completely at odds with each of those four criteria. It is committed to maintaining the funding for Indigenous specific programs. It has established an Office of Indigenous Policy Coordination and Indigenous coordination centres across the country. It has made it clear that the mainstream departments have to work together, and it has said that there needs to be flexibility in programs so they can respond to local need. What we have here is a quite new approach. It will not work quickly; this is in for the long term. It is not mainstreaming in the sense of the articles that have been written criticising it. It is a new whole of- government approach, and that is what I am committed to.^[5]

I have discussed the new arrangements (constituting a ‘quiet revolution’ according to Senator Vanstone^[6]) in detail in the past two Social Justice Reports.^[7] The government’s new approach to Indigenous affairs reflects its strong commitment to what it terms ‘practical reconciliation’. As my predecessor, Dr William Jonas AM, observed in the Social Justice Report 2003:

The government has emphasised time and again that the key focus of reconciliation should be on practical and effective measures that address the legacy of profound economic and social disadvantage.^[8]

A number of commentators have noted that in some respects these new arrangements are not all that new.^[9] ‘Mainstreaming’ as such has been a mainstay of Indigenous policy discourse for many years.^[10] What was particularly new was the abolition of ATSIC and thereby the loss of an Indigenous representative voice in the processes of government at national and regional levels.

So how have the new arrangements matched with the rhetoric and begun to demonstrate their potential to impact on the social and economic disadvantage experienced by Indigenous Australians? This chapter examines the efficacy of the new arrangements, including in respect of the objective of improving access for Indigenous Australians to mainstream services.

Indigenous disadvantage and human rights

There is no dispute that there is a significant problem in respect of Indigenous disadvantage in Australia. As Gary Banks, Chairman of the Productivity Commission has noted in the Foreword to the Report Overcoming Indigenous Disadvantage – Key Indicators 2003:

Notwithstanding many years of policy attention, this Report confirms that Indigenous Australians continue to experience marked and widespread disadvantage. This is shown most fundamentally by the 20 year gap in average life expectancy between Indigenous and other Australians. ^[11]

More recently Dr Ken Henry, Secretary of Treasury, commenting on the extent and persistence of Indigenous disadvantage in Australia, observed that ‘Indigenous disadvantage diminishes all of Australia’ and stated that ‘it has to be admitted that decades of policy action have failed’.^[12]

The situation in respect of Indigenous disadvantage has been noted at the international level. In 2000 the United Nations Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) expressed its:

... concern that, despite the efforts and achievements of the State party [Australia], the indigenous populations of Australia continued to be at a comparative disadvantage in the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights, particularly in the field of employment, housing, health and education.^[13]

In important respects things are not improving for Indigenous Australians. Gary Banks, on the release of the Overcoming Indigenous Disadvantage: Key Indicators 2005,^[14] commented on the mixed results in the report and identified ‘areas of regression’. These included: increases in Indigenous peoples as victims of violence, as subject to child protection notifications, and in regard to imprisonment rates, especially for women.^[15]

Recent reports suggest that increases in diabetes amongst Indigenous peoples will have a devastating impact over time. For example, up to 30% of Torres Strait Islanders are affected by type 2 diabetes.^[16] Statistics on the large Aboriginal community of Wadeye in the Northern Territory reflect a parlous situation, with a death rate four times higher than the rate for the Northern Territory, an average life expectancy of 46 years, a range of serious and endemic health problems, and a high percentage of children in the 0-5 age group who are stunted (20%), wasted (10%) and/ or underweight (21%).^[17]

Whilst there is widespread agreement and concern about the state of Indigenous disadvantage measured against a range of economic and social indicators, there is less recognition that this situation reflects a profound failure to afford Indigenous Australians their full range of human rights. Australia’s ongoing inability to secure decent living standards for its Indigenous citizens is not only a failure of domestic policy, it is also a failure to meet basic legal obligations arising from Australia’s role as a responsible member of the international community.

There is a clear obligation on Australia, in terms of the requirements under international law and in particular under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR – ratified by Australia), to:

... take steps ... to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realisation of the rights recognised in the present Covenant by all appropriate means.^[18]

These rights are precisely the sorts of rights in which Indigenous Australians fare so poorly. They include the right to an adequate standard of living (which includes adequate housing) and the right to the highest attainable standards of physical and mental health. Further, the steps required to be taken under the Covenant must be deliberate, concrete and targeted towards ensuring the full realisation of rights and governments must demonstrate that they are progressively realising the enjoyment of rights.^[19] This requires that service delivery occur within an overall strategy that includes specific, time-bound and verifiable benchmarks and indicators^[20] to ensure that the enjoyment of rights improves over time.^[21]

In Australia, this requires an integrated and purposeful approach to improving Indigenous living standards which will necessarily include improved access to mainstream services and a range of Indigenous specific programs to respond to particular circumstances. It also requires flexibility and sensibility to the cultural and social norms and aspirations of Indigenous peoples. This principle is well established in international law,^[22] and it should be the very bedrock on which Australia’s reconciliation process is built.

When considering Indigenous peoples’ ability to exercise and enjoy their economic, social and cultural rights, the United Nations Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights has also provided guidance to governments about how to fulfil their legal obligations. The Committee has encouraged governments to:

• Prepare aggregate national statistics or estimates so that they have an accurate diagnosis and knowledge of the existing situation;
• Give special attention to ‘any worse-off regions or areas and to any specific groups or subgroups which appear to be particularly vulnerable or disadvantaged’;
• Engage in the elaboration of clearly stated and carefully targeted policies and develop and adopt a detailed plan of action for the progressive implementation of each of the rights contained in the Covenant;
• Facilitate public scrutiny of government policies with respect to economic, social and cultural rights, and encourage the involvement of the relevant sectors of civil society in the formulation, implementation and review of these policies;
• Identify specific benchmarks or goals against which their performance in a given area can be assessed; and
• Report in detail on the factors and difficulties that inhibit progressive realisation of the full range of economic, social and cultural rights so that more appropriate policies can be put in place.^[23]
  

There have also been a number of developments at the international level in recent years which have seen a clearer understanding emerge of the relationship between human rights and development and poverty eradication. Past Social Justice and Native Title Reports have highlighted these developments.^[24]

One of the most significant outcomes of this focus on integrating human rights and development and poverty eradication activities has been the agreement among the agencies of the United Nations of the Common Understanding of a Human-Rights Based Approach to Development Cooperation.^[25]

This document outlines the human rights principles that are common to the policy and practice of the UN bodies. The Common Understanding states that these principles are intended to guide programming across a range of service delivery areas.^[26] They are of importance in addressing the accessibility of mainstream services.

The Common Understanding has three principles. Namely, that:

• All programmes, policies and technical assistance should further the realisation of human rights;
• Human rights standards guide all development cooperation and all phases of programming; and
• Development cooperation contributes to the development of the capacity of ‘duty-bearers’ to meet their obligations and of ‘rights-holders’ to claim their rights.^[27]
  

The Common Understanding also identifies the following elements that are ‘necessary, specific, and unique to a human rights-based approach’ to development.^[28]

These principles provide useful guidance for incorporating participatory development principles into domestic policies and programs relating to Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander policy, including, to improve accessibility of mainstream services.

The challenge of improving Indigenous access to mainstream services

Most expenditure by Australian governments on the provision of services to Indigenous peoples is made through mainstream services generally available to all citizens. However, the Commonwealth Grants Commission’s Report on Indigenous Funding 2001 found that Indigenous peoples do not access these mainstream services on an equitable basis:

It is clear from all available evidence that mainstream services do not meet the needs of Indigenous people to the same extent as they meet the needs of non-Indigenous people. In general, Indigenous people experience greater disadvantage and have greater needs than non-Indigenous people and, for geographic, economic and cultural reasons, mainstream services are less accessible to them.^[29]

The report noted that despite the physical accessibility of services in urban areas, there was a range of factors constraining access (see below). Although Indigenous peoples in rural and remote areas face similar barriers to urban Indigenous peoples, they also face major physical access difficulties because mainstream services are often either not provided, or physical access to them is restricted by distance.^[30] There can also be problems in attracting and retaining experienced and trained staff to work in rural and remote areas or specifically with Indigenous peoples, regardless of location.

In response to this situation, the report identified as a principle that should underlie service delivery:

Recognition of the critical importance of effective access to mainstream programs and services, and clear actions to identify and address barriers to access.^[31] [emphasis added]

The ramifications of problems of accessibility to services were examined in the Social Justice Report 2002.^[32] By way of example, that report noted that Indigenous peoples’ access to health services needs to be viewed widely to include not only an evaluation of the specific health service in question, but the broader health context and underlying determinants of people’s overall wellbeing. The work of the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) is particularly relevant here as this body broadly interprets the right to health as contained in the Covenant as:

an inclusive right extending not only to timely and appropriate health care but also to the underlying determinants of health, such as access to safe and potable water and adequate sanitation, an adequate supply of safe food, nutrition and housing, healthy occupational and environmental conditions, and access to health-related education and information, including on sexual and reproductive health. A further important aspect is the participation of the population in all health-related decision-making at the community, national and international levels.^[33] [emphasis added]

The right to health has been elaborated in international law to give it real potency to improve health. This broad perspective and considered and elaborated approach to improving access to mainstream programs needs to be brought to bear in respect of the objective of ‘harnessing the mainstream’ under the new arrangements for Indigenous affairs in Australia.

There is a further dimension to consider when the health service in question is to be accessed by Indigenous peoples. The Social Justice Report 2002 also observed that:

Of particular note is the inclusion of a paragraph [in CESCR General Comment 14] specifically relating this right to Indigenous peoples.^[34] The paragraph emphasises the need for health services to be culturally appropriate and for full and effective participation by Indigenous peoples. The Committee notes that in Indigenous communities the health of the individual is often linked to the health of the society as a whole and has a collective dimension. As with other rights protected by the Covenant (including the right to education), there is an emphasis on the need to develop health strategies that should identify appropriate right to health indicators and benchmarks. ...... Having identified appropriate right to health indicators, states should set appropriate benchmarks to each indicator, for use in monitoring and reporting.^[35] [emphasis added]

The relevance of accessing mainstream services has been highlighted under the new arrangements for service delivery at the federal government level. The new arrangements emphasise whole of government service delivery and improved coordination and integration. Whole of government (or ‘joined up’ or ‘connected’ government) is a policy imperative that increasingly underpins the provision of government services across the board, including Indigenous services. Dr Shergold, Secretary of the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, has made clear that a whole of government approach is a high priority for the Australian Public Service.^[36] ‘Harnessing the mainstream’ is a central plank in the ‘whole of government’ approach to service delivery.

The Australian government has also worked with state and territory governments to achieve better whole of government coordination between levels of government. The Council of Australian Governments (COAG) has made significant commitments to overcoming Indigenous disadvantage, including through the National Framework of Principles for Delivering Services to Indigenous Australians as agreed in June 2004. These principles include:

address sharing responsibility, harnessing the mainstream, streamlining service delivery, establishing transparency and accountability, developing a learning framework and focussing on priority areas.^[37]

COAG has identified the parameters of the objective of ‘harnessing the mainstream’ as follows.

Increased access to mainstream programs is closely linked with improved integration and coordination of service delivery to Indigenous peoples and communities. In fact, these objectives are complementary, as one of the reasons for poor access is often perceived to be uncoordinated and complex service delivery arrangements. As I noted in my Social Justice Report 2004, the new arrangements for Indigenous affairs mean that, to a significant extent, at the federal level the administration of mainstream programs now sits alongside Indigenous-specific programs in the Indigenous Coordination Centres established to deliver Indigenous programs on a whole of government basis. As I emphasised:

This is a significant opportunity to improve the accessibility of mainstream programs for Indigenous people and communities so as to better meet their needs.^[39]

The new relationship between Indigenous-specific and general programs within portfolios rather than with external agencies, such as ATSIC, can lead to greater sensitivity in respect of actual mainstream program delivery. For example, delivery of mainstream services by an agency should now benefit from association with the Indigenous-specific services also being delivered. In this setting mainstream administrators will have a greater opportunity to learn about appropriate and effective Indigenous service delivery and be sensitised to particular difficulties confronting Indigenous peoples in their relations with government service providers.

As well, mainstreaming of ATSIC services under the new arrangements has given these issues greater cogency given that virtually all Indigenous funding now comes through mainstream agencies, whether as Indigenous-specific or as mainstream programs.

This can, however, be problematic. As Gray and Sanders have noted, ‘The relationship between Indigenous-specific programs and general programs within a portfolio area is complex’.^[40] The problem is that the tendency to substitute rather than to complement and supplement programs can arise, even within portfolios – so that the burden may yet again be left to the Indigenous-specific programs, and the mainstream programs step back from the task. This substitution effect is explained in Text Box 3 below.

I appreciate that various high-level arrangements have been put in place to try to avoid such back-sliding.^[41] Nevertheless, over time, there is a risk. As Gray and Sanders comment:

Here then is the conundrum of Indigenous-specific mechanisms within government administration. They run the danger of letting general mechanisms avoid responsibility for Indigenous people, while simultaneously holding out the hope of sensitising those general mechanisms to Indigenous difference.^[42]

The Secretaries’ Group on Indigenous Affairs has delineated some of the challenges:

The many challenges in this area include ensuring that Indigenous-specific and mainstream programs are complementary, reducing the red tape associated with these services, and making mainstream services attractive to Indigenous people.^[43]

These are important and difficult challenges for successful implementation of the new arrangements. The difficulties in the past in achieving objectives such as improving access to mainstream service provision provide a salutary lesson. Such difficulties were neither the making of ATSIC nor its predecessors, but instead reflect entrenched problems in responding to Indigenous disadvantage. One lesson is that, whilst ever Indigenous Australians retain distinctive cultural and societal values and practices, governments need to understand, respect and respond to such difference. They also need to value Indigenous participation in designing and implementing service delivery. Otherwise the difficulties between the ‘mainstream’ service providers and their Indigenous clients will worsen and inevitably, Indigenous people will bear the brunt of the failure.

I commented in my previous Social Justice Report that removing the barriers to accessing services is particularly challenging, and progress has been slow.^[44] I believe this remains the case, and if anything this objective of the new arrangements has tended to slip from view. I also noted the absence of mainstream data, the lack of linkages between the Overcoming Indigenous Disadvantage reporting framework and mainstream programs, the absence of appropriate monitoring and evaluation processes, and the lack of mechanisms for Indigenous engagement and participation in designing and delivering services.^[45] There remains a need for effective and credible evaluation of progress towards achieving the objective of ‘harnessing the mainstream’.

The situation of urban Indigenous peoples– a particular concern

The federal government has made remote communities its priority for Indigenous-specific funding under the new arrangements. This is on the basis that need is greatest in remote communities, and on the understanding that mainstream services are generally available to urban-based Indigenous peoples.

This emphasis on remote communities is reflected in discussions at the November 2006 Senate Estimates hearings of the Senate Standing Committee on Community Affairs in the context of the ‘strategic interventions’ approach now being implemented in Indigenous affairs (see further below). In response to a question, the Associate Secretary of the Department of Families, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs (FaCSIA) advised that the great majority of these interventions are focused on remote locations that have been neglected, or where the needs are greatest. This reflects the Government’s general approach:

Mr Gibbons—There is an Indigenous specific cluster [within FaCSIA] and the resources of that program cluster are focused more on remote Australia than anywhere else—not exclusively, but the burden of our investment is going to be on the backlog in housing and infrastructure in remote Australia. That is a clear priority of the government.^[46] [emphasis added]

The implicit assumption is that to a considerable extent the needs of urban Indigenous peoples (including people living in regional centres) can be met by mainstream programs because:

• services are already in place to serve the wider community, unlike more remote areas where services may have to be provided specifically to meet the needs of Indigenous communities; and
• many Indigenous peoples in urban areas follow a lifestyle quite similar to the wider society, and so it may appear that these people are better placed to utilise mainstream services.
  

But the diversity of situations of Indigenous peoples in urban and regional areas makes it unrealistic to over-generalise. The needs of Indigenous peoples living on Special Purpose Leases on the outskirts of Alice Springs, Darwin or Katherine in the Northern Territory will be quite different to those of people living in the suburbs of Sydney or Melbourne or housing estates in regional centres such as Dubbo or Geraldton.

The Commonwealth Grants Commission has pointed out that:

Despite the physical accessibility of services in urban areas, a range of factors clearly constrains access of Indigenous people to them. The result is that mainstream services are not meeting the needs of Indigenous people equitably.^[47]

There are a number of reasons for this relative under-utilisation of mainstream services, which can be generally considered under the term of ‘barriers to access’. This under-utilisation of services undoubtedly is a contributing factor to the relative disadvantage of the Indigenous population, including the disadvantage experienced by Indigenous peoples living in urban areas. The Commonwealth Grants Commission listed the following barriers to access in urban areas.

Cultural practices and social arrangements are also important determinants of the lower uptake, relative to the wider population, of mainstream services by Indigenous peoples in urban areas.

The persistence of Indigenous difference, and evolving Indigenous norms and customs, including in urban areas, results in mainstream services often being unsuitable or unworkable. For example, in urban and regional areas the mainstream criminal justice system, with relatively high rates of Indigenous offending and incarceration, is often less effective than it might be in deterring criminal behaviour and in providing effective rehabilitation. Consequently a number of initiatives, including elder participation in judicial processes and circle sentencing have been developed. This has been a positive development in aligning mainstream services with Indigenous needs and values. As my predecessor, Dr Jonas, pointed out:

The fact that Indigenous involvement in sentencing processes is taking place in urban areas in the most settled eastern sea-board states, such as through the Koori, Ngunga and Murri Courts and circle sentencing, demonstrates the vitality and evolving nature of [Indigenous] customary law.^[49]

As well, past bad experiences with mainstream service providers, and the confidence-sapping effects of a lifetime led in the shadow of racism, can all be real barriers to accessing services.^[50]

Thus, as I pointed out in the Social Justice Report 2004, the emphasis in the new arrangements on remote discrete Indigenous communities poses difficulties for Indigenous peoples in urban areas.^[51] Urban Indigenous peoples may in effect be abandoned to mainstream services, without adequately addressing issues of access, flexibility and relevance.

The House of Representatives Standing Committee on Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs (HORSCATSIA) considered some of these problems in an inquiry into the needs of urban dwelling Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples in 2001. In respect of accessing mainstream services, it noted that:

The evidence suggests that Indigenous people in urban areas tend not to use mainstream services and choose instead to use Indigenous community organisations as either intermediaries with mainstream agencies or as replacement service providers, or not to use any services at all [emphasis added]. ^[52]

Or, as Shelley Reys, an Indigenous consultant and a Board member of Reconciliation Australia, has observed:

... Indigenous people in Sydney are expected to access mainstream services that often don’t meet their needs. ^[53]

Indeed, HORSCATSIA’s Report set out the challenges and parameters of service delivery to urban-based Indigenous peoples as follows:

In urban areas at least, the urgent priority should be on meeting the needs of Indigenous people through better access to existing mainstream services. This means that mainstream services need to be appropriately designed and delivered in culturally sensitive ways that reflect regional differences and cultural diversity. It also means that Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples need to be involved in program design and service delivery. It may be necessary to invest in parallel Indigenous specific structures or services where mainstream services are inadequate or non existent.

The Committee acknowledges that there are many mainstream government services that Indigenous people find currently neither easy to use nor appropriate to their circumstances. However, this is not a reason for doing nothing. Appropriate plans need to be developed to overcome these obstacles. They should not be perpetuated.^[54]

This is the nub of the situation. These comments by the HORSCATSIA provide a template for the provision of services to Indigenous peoples in urban areas and regional centres. The question that needs to be considered is whether the new arrangements for Indigenous affairs are responsive to the needs of Indigenous peoples in urban areas. Does the current emphasis on SRAs and strategic interventions in discrete and remote communities mean that for urban Indigenous peoples the unsatisfactory state of affairs regarding access to mainstream services will be perpetuated?

The Office of Indigenous Policy Coordination has identified improving mainstream access as a critical component of the new arrangements if the government is to improve service delivery to Indigenous peoples in urban locations:

the Government recognises that Indigenous disadvantage will not be addressed through Indigenous-specific programs and services alone. It is important, particularly in an urban context where the majority of mainstream infrastructure is already present, to 'harness the mainstream'... In urban and regional environments, where the majority of the Indigenous population lives, physical access to mainstream services is less likely to be the key issue. However, mainstream services have not performed as well as they should in meeting the needs of Indigenous people in urban areas. Therefore, the Australian Government is also working to harness mainstream services, to improve access to, take-up of and outcomes from these services for Indigenous Australians. This is also an issue being raised in various bilateral negotiations with the States.^[55]

In correspondence provided for this year’s report, as well as discussions with senior officials in OIPC, the government has indicated that it continues to struggle with the challenge of ‘harnessing the mainstream’ among Indigenous peoples in urban communities:

Our analysis shows that harnessing the mainstream is closely connected to the effective provision of services to urban Indigenous people. Feedback from those working on the ground as well as nationally... reveals that there are many success factors and challenges common to both urban and mainstreaming issues. These include:

• Improved mechanisms/incentives are needed in mainstream services to break down barriers to access and to ensure that use by Indigenous people is in line with need and that outcomes achieved are comparable to other Australians in like circumstances;
• Further information is needed on Indigenous mobility and service usage in urban areas;
• The Indigenous population in urban areas can be diffuse and is not always readily identified as cohesive or ‘community’ groupings for the purpose of targeting services and collaboration;
• Cooperative action by governments can be hampered by inflexibility resulting from the funding, structure and operation of agencies and programs; and
• The necessary changes and improvements need a long term approach.
  

These success factors and challenges will be further examined during ongoing policy developments on improving urban and mainstream services.^[56]

A case study: withdrawal of CDEP from urban and certain regional centres and abolition of Indigenous Employment Centres

There are two aspects to improving accessibility of mainstream services for Indigenous peoples. The first is improving such access through whole of government coordination and the machinery of the new arrangements (as discussed throughout this chapter). The second is the efforts of individual mainstream departments to build better connections between the mainstream and Indigenous specific services they deliver on a day-to-day basis.

The Department of Employment and Workplace Relations (DEWR) is one such mainstream agency that has taken on a significant role in Indigenous affairs as a result of the new arrangements. This owes much to the fact that tackling Indigenous unemployment and underemployment are at the core of the federal government’s Indigenous Economic Development Strategy (IEDS), which was launched in November 2005.^[57]

The goal of the IEDS is to support Indigenous Australians achieve economic independence by reducing their dependence on passive welfare. The strategy takes a whole-of-government approach to removing barriers to Indigenous economic independence, drawing together the range of mainstream and Indigenous-specific programs and services, and linking them into support offered through the corporate, community and philanthropic sectors.

Under this strategy, the ‘key ingredients for economic independence’ are Indigenous employment, home ownership and business development.^[58] The twelve initiatives in the IEDS focus on two main areas: work and asset/ wealth management. The work initiatives include CDEP reform; local jobs for local people; improved employment service performance; and targeted industry strategies. The asset/ wealth management initiatives include increased Indigenous home ownership and economic development on Indigenous land.^[59]

DEWR’s prominence in Indigenous affairs is also related to the fact it is responsible for the largest Indigenous specific program, the Community Development Employment Project (CDEP). The CDEP scheme was transferred from ATSIC to DEWR in July 2004, and underwent significant changes to align Indigenous specific services with mainstream services which I commented on in the Social Justice Report 2005.^[60] Now one year on, we are faced with even more sweeping changes.

The CDEP scheme plays a central role in the economic and community life of many discrete Indigenous communities and rural towns with a significant Indigenous population.^[61] As I reported in the Social Justice Report 2005:

At 30 June 2004, there were over 36,000 CDEP participants and 220 CDEP organisations. In 2002 the CDEP scheme accounted for over one-quarter of the total employment of Indigenous Australians, with 13 percent of the working-age population being employed in the CDEP scheme. ... The majority of CDEP participants (62%) were in very remote areas, 11 percent were in remote areas, 11 percent in outer regional areas, 9 percent in major cities and 7 percent in the inner regional areas.^[62]

CDEP has been a contentious program since its inception in the late 1970s. Interestingly, it was an attempt to address the perceived negative effects that could flow from providing remote communities with social service benefits. There was a concern even then, that this ‘passive welfare’ would have harmful personal and social consequences.

Over its lifespan, the CDEP scheme has been criticised by Indigenous peoples and governments for a range of reasons, including that it:

• Is an alternative form of employment for Indigenous peoples, even where there are other jobs available in the local labour market;
• Is a destination or dead-end, rather than a pathway to ‘real’ and sustainable employment;
• It lets governments at all levels get away with not providing essential services to Indigenous communities;
• It devalues the work done by CDEP participants because a ‘real job’ would earn a ‘real wage;’ and
• CDEP participants do not have access to superannuation, long-service leave and union membership.
  

For all its criticisms, it is important to acknowledge that the CDEP scheme has enabled many Indigenous communities to develop valuable community services which address key community needs. Many of these services are now regarded as ‘essential services’ in Indigenous communities and it is questionable that commercial enterprises could either afford to provide them, or deliver them in a culturally appropriate manner. Examples include: night patrol services; childcare centres; cultural and natural heritage programs; and garbage services.

The CDEP scheme has also contributed to the development of Indigenous businesses, entrepreneurship and leadership in some communities. CDEPs have been able to increase the employment prospects of many participants through the delivery of accredited vocational training courses, paid work experience, personal support and literacy/numeracy skills.^[63]

Initially CDEP was based on community development with projects typically ranging from housing and road maintenance, to artefact production and horticultural enterprises. There was a strong emphasis on projects that positively contributed to community coherence and cultural integrity. There was also an emphasis on boosting the number of CDEP participants and completed projects.

However, reforms in recent years have shifted the focus towards long-term employment outside the CDEP scheme. Increasingly CDEP organisations are required to make links with a range of government programs aimed at getting Indigenous peoples into mainstream employment or developing Indigenous business opportunities.

The government’s introduction of Indigenous Employment Centres (IECs) in recent years is indicative of the re-orientation of the CDEP scheme towards mainstream employment outcomes. From 2002, the government encouraged the establishment of IECs by CDEPs located in areas with good employment opportunities. The purpose of these centres was to assist more CDEP participants to move off CDEP into long-term employment outside the CDEP scheme. IECs would tailor help for individual CDEP participants to get them job ready, support them while they are in their chosen job, and provide a pathway to employment that has strong connections with the local community. IECs continued to be established in a total of 43 locations across Australia until 2006.^[64]

On 6 November 2006 the Minister for Employment and Workplace Relations released an Indigenous employment discussion paper: Indigenous Potential meets Economic Opportunity.^[65] It proposes ‘a new model of employment services’ for Indigenous Australians in urban and major regional centres.

The discussion paper notes major achievements of the CDEP reform process, which it credits to the introduction of the IECS, including:

• 3,704 Indigenous people moved out of CDEP and into employment in the 2005-06 financial year, an increase of 135 per cent on the 2004-05 financial year;
• In the three months to end September 2006, 1,482 CDEP participants were placed into jobs outside of CDEP – more than double the number in the same period last year;
• Over 20 businesses were progressed through CDEP during 2005-06. An additional 52 were identified and are progressing;
• The CDEP “No work No pay” rule is being more strictly enforced with participants now required to sign an acknowledgement form to ensure they are aware of the rule; and
• A more competitive funding process ensuring better value for money from CDEP.^[66]
  

At the same time, the discussion paper acknowledges that only 5 percent of the people moving through CDEP in 2005-06 were recorded as ‘achieving employment off CDEP’.^[67] In contrast, Job Network (‘Australia’s largest and most effective program in finding jobs for Indigenous people’^[68]) placed over 45,200 Indigenous job seekers into jobs in a similar twelve month timeframe.^[69] It is this apparent success of a mainstream service provider in placing Indigenous job seekers in employment that appears to be driving the government’s latest round of CDEP changes.

Another reason for the changes is that ‘outcomes from CDEP appear to be growing faster in remote areas than in urban areas’, and ‘a new approach is required to improve performance, particularly in urban and major regional centres with strong labour markets’.^[70] This ‘new approach’ will include the abolition of CDEPs and IECs in urban and major regional centres, as well as a greater focus on placement directly into jobs through ‘employer-focused job brokerage’. As the government’s discussion paper elaborates:

To make the most of strong labour markets in urban and major regional centres, the Australian Government proposes to further increase the focus on employer demand and placement directly into jobs. This would mean that in these locations, CDEP and IEC activities would cease and funding would be redirected to an enhanced STEP brokerage service from 1 July 2007. [emphasis added]

The IEC model, which was designed to bridge the gap between CDEP and Job Network, is no longer necessary given the improved performance of CDEP service providers and Job Network members. Funding for IECs across Australia would cease on 30 June 2007. CDEP would continue to operate for eligible people in remote locations and regional location with weaker labour markets. ^[71] ... This would affect about 40 of the 210 current CDEP service providers and about 7,000 CDEP places out of around 35,000. All IECs across Australia would cease on 30 June 2007.^[72] [emphasis added]

The new ‘brokerage services’ would be provided by enhanced Structured Training and Employment Projects (STEP) brokers (see text box below). They would work with local employers to identify employment opportunities and place people directly into jobs or organise training, mentoring and other activities that would prepare job seekers for identified jobs. CDEPs and IECs would be able to compete for new business as STEP brokers.^[73]

It is important to note that these proposed changes are intended to commence implementation in mid 2007. The lifespan of these proposed new arrangements is only identified as being the next 2 years, i.e. 2007-08 and 2008-09. It seems the way is being left open for the full mainstreaming of Indigenous employment services in urban and regional centres following that.

The latest round of proposed changes to the CDEP scheme comes not long after a significant round of reforms last year. There has not been sufficient time to assess whether those changes were having a positive effective before Indigenous communities and organisations are now expected to absorb another, arguably more complex round of changes. This apparent ‘restlessness’ in arrangements, with constant changing of organisations, policy-settings, and even names, creates its own stresses and problems.^[79]

It is important that there is clear direction and informed policy development in the critical area of Indigenous employment. This is not to suggest that all new policies should be free of modification and adjustment, but there needs to be recognition that communities and organisations can only absorb so much change before it becomes destabilising and detrimental.

It remains to be seen whether the government’s proposal to increase Indigenous employment through job placement and job-relevant training in areas with an apparent strong labour market will result in increased sustainable job placements. However, there are a number of factors that bring into question whether this will be the case.

Principal among these is the assumption that a market with strong local demand will take up an Indigenous job seeker as readily as it would a non-Indigenous job seeker. As Job Futures pointed out in its response to the government’s discussion paper:

Aboriginal job seekers, on the whole, are further from the world of work, more likely to live in jobless households, have lower basic skills (including literacy/numeracy) and are less likely to be prepared for sustainable work.^[80]

Similarly, a downturn in current buoyant labour conditions may also weaken the position of Indigenous job seekers in the employment market.

Although the government is confident that the CDEPs that have been targeted for replacement by enhanced STEP brokers all have strong labour markets, the socio-economic status of Indigenous peoples in those locations does not compare well to the non-Indigenous population. As Job Futures explains, in each location:

• The unemployment rate of Indigenous peoples is higher and the labour force participation rate lower than for non-Indigenous people – even when the CDEP labour force is included in the employment figures;
• The level of long-term unemployment is higher amongst Indigenous people than non-Indigenous people; and
• The level of schooling of Indigenous people is substantially lower than non-Indigenous people.^[81]
  

Given the profile of Indigenous job seekers in the locations where the CDEP reforms will occur, Job Futures has recommended the government maintain the CDEP scheme as an ‘intermediate labour market program’ – which was the broad intention of the 2005-06 changes to CDEP guidelines. Job Futures recommends that in urban areas, rather than abolishing them, CDEPs be:

... repositioned as an Intermediate Labour Market program which provides an experience of real work, for wages, which reconnects people to the world of work and facilitates the transition to mainstream employment. ... While many employers are willing to provide vocational skills, employers are not geared to assisting employees to gain basic skills. Employers want employees who will turn up each day appropriately dressed, able to work effectively with co-workers and with a basic understanding of work safety rules. Intermediate labour market programs give people the chance to develop these skills’.^[82]

I am not alone in my concerns about the haste with which the changes to the CDEP scheme will be introduced, and the extent to which Indigenous communities and organisations will be prepared for their introduction.^[83] The government’s discussion paper acknowledges that on 1 July 2007 approximately 7,000 people will lose their CDEP wage. What it does not contemplate are the possible adverse social and economic consequences for the Indigenous individuals, families and communities that will be affected. As Job Futures warns:

CDEP is currently the largest employer of Aboriginal people in the country and is considered a real job by participants, community members and recipients of CDEP services. ... Unless these individuals have a job to go to, they will be made redundant and are likely to experience the range of personal, social and financial problems that go with this. Shame, withdrawal from social activity, ill health and poor financial status are some of the consequences. ...

We highlight these issues not because we believe that the status quo should remain, but because we believe that change should be measured and should be calculated to improve the situation of Aboriginal people – not drive communities and individuals to despair.^[84] [emphasis added]

Although the government’s discussion paper provides assurances that DEWR will develop comprehensive transition arrangements for all CDEP participants and service providers affected by the new model, there is surprisingly little detail about what such arrangements might entail. Beyond assurances that DEWR will ‘ensure affected participants understand how the changes affect them and what their options are’, and will ‘work with CDEP service providers, Centrelink, and other service providers’ to assist participants – there is no further information.^[85]

The government’s proposal to abolish all IECs without first evaluating their effectiveness is also a matter of concern. The discussion paper makes no comment about whether they achieved any of their objectives, or how the enhanced STEP brokerage system will improve on them. Rather it appears that the IEC model is being mainstreamed and re-badged as something new and improved, namely enhanced STEP. However there is surprisingly little detail about how the ‘enhanced STEP’ will be different from the old ‘STEP’. For example, there is no information about:

• The number of people that will be able to access the service over time;
• The nature or level of the community activities stream;
• How activities under STEP will be differentiated from Job Network services; and
• The key performance indicators or the guidelines that DEWR will use to distribute business amongst the employment brokers.
  

I am not confident that the month-long public consultation process shed any further light on these matters or enhanced general understanding in the Indigenous community about how the reforms will operate. Such understanding is critical to the smooth implementation at the community level. As Job Futures observes:

After one consultation session at which DEWR presented, a number of organisational representatives discussed their impression of the extent to which community engagement activities would continue to be part of the enhanced STEP model. The organisations had impressions ranging from that these activities would be unchanged under the new arrangements, to that they would be practically eliminated. This difference highlights the fact that the discussion paper simply does not have the level of information required by communities, recipients of CDEP services (eg childcare centres, Day Patrol) and CDEP participants to enable them to consult about the impact of the changes.^[86]

I expressed significant concerns about the consultation process held for the previous round of CDEP reforms.^[87] Similar concerns exist about the latest round of consultations on the discussion paper. A total of 30 face-to-face consultations were held in urban and regional centres over a two week period in November 2006, and each consultation ran for three hours. Interested parties had at most, one month to submit written comments.^[88] Although the government has provided assurances that the feedback from these consultations will ‘be used to shape the future direction of CDEP,’^[89] I question the extent to which the government will take on board any Indigenous or employment industry feedback. The government has already identified which CDEPs it will abolish, it has set a deadline of 1 July 2007 for the commencement of the STEP brokerages, and there simply is not the time to rethink the model in any substantive way.

Concerns have also been expressed regarding the capacity of some CDEPs and IECs to compete for STEP brokerage contracts against organisations that have years of experience bidding for contracts with DEWR.^[90] Although DEWR intends to ‘work closely with CDEP organisations to maximise the opportunities for emerging businesses to continue’,^[91] there is considerable risk that some of these organisations will not make the transition. The loss of organisations that deliver valuable if not essential services in Indigenous communities will have broader social and economic consequences that will need to be addressed as a matter of urgency.

Finally, I question the extent to which enhanced STEP will really provide a new service to Indigenous job seekers. The government acknowledges that some Indigenous job seekers will not be ready for training or job placement; hence community work activities will have to continue to be provided through the enhanced STEP. It appears that, to this extent at least, STEP will continue to operate like a CDEP in relation to these Indigenous clients. Similarly, the services described as falling within enhanced STEP are already currently available through the Job Network or Wage Assistance.^[92]

My Office will continue to monitor developments in relation to the operation of the CDEP scheme and the enhanced STEP model. The effects of the changed arrangements will need to be carefully monitored before further changes are introduced. This will especially be the case if the proposed changes prove to be a trojan horse for further mainstreaming of Indigenous employment services in urban areas. It would be highly undesirable if a class of Indigenous peoples become permanently isolated from the labour market in urban and regional areas, without the support of CDEP or some similar arrangement that meets the particular needs of Indigenous unemployed people and allows them activity, training and purpose. It is difficult at this stage to see this being satisfactorily provided by the mainstream employment services.

The Council of Australian Governments (COAG) Trials

The genesis of the new arrangements are to be found in the agreement in April 2002 of the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) to trial a new whole of government approach to the delivery of services to Indigenous communities at eight selected trial sites:

The aim of these trials will be to improve the way governments interact with each other and with communities to deliver more effective responses to the needs of indigenous Australians. The lessons learnt from these cooperative approaches will be able to be applied more broadly.^[93]

The key objectives in the COAG trial sites were to:

• tailor government action to identified community needs and aspirations;
• coordinate government programs and services where this will improve service delivery outcomes;
• encourage innovative approaches;
• cut through blockages and red tape to resolve issues quickly;
• negotiate agreed project outcomes, benchmarks and responsibilities with the relevant people in Indigenous communities;
• work with Indigenous communities to build the capacity of people in those communities to negotiate as genuine partners with government; and
• build the capacity of government employees to work in new ways with Indigenous communities.^[94]
  

As it turns out, on the information available to date, it would appear that none of these objectives have been achieved to any significant degree (see below).^[95]

The trials got underway in some sites in 2002 and in others in 2003. A federal government department was identified for each trial site to lead the government’s involvement in the trial. The Secretary of the Department was to act as a ‘champion’ for the relevant community, in the sense of promoting the coordinated delivery of services by the federal departments involved. The sites were to be individually monitored and evaluated, as well as evaluating the overall whole of government approach embodied in the trials:

The whole-of-government initiative will be evaluated by an independent expert within two years of commencement and again after five years. Data collected and analysed through the performance monitoring process and feedback received from trial regions will be included in the evaluation.^[96]

Unfortunately, these early commitments concerning evaluation of the COAG trials were slow in coming to realisation. An evaluation framework for the trials was released in October 2003, but this set out evaluation priorities rather than an evaluation process. In April 2004 it was stated that ‘evaluation of the trials would be premature at this stage’.^[97] Even though the trials had neither been completed nor evaluated at the time, in July 2004 the Government chose to replicate this whole of government service delivery model on a nation-wide basis through implementing the new arrangements for the administration of Indigenous affairs.

Thus, as I noted in 2004:

The structures of the new arrangements and the philosophy that underpins them can be seen to have been directly derived from the COAG trials.^[98]

Indeed, despite the absence of any formal evaluation, the federal government continually stated that the new arrangements were based on ‘the early learnings’ from the COAG trials, as well as findings of the ATSIC Review.^[99] This places the COAG trials at the centre of the new arrangements. Concerns about the trials have to be viewed in this context.

The key problem that presents itself is whether there was premature adoption of the COAG trials in terms of implementing the new arrangements. This danger was noted by the Senate Select Committee on the Administration of Indigenous Affairs in its 2005 report After ATSIC – Life in the Mainstream?^[100] While the Senate Committee was supportive of the COAG trials, it had concerns, especially if the model was to be applied widely too early. As the Committee noted:

The Committee is concerned that the COAG trials are being used as a model for wider service delivery arrangements before there is any clear idea of whether these trial sites have succeeded or not. In point of fact, the COAG trials are yet to be assessed in any authoritative manner; until such time as that occurs, the likelihood of success of the new arrangements is difficult to gauge, and as such, represents a risk in terms of public policy. ^[101] [emphasis added]

In what now appears to be a prophetic observation, the Committee noted that the extent of dedicated support that the COAG trials were then receiving to ensure their success was unsustainable.^[102]

My Office became increasingly concerned about arrangements for evaluation of these trials and public accountability for their outcomes. The Social Justice Report 2003 noted that:

... it is not clear at this stage that the performance monitoring framework of the trials will be sufficiently rigorous.^[103] ... The lack of a clear evaluation strategy is of great concern.^[104]

Consequently I recommended that an independent monitoring and evaluation process for the whole of government community trials initiative be initiated.^[105] However, by the time of the Social Justice Report 2005, my concerns about the evaluation had not diminished, and I reported that:

To date, progress has been slow in ensuring that the new arrangements are subject to rigorous and transparent monitoring processes. The absence of sufficient processes amounts to a failure of government accountability.^[106]

HORSCATSIA, in its 2004 report on its inquiry into capacity building and service delivery in Indigenous communities, whilst being generally supportive of the trials, also noted its’ ‘serious concerns regarding the Trials.’^[107] They stated:

The Committee notes that there has been limited, if any coordinated reporting on their implementation and, to date, no tangible evidence has emerged on their progress. The Committee has concerns regarding accountability matters, and believes that an effective audit process needs to be put in place and a regular report made on their progress in achieving outcomes.^[108]

The Committee went on to recommend that:

The Commonwealth Government report to Parliament on an annual basis on the progress of the COAG Trial of the whole of government approach to service delivery in Indigenous communities and regions, and that procedures be implemented to ensure that the report presented in the House of Representatives stands referred to this Committee for its considerations and report.^[109]

In its response to the Committee’s Report (August 2006), the government rejected this recommendation, arguing that it:

... is committed to ensuring that reporting on the progress of the COAG trials is carried out and made widely available, and therefore [the government] does not consider that a report to the Parliament is necessary.^[110]

Information about the progress of COAG trials has clearly not been made ‘widely available’ to date. The past three Social Justice Reports have expressed concerns about the lack of transparency and the absence of monitoring and evaluative processes, and the consequent lack of government accountability, for the COAG trials in some depth.^[111]

This year the advice from the Office of Indigenous Policy Coordination (OIPC) concerning the status of the evaluation of the COAG sites has been as follows:

In late 2003 the Australian and State and Territory Governments agreed on a monitoring and evaluation framework for the eight COAG Indigenous coordination trials ... OIPC is coordinating evaluations of the eight COAG trial sites on behalf of the Australian Government, in consultation with the relevant Commonwealth and State/Territory lead agencies in each site.

Formative evaluations of each site commenced in 2005-06. The evaluations are looking at what’s working well and what can be improved. They are being undertaken by independent evaluators using a common evaluation framework. They are focusing on how governments can improve their engagement with each other and with Indigenous people and communities. The evaluation reports will cover the history of the trial, the coordination processes used in the trial, interim outcomes and options for further consideration by the trial partners. The evaluations should be largely completed by July 2006.

An overarching report (or meta-evaluation) in the second half of 2006 will draw together the common themes and lessons from the individual COAG Trial site evaluations.

The need for and nature of further evaluation of the COAG Trials will be considered after the meta-evaluation and will be flagged in future evaluation plans as appropriate.^[112]

This timetable has run behind schedule. Further, the federal government has not made the findings of the reviews of the COAG trial sites publicly available as they have been completed, preferring instead to release all of the individual trial reports and the synopsis report when they are all complete and the government has had the opportunity to consider them.^[113]

In the absence of information from the federal government on the evaluation of the trials, I sought to gauge the effectiveness of the trials using what information was available from various state and territory governments and other sources.^[114] I presented and analysed this information in the Social Justice Report 2005, noting the shortcomings and problems evident in at least some of the trials at that stage. For example, independent evaluations of the Shepparton COAG trial, commissioned by the community partners, concluded that the trial was failing.^[115]

Such apparent failures put a question mark over the entire COAG trial process. As the authors of the Shepparton evaluation rightly asked:

If the COAG pilot is unable to function successfully in an innovative and tested Aboriginal community such as Shepparton, the question must be asked: Where can it succeed?^[116]

We now have part of the answer to that question: not, apparently, at Wadeye in the Northern Territory.

The evaluation of the Wadeye COAG trial (also referred to as the ‘Gray Report’) entered the public arena in late 2006 before the government intended and was widely reported in the press.^[117] It was also discussed at the November 2006 Senate Estimates hearings. The Gray Report described significant problems with the Wadeye trial (see box below).

Wadeye was selected as the Northern Territory site for a COAG trial. The Secretary of the then Department of Family and Community Services (FaCS) was responsible for the implementation of the trial. Its high profile nature prompted the Prime Minister, the Chief Minister of the NT, and other senior Ministers to visit Wadeye during the period of the trial, which in turn heightened expectations of the trial’s success. The Secretaries' Group on Indigenous Affairs Annual Report 2004-05 commented:

The trial site at Wadeye is showing how governments can work together with Indigenous communities to improve outcomes for Indigenous people.^[118]

In a similar vein, the then Minister, Senator Vanstone, had commented:

In the COAG trial we dealt directly with the 'Thamarrurr' [traditional governance arrangement] so each of the clans has been able to have its say. As a result of us listening to the Thamarrurr and responding, life is now improving for the people of Wadeye.

The Thamarrurr, Territory and Australian governments agreed education was a priority and just last week there was a massive increase in the number of children attending school. So much so that more desks had to be put on the barge from Darwin.

What works in Wadeye of course will not work everywhere else.^[119]

Unfortunately the optimism shown about the trial proved to be misplaced. The evaluation report by Bill Gray AM, a highly regarded former senior government official, indicates an almost total failure of the Wadeye trial to achieve its objectives.

The Wadeye COAG trial showed that the whole of government approach to service delivery is difficult to implement, requires a major investment of time and resources, and has yet to demonstrate that it provides a reliable and realistic platform for the administration of Indigenous affairs. Whilst coordination of service delivery is important and should be pursued, it is not a substitute for developing and implementing strong policies and effective programs to respond to the difficult circumstances facing communities like Wadeye.

A sense of urgency, commitment and partnership is required. However, as of November 2006 at Wadeye the government is instead locked in a wrangle over leasing arrangements for the township which seem more to do with ideology and less to do with service delivery.^[121] Australian National University researcher John Taylor has observed:

... the Thamarrurr region is rapidly expanding in population size. Unless a major upgrading occurs, this trajectory means that Wadeye (along with many predominantly Aboriginal towns across the Top End) will be increasingly anomalous in the Australian settlement hierarchy for being a vibrant and growing medium-sized country town yet with almost none of the basic infrastructure and services normally associated with such places.^[122]

The Wadeye trial indicated unresolved tensions or contradictions in policy settings. For example, genuine engagement at family level, a key objective of the new arrangements, will almost certainly take government down the path of support for smaller family and clan-based satellite and outstation communities. However, present federal government policy towards outstations is uncertain at best, and has included a moratorium on housing for outstation and similar communities, as described in Text Box 7 below.

The greatest danger arising from the disappointing outcomes of the COAG Wadeye trial, and from similar problems with other COAG trials, is that the wrong lessons will be learned.

When asked about the government’s response to the Gray Report at Senate Estimates hearings in early 2007, the Associate Secretary of FaCSIA explained that ‘ ... our [the government’s] response to the evaluation predated our receipt of the report’.^[124] The Associate Secretary went on to explain that shortly after taking office, the Minister for Indigenous Affairs travelled to Wadeye and undertook immediate action to try to alleviate the situation and quell local riots. Not only is this an indication of the extent to which the trial had failed to achieve a coordinated, whole of government outcome, it is also a very clear indication of the fact that we may not be given the opportunity to learn the lessons from the Wadeye trial. The message from Wadeye may well be as much about policy failure as about failure of processes and procedures. We have to look this possibility squarely in the face – simply moving on to another ‘model’ of intervention will not do.

Whilst the trial evaluations remain important in their own right, the COAG trial evaluations are something of a proxy for evaluation of the new arrangements in their entirety. Significant problems in respect of the trial sites would suggest that the system as a whole may be in difficulty. This consideration adds a dimension of urgency and significance to the evaluations of the COAG trials.

It is becoming evident that serious discussion needs to takes place with Indigenous peoples and other stakeholders at national, regional and local levels about the new arrangements in Indigenous affairs. As we move into post-COAG t