Submission of the Human Rights And Equal Opportunity Commission
to the Senate
Legal And Constitutional Legislation Committee
on the Human
Rights Legislation Amendment Bill (No.2) 1998
1.1 The amendments
effected by the Human Rights Legislation Amendment Bill (No.2) 1998
(Cth) (AHRLAB No.2") can be divided into two categories:
core amendments that impact upon the independence, integrity and effectiveness
of the Commission, namely:
(a) the removal
of the Commission's power to intervene in proceedings before the Courts;
(b) the lack
of transitional provisions for current Commissioners to transfer to
the positions of Deputy Presidents; and
that impact upon the internal procedural operation of the Commission
and the public's understanding and perception of the Commission but
are not integral to the Commission's independence, namely:
(a) the restriction
on the President's power to delegate complaint handling powers under
Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission 1986 (Cth) ("HREOCA")
to Deputy Presidents;
(b) the structure
of the Commission;
(c) the new nomenclature
for the Commission and Deputy Presidents;
amendments to HREOCA, the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth)
("RDA") and Sex Discrimination Act 1984 ("SDA"); and
(e) the separation
of the office of the Privacy Commissioner from the Commission.
submission strongly opposes the proposed amendments on the matters referred
to in paragraph 1.1.1 above and makes recommendations accordingly. This
submission also provides comments for the Committee's consideration in
relation to the matters referred to in paragraph 1.1.2 above.
2. FUNDAMENTAL CORE CHANGES
EFFECTED BY HRLAB NO. 2
2.1 The independence
of the Commission is at the very core of the Commission's ability to perform
(and to be seen to perform) its functions with effectiveness, integrity
has played the leading role in the promotion of independent national human
rights institutions internationally, including in the development of the
Principles relating to the Status of National Institutions (the "Paris
Principles") (1) that set the international
minimum standard for those institutions. It is the essence of the Paris
Principles that such a national human rights institution maintains
and is permitted to maintain the independence and mandate that is essential
for it to perform its functions and operate in an uncompromised manner.
2.3 For many
years the Australian Government has been the principal sponsor of the
annual resolutions of the UN Commission on Human Rights and the UN General
Assembly that re affirm the need for national institutions to comply with
the guarantees of independence contained in the Paris Principles.
It has been responsible for the drafting, negotiation and presentation
of these resolutions to the UN Commission and to the General Assembly.
2.4 The Australian
Government and the Commission are also world leaders in working cooperatively
with other countries to establish and strengthen independent national
human rights institutions in accordance with the Paris Principles.
2.5 The Australian
Government has supported the establishment of the Asia Pacific Forum of
National Human Rights Institutions for this purpose and provided funding
for the Forum secretariat. Through the Forum it supports multilateral
and bilateral programs of technical assistance for this purpose. It has
provided funding towards the establishment or strengthening of institutions
in South Africa, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Mongolia and the Philippines.
The Minister for Foreign Affairs recently announced a $2m program of technical
assistance to the Indonesian Human Rights Commission. The success of this
work rests on Australia's integrity in having established its own national
human rights institution that is truly independent, effective and credible.
2.6 It is,
therefore, a matter of great concern to the Commission that two facets
of the amendments contained in HRLAB No. 2 compromise the Commission's
independence and integrity by:
(a) placing conditions
on the Commission's power to intervene in proceedings before the Courts,
(b) failing to
provide transitional provisions in relation to present Commissioners
being Deputy Presidents in the new Human Rights and Responsibilities
3. CONDITIONS PLACED BY HRLAB
NO. 2 ON THE COMMISSION'S POWERS TO INTERVENE
to legislative provisions in the HREOCA, RDA, SDA and Disability Discrimination
Act 1992 (Cth) ("DDA"), the Commission has the function to seek leave
to intervene in matters before the Courts.(3)
3.2 The Commission
has used the function sparingly, seeking to intervene only where it considered
a case raised a significant human rights or anti-discrimination issue
that the parties would not present to the Court adequately or at all.
3.2 The Commission
has sought and been granted leave to intervene in matters before the High
Court, Federal Court, Family Court or a state Court on approximately 17
occasions in the 11 years that the Commission has exercised the function.
3.3 The most
notable cases where the Commission has been granted leave to intervene
and has provided the Court with substantive submissions include:
(a) a number of
cases over ten years relating to the rights of the child, including
(i) cases concerning
applications to the Family Court for the sterilisation of girls and
young women with intellectual disabilities: Re a Teenager (1988)
94 FLR 181; Secretary, Department of Health and Community Services
v. J.W.B and S.M.B (1992) 175 C.L.R 218 (Marion's Case) where
the High Court adopted the approach argued by the Commission; Re
Marion [No.2] (1994) FLC 92-448; P v. P (1995) FLC 92-615
and Re Katie (1996) FLC 92-659
(ii) Re Michael:
John Briton, Acting Public Advocate (Victoria) v. GP & KP (1994)
FLC 92-486 concerning the consent required for a child to receive
(iii) ZP v.
PS (1994) 68 ALJR 554 concerning the application of the law when
a child is abducted from Australia; and
of State for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Teoh (1995) 183
CLR 273, concerning the best interests of a child in relation to the
deportation of a parent, where the Commission's submissions were adopted
by the majority of the High Court
(b) a number of
cases concerning the rights of immigration detainees and applicants
for refugee status, including Wu v. Minister for Immigration and
Ethnic Affairs & the Commonwealth of Australia (1996) 64 FCR 245,
C, L, J & Z v. Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs, Mr M
H Gerkens & Mr J Vrachnas (unreported, O'Loughlin J, 30 March 1995)
(c) Langer v.
The Commonwealth (1996) 186 CLR 302 concerning the principle of
freedom of political speech and imprisonment for contempt of court
(d) Croome &
Anor v. State of Tasmania (1997) 71 ALR 397 concerning the inconsistency
between State and federal legislation in relation to consenting adult
homosexual activity; and
& Anor v The Commonwealth of Australia (1997) 152 ALR 540, concerning
the validity of federal legislation that may be racially discriminatory,
where the Commission's submissions were referred to in three of the
four judgements in the High Court.
No.2 has the effect of seriously fettering the Commission's power to seek
leave to intervene in proceedings before the Courts by making this power
dependent upon the approval of the Attorney-General. (4)
In deciding whether to grant such approval, the Attorney-General may (but
need not) have regard to whether:
(a) the Commonwealth
or a person on behalf of the Commonwealth has already intervened in
(b) in the Attorney-General's
opinion, the proceedings may affect to a significant extent the human
rights of persons who are not parties to the proceedings;
(c) in the Attorney-General's
opinion, the proceedings have significant implications for the administration
of the relevant Act and other legislation administered by the Commission;
(d) in the Attorney-General's
opinion, there are special circumstances such that it would be in the
public interest for the Commission to intervene.
3.5 The Commission
is concerned that the proposed amendment:
(a) usurps the
authority of the Court to determine if it shall grant leave to an intervenor
by preventing the Commission approaching the Court directly;
(b) raises real
issues of conflict of interest given that, at times, the Commonwealth
will be a party (usually in the role of respondent) to a matter in which
the Commission wishes to intervene. It is inappropriate for a party
to have a "gatekeeper" role as to who should be permitted to intervene
in a matter in which it is a litigant;
(c) seriously compromises
the Commission's independence as it may deny the Commission the opportunity
to argue human rights issues before the Courts in cases where the Commonwealth
takes a different view to the Commission of Australia's human rights
(d) overlooks the
fact that there may be situations where the Commission may have a very
real contribution to make in terms of its expertise and specialisation
in human rights even where the Commonwealth may be intervening in the
(e) raises the
possibility of a perception of political control of the Commission,
including in cases where the Commission's independent intervention would
be most important, ie, where the Commission considers that violation
of human rights are at issue.
3.6 The placing
of conditions on the Commission's ability to intervene is contrary to
the Paris Principles which provide that a national institution
vested with competence to promote and protect human rights shall
consider any questions falling within its competence, whether they are
submitted by the Government or taken up by it without referral to a higher
authority, on the proposal of its members or any petitioner".
The Commission makes
the following recommendations in relation to the amendments contained
in HRLAB No.2 that fetter the Commission's intervention powers:
(a) that the status
quo prevail and the Commission's intervention power remain unfettered
by the need for approval from the Attorney-General; or
(b) if criteria
are to be inserted as to when the Commission should seek leave to intervene
in a matter, then the criteria should apply to the Commission's consideration
of whether it should seek leave and should be without the need for the
Attorney-General's approval; and/or
(c) if there is
a concern that there may a duplication in resources and submissions
if the Commission and the Commonwealth intervene in the same matter
then a more appropriate response to any perceived difficulty is the
development of written protocol between the Attorney-General and the
Commission in relation to the consideration of possible interventions
by the Commission so that the Commission and the Commonwealth may co-operate
in relation to interventions in a way that avoids any need for a legislative
amendment that expressly and contrary to committed principles fetters
the Commission's power to intervene.
4. LACK OF TRANSITIONAL PROVISIONS
IN RELATION TO PRESENT COMMISSIONERS
4.1 One characteristic
of an independent national human rights institutions is that its members
are appointed for fixed terms and can only be dismissed before the expiry
of those terms for reasons of misconduct, incapacity or bankruptcy. The
present legislation reflects this central principle.(5)
the lack of transitional provisions in relation to Commissioners is contrary
to the Paris Principles which require that:
to ensure a stable mandate for the members of the national institution,
without which there can be no real independence, their appointment shall
be effected by an official act which shall establish a specific duration
of the mandate...."
No. 2 provides transitional provisions whereby the continuity of the term
of the President of the Commission is not affected by HRLAB No. 2(6)
and the President of the Commission is automatically re-appointed (with
accrued entitlements) as a full-time member of the HRRC. (7)
No. 2 does not provide equivalent transitional provisions for the current
Commissioners to transfer to Deputy President positions. The absence of
the transitional provisions affects the security of tenure of the current
Commissioners which is integral to the nature of their appointments.
4.5 It should
also be noted that when the current Commission was established by HREOCA
in 1986, replacing the Human Rights Commission, the timing of the restructure
was such that it coincided with the expiration of the terms of the Commissioner's
of the Human Right Commission and therefore the length of the Commissioners'
terms were not abbreviated.
4.6 The omission
of such transitional provisions also threatens the stability of and the
public confidence in the Commission as it creates the perception that
the Government is threatening the independence of the Commission.
In relation to the
absence of transitional provisions in HRLAB No.2 relating to the currently
appointed Commissioners' transition to Deputy Presidents, the Commission
recommends that provisions in the same form as those concerning the continuity
of the President's appointment, be inserted into HRLAB No. 2.
5. OTHER AMENDMENTS
The other amendments
effected by HRLAB No. 2 impact upon the internal procedural operation
of the Commission and the public's understanding and perception of the
Commission. The Commission provides the following comments on the possible
effect of some of the amendments on the functioning and perception of
on President's powers to delegate under HREOCA
5.1.1 The effect
of the Human Rights Legislation Amendment Bill 1997 (HRLAB) (8)
is to prohibit the President from delegating the complaint handling
powers in the areas of race, sex and disability discrimination to members
of HREOC (including the Deputy Presidents dealing with race, sex and
disability discrimination). Under HRLAB No. 2, the President could delegate
his or her powers under section 11(1)(f) and (p) and section 31(b) and
(k) of HREOCA but only to the Human Rights Commissioner.
5.1.2 Clause 25
of HRLAB No. 2 extends the prohibition on the President delegating complaint
handling powers to Deputy Presidents to the President's complaint handling
powers under HREOCA(9) . This represents
a fundamental change from the scheme provided for in HRLAB that recognised
that the complaint handling function under HREOCA is different from
that provided for under the RDA, SDA and DDA in that HREOCA provides
for reports to be made to the Attorney-General in relation to acts or
practices that are inconsistent with human rights.
5.1.3 It has consistently
been the Commission's view (as was expressed to the Committee's inquiry
into HRLAB) that the President should be empowered to delegate complaint
handling powers to members of the Commission and that it is inappropriate
to limit the President's discretion to delegate to anyone, including
a Deputy President, that he or she thinks fit to exercise the relevant
it has consistently been the view of the Commission that the function
of reporting to Parliament on unconciliated complaints pursuant to s.11(f)(ii)
and s.31(b)(ii) of HREOCA should be the responsibility of the Commission
rather than of an individual member of the Commission.
5.2 The Structure
of the Commission
5.2.1 HRLAB No.
2 retains specialist portfolio office holders within the Commission,
but amalgamates four of the existing positions into two. The Commission
considers that Australia has been well served by the structure adopted
to date of specialist office holders. As a federal body, the wide jurisdiction
of the Commission requires specialist Commissioners and such specialisation
complements the generalist officeholders that exist in the state and
5.2.2 There have
been suggestions from many groups in recent years that further specialist
Commissioners should be added to focus on the rights of children, older
Australians and on discrimination based on sexual orientation. While
urging the continuation of specialist officeholders the Commission does
not make any recommendation on their number or on what their focal areas
5.2.3 The Commission
recognises that there is no perfect or universally recommended structure
for a national human rights institution. The most appropriate structure
will depend on the particular circumstances in the country at a particular
5.2.4 Such a consideration
- of the particular circumstances at a particular time - points to the
need to maintain a Commissioner who has significant experience in the
community life of Aboriginal persons or Torres Strait Islanders (see
below para 5.4.1(d)).
5.3 The new nomenclature
for the Commission and the Deputy Presidents
5.3.1 HRLAB No.
2 repeals all references to the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission
and replaces them with the Human Rights and Responsibilities Commission.
5.3.2 The Commission
agrees that the Commission's name should be changed but is of the view
that the suggested title is confusing as it combines two different aspects
of the character of the Commission and does not assist in explaining
the purpose or role of the Commission. Given that the public, media
and even the Government itself refers to the Commission as the "Human
Rights Commission", the Commission suggests that the law should reflect
the practice. The Attorney-General took this view recently in relation
to the change of the official name of the Australian Law Reform Commission.
5.3.3 The titles
Human Rights Commissioner, Race Discrimination Commissioner, Sex Discrimination
Commissioner and Disability Discrimination Commissioner are to be repealed
by HRLAB No.2 and substituted with the Deputy President responsible
for human rights and disability discrimination, Deputy President responsible
for racial discrimination and social justice and Deputy President responsible
for sex discrimination and equal opportunity.
5.3.4 The Commission's
comments in relation to these changes in nomenclature are:
(a) the new terminology
for the Deputy Presidents is long, ambiguous and cumbersome for everyday
use and does not assist in clearly and helpfully distinguishing between
each Deputy President, especially if it is to be used in a shorthand
(b) the manner
in which each Deputy President is described as being "responsible
for" a particular form of discrimination is maladroit;
(c) the terms
"social justice" and "equal opportunity" are too open-ended and capable
of supporting a wide range of meanings and intentions and do not concisely
reflect the mandate of the Commission or the particular Deputy President:
(i) the existing
title of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner
is not an accurate reflection of the jurisdiction of the Commission
or the Commissioner in this area and maintaining the term "social
justice" continues this inaccuracy. Social justice is a much broader
term than human rights and it is not found anywhere in HREOCA other
than in the title of the Commissioner.
A more accurate
description of this area of concern would be "indigenous human rights".
the term "equal opportunity" is broad and unhelpful in terms of
defining the role of the relevant Deputy President. The Commission
as a whole and each individual Deputy President will be committed
to promoting equal opportunity.
A more appropriate
term in the context would be "gender equality".
(d) A simple
and accurate way to characterise the Deputy Presidents is Deputy President
(Human Rights and Disability Discrimination), Deputy President (Sex
Discrimination and Gender Equality), and if there is not to be a Deputy
President specifically responsible for Indigenous Human Rights, Deputy
President (Race Discrimination and Indigenous Human Rights).
5.4 The specific
amendments to the HREOCA, RDA and SDA
(a) Sections 29(2)(c)
and 35(2)(c) of HREOCA provide that a notice issued pursuant to HREOCA
in relation to a finding that an act or practice is inconsistent with
or contrary to any human right, may include a recommendation for the
payment of compensation and the taking of other action that may remedy
or reduce loss or damage suffered by a person.
(b) Clauses 30
and 37 of HRLAB No. 2 provide that the notice to be issued pursuant
to s.29(2)(c) and s.35(2)(c) of HREOCA may include any recommendation
by the Commission that action be taken to remedy or reduce loss or damages
suffered by a person as a result of the act or practice other than payment
of compensation or damages to the person.
(c) A finding by
the Commission that is contained in the above notices can relate to
a significant violation of human rights or act of discrimination or
to a minor one. The only way to distinguish between the degrees of seriousness
of the violation is for the recommendation to reflect it. The removal
of the power to make recommendations as to compensation denies the Commission
the power to make these distinctions. The effect of the amendment is
that reports would only reflect the finding of a violation, leaving
the respondent to face exposure and criticism for what may be a relatively
Torres Strait Islander Commissioner or Deputy President
(d) The Commission
has expressed its views in the past on the need to maintain a specialist
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commissioner or Deputy President.
If the position is to be abolished, however, the Commission is concerned
that the new Deputy President who will deal with both racial discrimination
and Indigenous human rights may not be appropriately qualified to deal
with the second part of the duties. This is because the repeal of the
definition of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commissioner
in s.46B of HREOCA, also involves the repeal of the requirement that:
"A person is
not qualified to be appointed unless the Governor General is satisfied
that the person has significant experience in the community life of
Aboriginal persons or Torres Strait Islanders".
(e) The Commission
is strongly of the view that one of the Deputy Presidents should be
someone who satisfies the above criteria.
(f) Clause 23 of
HRLAB No. 2 repeals section 17 of HREOCA which provides that the Attorney-General
shall establish at least one advisory committee to advise:
(i) the Commission
on the performance of the Commission's functions; and
(ii) when requested
by the Attorney-General, to report to the Attorney-General on action
(if any) that needs to be taken by Australia in order to comply with
the provisions of the Discrimination (Employment and Occupation)
Convention 1958 and in respect of national policies relating to
equality of opportunity and treatment in employment and occupation.
(g) The repeal
of s.17 of HREOCA would result in the abolition of the National Advisory
Committee on Discrimination in Employment and Occupation ("the NAC").
The NAC's members include representatives of key organisations including
the Business Council of Australia, the Australian Chamber of Commerce
and Industry and the Australian Council of Trade Unions. It also includes
representatives of all state and territory governments and other significant
community organisations. The NAC submitted to the Attorney-General in
mid-1997 a draft national policy on discrimination in employment.
(h) The Commission
suggests that the Committee may wish to canvass the views of organisations
represented on the NAC before the NAC is abolished.
(a) Clause 113
of HRLAB No. 2 repeals the provisions contained in Part V of the RDA
that establish the Community Relations Council ("the Council"). The
functions of the Council (10) are to
advise and make recommendations to the Attorney-General either of its
own motion or upon a request from the Attorney-General on:
(i) the observance
and implementation of the International Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination ("the Convention");
(ii) the promotion
of educational programs with respect to the observance of the Convention;
(iii) the promotion
of studies and research programs with respect to the observance and
implementation of the Convention;
(iv) the publication
and dissemination of material to assist in the observance and implementation
of the Convention;
(v) the promotion
of understanding, tolerance and friendship among racial and ethnic groups;
(vi) any other
matter related to the observance or implementation of the Convention.
(b) While successive
governments have failed to fulfil the function under the RDA of establishing
the Council, the Commission suggests that any move to abolish the Council
should be reconsidered, given the current national sensitivities on
The Commission is
concerned that the specific roles of the Sex Discrimination Commissioner
or the relevant Deputy President under the Remuneration Tribunal Act
1973 and the Workplace Relations Act 1996 have been removed and
given to the Commission or any member of it (see clauses 32, 33 and 34
of Schedule 3 of HRLAB No.2).
Whilst it is still
possible for the relevant Deputy President to exercise this role, it is
a removal of a very relevant and important nexus between those jurisdictions
and the sex discrimination portfolio.
of the office of the Privacy Commissioner from the Commission
Neither the Commission
nor the Privacy Commissioner has any objection to the separation of the
Office of the Privacy Commissioner from the Commission pursuant to the
provisions of HRLAB No. 2.
THE INDEPENDENCE OF HUMAN
The single most important
attribute of an institution established to protect and promote human rights
is its independence. These institutions have the task of monitoring the
conduct of governments and the agents of governments. If they are subject
to direction and control by governments their effectiveness, integrity
and impartiality are compromised and they have no credibility in the eyes
of those whose rights are to be protected.
over the 20 years the United Nations has encouraged the establishment
of independent national human rights institutions. Resolutions about these
bodies have always stressed the essential attribute of independence. In
its most significant resolution on national institutions in 1993, the
UN General Assembly
the importance of developing, in accordance with national legislation,
effective national institutions for the promotion and protection of human
rights and of ensuring their pluralism and their independence. (11)
That resolution also
welcomed the development of the Principles Relating to the Status of
National Institutions (the "Paris Principles") (12)
which provide minimum standards for the establishment and operation of
national institutions to promote and protect human rights. The essence
of the Paris Principles is that a national human rights institution
must have the independence and mandate essential for it to perform its
functions effectively and operate in an unfettered and uncompromised manner.
the leading role in the development of the Paris Principles. For
many years it has been the principal sponsor of the annual resolutions
of the UN Commission on Human Rights and the UN General Assembly that
re-affirm the need for national institutions to comply with the guarantees
of independence contained in the Paris Principles. In 1997, for
example, the UN Commission on Human Rights
the importance of the development of effective, independent, pluralistic
national institutions for the promotion and protection of human rights
in keeping with the Principles relating to the status of national institutions.
In 1998 the UN Commission
on Human Rights again
the importance of the development of effective, independent, pluralistic
national institutions for the promotion and protection of human rights
in conformity with the Principles relating to the status of national institutions.
The Australian Government
was responsible for the drafting, negotiation and presentation of these
resolutions to the UN Commission and to the General Assembly. As Mr Downer,
Australia's Minister for Foreign Affairs stated in New York in October
1997, in his speech to the 52nd session of the General Assembly of the
"It is with
this in mind that Australia gives priority to institution building in
the human rights field. One of the most significant developments in recent
years has been the spread of national institutions for the promotion of
human rights. Such institutions, able to work with governments and civil
society, can reflect to a significant degree the different cultures and
local conditions of the societies in which they are established, while
at the same time remaining consistent with international human rights
standards. Moreover, it is worth noting that the General Assembly has
endorsed a set of minimum standards for such institutions - the so-called
"Paris Principles". Despite considerable early scepticism, recent experience
has been very positive and many governments and non-governmental organisations
are now looking positively at independent national institutions as an
important means to promote and protect human rights. The generally positive
view of the work of national institutions held by most states was reflected
in the adoption by consensus of Australia's resolution on this subject
at this year's session of the Commission on Human Rights, with an increased
number of co-sponsors". (15)
The Office of the
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, formerly called the
Centre for Human Rights, has produced a manual for human rights institutions,
National Human Rights Institutions: A Handbook on the Establishment and
Strengthening of National Institutions for the Promotion and Protection
of Human Rights ("the Manual"). (16) The
national institution will be one which is capable of acting independently
of government, of party politics and of all other entities and situations
which may be in a position to affect its work. (17)
The Manual describes
four essential characteristics of independence: independence through legal
and operational autonomy, independence through financial autonomy, independence
through appointment and dismissal procedures and independence through
Principles relating to the Status of National Institutions (Paris Principles)
at Appendix 1.
further information on the independence of human rights institutions at
s.11(1)(o) of HREOCA, s. 20(1)(e) of the RDA, s. 48(1)(gb) of the SDA
and s.67(1)(l) of the DDA.
See clauses 33 and 34 (in relation to HREOCA), 106 and 109 (in relation
to the RDA), 125 and 127 (in relation to the SDA) and 80 and 82 (in relation
to the DDA).
See s.41 and 46I of HREOCA; s.34 of the RDA; s.102 of the SDA; s.119
of the DDA and s.25 of the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth).
See clause 132 of HRLAB No.2.
See clause 133 of HRLAB No. 2.
Clause 55 of HRLAB.
Sections 11(1)(f), 31(1)(b) and 31(1)(k) of HREOCA.
See section 28(2) of the RDA.
Resolution A/Res/48/134 of 20 December 1993 Operative Paragraph 2.
Annexed to Commission on Human Rights resolution 1992/54 of 3 March 1992
(Official Records of the Economic and Social Council, 1992, Supplement
No. 2 (E/1992/22), chap. II, sect. A and to General Assembly resolution
48/134 of 20 December 1993.
Australia's Statement to the 52nd session of the General Assembly of the
united Nations by the Hon. Alexander Downer, MP, Minister for Foreign
Affairs, N.Y. 3 October 1997.
Professional Training Series No.4, Centre for Human Rights, United Nations,
Ibid., para 68
Ibid., paras 70-85
updated 27 March 2003.