SUBMISSION OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS AND EQUAL OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION TO THE AUSTRALIAN LAW REFORM COMMISSION IN RESPONSE TO BACKGROUND PAPER 8: PROTECTING CLASSIFIED AND SECURITY SENSITIVE INFORMATION

Introduction

  1. The Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (HREOC) is established by the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission Act 1986. HREOC is Australia's National Human Rights Institution.
  2. HREOC's functions include those set out in section 11(1) of the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission Act 1986 (HREOC Act). Section 11(1)(g) of the HREOC Act confers upon HREOC the function of promoting an understanding and acceptance, and the public discussion, of human rights in Australia.
  3. HREOC notes that the Attorney-General has asked the Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC) to inquire into, and report on, measures to protect classified and security sensitive information in the course of investigations and legal proceedings, and in other contexts. HREOC understands that the ALRC has been asked to consider whether existing mechanisms adequately protect classified and security sensitive information and whether there is a need for further regulatory or non-regulatory measures in this area.
  4. HREOC's purpose in making this submission in response to the ALRC's Background Paper 8: Protecting Classified and Security Sensitive Information (Background Paper) is to assist the ALRC to ensure that the laws, proposals and recommendations it reviews or considers are, as far as practicable, consistent with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Schedule 2 to the HREOC Act) (ICCPR), in accordance with section 24(1) of the Australian Law Reform Commission Act 1996 (Cth).
  5. Australia ratified the ICCPR on 13 August 1980, which is binding upon it as a matter of international law. The ICCPR has its own individual complaint mechanism as provided for in the First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR (which was ratified by Australia on 25 September 1991).

Derogation from the ICCPR

  1. The ICCPR sets out a procedure for the derogation from certain rights in times of public emergency or war. Article 4 of the ICCPR provides for derogation from human rights protectionsin times of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation". However, that derogation provision is carefully circumscribed so as to avoid arbitrary disregard for human rights. The following requirements apply if Australia seeks to invoke Article 4:
  • The public emergency must threaten the life of the nation;
  • The public emergency must be publicly proclaimed;
  • The measures must be strictly required by the exigencies of the situation;
  • The measures cannot be inconsistent with other requirements of international law; and
  • The measures must not involve discrimination solely on the grounds of race, sex, colour, language, religion or social origin.
  • The United Nations Human Rights Committee noted in its General Comment No. 29 on States of Emergency that:
  • "Not every disturbance or catastrophe qualifies as a public emergency which threatens the life of the nation, as required by article 4, paragraph 1. The Covenant requires that even during an armed conflict measures derogating from the Covenant are allowed only if and to the extent that the situation constitutes a threat to the life of the nation. If States parties consider invoking article 4 in other situations than an armed conflict, they should carefully consider the justification and why such a measure is necessary and legitimate in the circumstances. On a number of occasions the Committee has expressed its concern over States parties that appear to have derogated from rights protected by the Covenant, or whose domestic law appears to allow such derogation in situations not covered by article 4."(1)

    Non-derogation from certain articles of the ICCPR

    1. While Article 4 provides that the ICCPR may be derogated from in certain times of public emergency, some rights under the ICCPR may not be derogated from in a public emergency or in any other circumstances.
    2. Article 4(2) of the ICCPR expressly provides that no derogation may be made from Article 6 (the right to life), Article 7 (which prohibits torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment or treatment), Article 8 (paragraphs 1 and 2, which prohibit slavery or servitude), Article 11 (which prohibits imprisonment for inability to fulfil contractual obligations), Article 15 (the guarantee against retrospective criminality), Article 16 (the right to recognition everywhere as a person before the law) and Article 18 (the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion).
    3. In addition to these non-derogable rights expressly identified in Article 4(2), other rights have been held by the United Nations Human Rights Committee to be non-derogable. Most relevantly, the Human Rights Committee noted in its General Comment No. 29 that as certain elements of the right to a fair trial under Article 14 are explicitly guaranteed under international humanitarian law during armed conflict, there is no justification for derogation from these guarantees during emergency situations.(2)
    4. Therefore certain requirements under the ICCPR in relation to investigations and legal proceedings must be respected even during a state of emergency proclaimed under Article 4. These include:
      1. the right to be tried by a court of law;
      2. the fundamental principles of a fair trial, including the presumption of innocence; and
      3. the right to judicial review of the lawfulness of detention (habeas corpus).(3)

    Current Position in Australia

    1. Given that Australia has not declared a public emergency under Article 4 of the ICCPR, it is not able to invoke the derogation procedures in Article 4. Therefore HREOC's comments are premised on the basis that Australia may not currently derogate from its obligations under the ICCPR in any new measures which may be proposed to protect classified and security sensitive information.

    National Security Concerns

    1. Human rights law seeks to strike a balance between legitimate national security concerns and the protection of fundamental freedoms. This balance is inherent in instruments such as the ICCPR, which includes limitations in various articles which may be invoked on grounds ofnational security" andpublic order". For example, the right to a public trial under Article 14(1) of the ICCPR may be limited, and the press and public excluded from all or part of a trial, on grounds including national security or public order.
    2. The Human Rights Committee has stated that such permissible limitations of ICCPR rights provide sufficient flexibility to cater even for the demands of emergency situations.(4)
    3. The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has noted that it:

      ".recognised the need, inherent in the Convention system, for a proper balance between the defence of the institutions of democracy in the common interest and the protection of human rights. Accordingly. the Court will. take into account the special nature of terrorist crime and the exigencies of dealing with it, as far as is compatible with the application provisions of the Convention in the light of their particular wording and overall object and purpose."(5)

    4. While the ECHR is prepared to take into account the background of terrorism in assessing the actions of States,

      ". the Court stresses that this does not mean that the Contracting States enjoy an unlimited discretion to subject persons within their jurisdiction to [counterterrorism measures]. The Court being aware of the danger such [action] poses of undermining or even destroying democracy on the ground of defending it."(6)

    5. HREOC notes that there is effectively little or no difference between the approach the ECHR takes to human rights and that of the Human Rights Committee. The ECHR's jurisprudence shows that the balancing act between legitimate national security concerns and the rights of individuals is neither a mechanical task nor an easy one. It varies from right to right and from situation to situation.
    6. =
    7. In September 2002, the High Commissioner for Human Rights submitted aNote to the Chair of the Counter-Terrorism Committee: A Human Rights Perspective on Counter-Terrorist Measures"(7) , in which the general principles of the ICCPR relevant to an analysis of counter-terrorism measures from a human rights perspective were set out, and States were reminded of the non-derogable nature of most of the obligations undertaken by them in ratifying the ICCPR.
    8. 19
    9. A resolution specifically focussing on the need to protect human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 18 December 2002(8). It affirmed that States must ensure that any measures taken to combat terrorism comply with their obligations under international law, in particular human rights, refugee and humanitarian law.
    10. However, the precise parameters of the ICCPR rights remain uncertain. As one commentator notes:

      "The dividing line between an ICCPR right and its limitations is by no means clear. Ultimately, it is up to the [Human Rights Committee]. to decide where that line lies. Therefore, the extent of the State's human rights duties to the individual is unclear, especially at theedges" of a right. The edges of a right may be characterized as the area between blatant conformity with the right and blatant nonconformity. The compatibility of a law impacting on the edges of a human right with that human right can only be worked out on a case-by-case basis. This uncertainty introduces flexibility to human rights interpretation, and generates ideological and cultural debate over the content of human rights guarantees. However, the lack of clarity in ICCPR duties does not negate the existence of those duties." (9)

    11. It is with these principles in mind that HREOC provides the following comments in response to the Background Paper. Given that there are currently no proposals to modify the existing measures protecting classified and security sensitive information, it is difficult to answer the broad questions posed by the ALRC with precision. In addition, in many cases there is no international jurisprudence directly on point which would allow for a more definitive answer. HREOC's comments are therefore sometimes necessarily general in nature. HREOC would be happy to provide further comments on later papers if this would be of assistance to the ALRC.

    Rights in investigations and legal proceedings - Article 14 of the ICCPR

    1. The fundamental principles which are most relevant to ensuring information protection measures are consistent with respect for human rights are those procedural rights set out in Article 14 of the ICCPR.
    2. Article 14 provides as follows:
      1. All persons shall be equal before the courts and tribunals. In the determination of any criminal charge against him, or of his rights and obligations in a suit at law, everyone shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law. The press and the public may be excluded from all or part of a trial for reasons of morals, public order (ordre public) or national security in a democratic society, or when the interest of the private lives of the parties so requires, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice; but any judgement rendered in a criminal case or in a suit at law shall be made public except where the interest of juvenile persons otherwise requires or the proceedings concern matrimonial disputes or the guardianship of children.
      2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall have the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law.
      3. In the determination of any criminal charge against him, everyone shall be entitled to the following minimum guarantees, in full equality:
        1. To be informed promptly and in detail in a language which he understands of the nature and cause of the charge against him;
        2. To have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence and to communicate with counsel of his own choosing;
        3. To be tried without undue delay;
        4. To be tried in his presence, and to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing; to be informed, if he does not have legal assistance, of this right; and to have legal assistance assigned to him, in any case where the interests of justice so require, and without payment by him in any such case if he does not have sufficient means to pay for it;
        5. To examine, or have examined, the witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him;
        6. To have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court;
        7. Not to be compelled to testify against himself or to confess guilt.
      4. In the case of juvenile persons, the procedure shall be such as will take account of their age and the desirability of promoting their rehabilitation.
      5. Everyone convicted of a crime shall have the right to his conviction and sentence being reviewed by a higher tribunal according to law.
      6. When a person has by a final decision been convicted of a criminal offence and when subsequently his conviction has been reversed or he has been pardoned on the ground that a new or newly discovered fact shows conclusively that there has been a miscarriage of justice, the person who has suffered punishment as a result of such conviction shall be compensated according to law, unless it is proved that the non-disclosure of the unknown fact in time is wholly or partly attributable to him.
      7. No one shall be liable to be tried or punished again for an offence for which he has already been finally convicted or acquitted in accordance with the law and penal procedure of each country."
    3. HREOC sets out below some comments in relation to the interpretation of those rights provided for in Article 14 of the ICCPR, in response to relevant questions in the ALRC Background Paper.

    Response to questions

    Question 26. What, if any, safeguards should be imposed on the use of closed proceedings to protect classified and security sensitive information, the rights of the parties and of the public?

    1. The ICCPR concept of a fair criminal trial is based upon an adversarial model in which the defendant is confronted by the witnesses against them, who give oral evidence to the court, which is open to the public. However, a major concern of countries in relation to classified information in terrorist cases, for example, is the protection of witnesses and sources of evidence.
    2. Under Article 14 of the ICCPR, the press and the public may be excluded from all or part of a trial for reasons of:
    • national security; or
    • to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice.
  • HREOC notes that all limitations in ICCPR rights, such as this permissible limitation in Article 14 on the right to a public hearing in certain circumstances, must benecessary in a democratic society". The notion of proportionality must also be taken into account.(10)
  • Therefore, in a matter which relates to "national security" and the secrecy of important military facts, the public may be excluded from all or part of the trial only so long as the principles of a democratic society are observed, and only to the extent strictly necessary in proportion to the perceived threat to national security.
  • State parties must also provide reasons for not providing a public trial. In Estrella v Uraguay (74/1980), a concert pianist tried by a military court for conspiracy to subvert the Constitution was sentenced to four and a half years of imprisonment in a trial held in camera. The Human Rights Committee found that a trial in camera violates Article 14(1) of the ICCPR if the State fails to provide a reason for not providing a public trial.
  • In light of the above, safeguards upon the use of closed hearings should:
    • reflect the requirement that the exclusion of the public be "necessary in a democratic society";
    • reflect the requirement of proportionality; and
    • ensure that clear reasons for not providing a public trial are given and recorded.

    Question 34. Do an accused's right to a fair trial and the guarantees set out in Article 14(3) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights rule out secret hearings and secret evidence in criminal matters? Should the minimum guarantees provided to accused persons under the Covenant be extended to parties in civil matters and administrative hearings?

    1. The right to a fair hearing is at the centre of the criminal and civil procedural guarantee and, with respect to criminal jurisdiction, is further articulated in the form of more specific rights in Articles 14 and 15. However, the right to a fair trial is broader than the sum of these individualminimum guarantees". The broader right to a fair trial applies as soon as the government suspects that an individual has committed an offence and continues through charge, arrest, preliminary hearings, trial, appeal, other post-conviction review, and punishment.
    2. The most important criterion of a fair trial is the principle ofequality of arms" between the plaintiff and respondent or the prosecutor and defendant. This principle is violated if a secret hearing with secret evidence is held. HREOC is of the view that measures may be taken to protect witnesses and classified information without resorting to secret hearings and secret evidence in criminal matters.
    3. In response to the ALRC's question as to whether the minimum guarantees provided to accused persons in criminal matters should be extended to parties in civil matters and administrative hearings, the right to a fair hearing under Article 14(1) already guarantees certain essential elements to parties insuits at law" (including, for example,the equality of arms, the respect of adversarial proceedings, the prohibition of ex officio penalty aggravation, and the swiftness of the procedure at all stages.")(11)
    4. An action is asuit at law" for the purposes of Article 14 of the ICCPR in two circumstances:
    • if the forum where the particular question is adjudicated is one where courts normally exercise control over the proceedings; and
    • where the right in question is subject to judicial control or judicial review.(12)
  • In V.M.R.B. v Canada (noted in the Background Paper at paragraph 5.5) the Human Rights Committee did not rule out the possibility that deportation proceedings may be 'suits at law'.(13)
  • HREOC notes that decisions in immigration and similar hearings involving classified or security sensitive information may affect an individual's right to liberty under Article 9, or their right to leave any country (including their own) under Article 12(2) of the ICCPR. Given the nature of the rights which may potentially be affected by such decisions, it may be desirable to have further specific procedural guarantees in these circumstances.
  • Question 41. Should there be any limitation of the right of a party to proceedings involving classified or security sensitive information to receive full reasons in relation to any judgment or decision which affects him or her? If so, when?

    1. HREOC notes that in most cases, judges and tribunals can give adequate reasons which indicate the classified information relied upon, without disclosing the nature of that classified information in the judgement or decision. Provided that such reasons still allow the judgement or decision to be reviewed in accordance with the right to review of a decision under Article 14(5), the requirements of the ICCPR will be met. It will be a question of drawing an appropriate balance in each case.

    Question 42. If the need to protect classified or security sensitive information is a ground for withholding a full statement of the reasons for a judgment or decision from a party to a proceeding involving such information, how can the content of the reduced reasons for decision be sufficiently meaningful and adequate to support any review or appeal?

    1. See response to Question 41, above.

    Question 43. Should there be any limitation on the publication of written reasons for any judgment or decision in proceedings involving classified or security sensitive information?

    1. Article 14(1) of the ICCPR has been interpreted to require that any judgement in a criminal case or suit at law shall be made public (except in juvenile proceedings or matrimonial disputes about the guardianship of children). The right to a public judgement requires that any judgement be in writing.(14)
    2. According to the Human Rights Committee,even in cases in which the public is excluded from the trial, the judgement must, with certain strictly defined exceptions, be made public."(15) The Human Rights Committee does not appear to have elaborated on the meaning ofcertain strictly defined exceptions".
    3. In Toron v Uraguay (7/32), the Human Rights Committee held that in the absence of a judgement in writing, it could not examine whether the proceedings or the severity of the sentence complied with the ICCPR. It held, among other breaches of the ICCPR, that the trial had violated Article 14(1) because the judgement was not made public.

    Question 44. What issues arise in relation to the withholding of recordings and transcripts of confessions and admissions (or other material) from suspects by Australia's investigating agencies-particularly on the basis that they would prejudice a covert investigation or in circumstances involving the protection of classified or security sensitive information?

    Question 45. When and how do prosecutors disclose to, and withhold from, the defence classified or security sensitive information prior to trial? Are these methods effective? How is prejudice to the accused minimised? Are further safeguards required?

    1. In response to Questions 44 and 45, HREOC notes that restrictions on the material disclosed by prosecutors to the defence poses problems throughout the course of the criminal process. If the ordinary rules are modified, there is the risk of running an unfair trial where the evidence gathering process does not protect the elementary rights of a defendant.
    2. A defendant is entitled toequality of arms" with the prosecution in the opportunity to influence the court. This implied principle of the right to a fair trial is pervasive, covering not only the trial procedure itself, but extending to the collection and use of evidence.
    3. At the beginning of the process, Article 14(3)(a) of the ICCPR requires that everyone charged with a criminal offence has the right to be informed promptly and in detail of the nature and cause of the charge, including the alleged facts on which the charge is based. In its General Comment on Article 14, the Human Rights Committee stated that this provision applies to all cases of criminal charges, including those of persons not in detention.(16) The Committee further indicated that:

      ".the right to be informed of the charge 'promptly' requires that information be given as soon as the charge is first made by a competent authority. In the opinion of the Committee this right might arise when in the course of an investigation a court or an authority of the prosecution decides to take procedural steps against a person suspected of a crime or publicly names him as such." (17)

    4. The Human Rights Committee has stated that the function of the notice requirement is to enable a person to take immediate steps to secure their release if they are detained and believe the reasons are invalid. It has also emphasised that this purpose requires that the notice includes details of the charges.
    5. In Caldas v Uraguay (43/1979), where an individual was arrested and told only that the arrest came underprompt security measures", the Human Rights Committee determined that he was not given sufficient details to indicate the substance of the complaint against him.
    6. Further elucidation of the requirement that the prosecution should disclose all material evidence, both for and against the defendant, to the defence is found in ECHR jurisprudence.(18) Like many other defence rights, this right to disclosure is not absolute. Particularly, for example, in terrorist trials, the government may wish to keep the sources of some of its evidence from the defence. If it does, it must have in place a procedure which, so far as possible, satisfies the principle of equality of arms.(19) Such procedures are crucial, given that the non-disclosure of evidence was a substantial component in many miscarriages of justice in terrorist trials in the United Kingdom.
    7. Restrictions on material disclosed by prosecutors may also raise issues under Article 14(3)(e) of the ICCPR, which provides that everyone charged with a crime has the right to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on their behalf under the same conditions as the witnesses against them. This right is an essential element ofequality of arms", and therefore of a fair trial (as noted at paragraph 6.9 of the Background Paper). The ECHR has conceded that the right of a defendant to call witnesses and to confront and cross-examine witnesses against him are not absolute rights where there is a compelling reason for encroaching on these rights.(20) However, the arrangements must be the least adverse to the defendant as is possible in the circumstances, and the evidence given under these special arrangements should not be the major item in the case against the defendant. Thus, in limited circumstances, the prosecution need not reveal the sources of intelligence evidence or security personnel may give their evidence anonymously or behind screens, as do informers.(21) Where a court allows evidence to be given in such circumstances, it is required that there be appropriate measures to assess the necessity for doing so, in which the defence can take part (to the extent that the purpose of the protective measures is not undermined).(22)

    Question 61. Is there a need to consider a special category of defendant where some of the normal protections usually afforded to a criminal accused are withheld in order to protect classified and security sensitive information?

    Question 62. If so, what modifications of these protections should be considered? Would such modifications be consistent with Australia's obligations under international law?

    1. In response to Questions 61 and 62, HREOC notes that where there are modifications to the ordinary criminal law, whether on the admission of evidence or in relation to witnesses, the question will be whether the prosecution has presented evidence capable of satisfying the burden of proof and whether the defence has had an opportunity to influence the tribunal at least to the same extent as the prosecution. An important consideration is that, wherever the rights of the defendant are diminished, so far as possible there should be some compensating protection. In PG and JH v United Kingdom, the ECHR, finding no violation, said:

      ". as far as possible, the decision-making procedure complied with the requirement of adversarial proceedings and equality of arms and incorporated adequate safeguards to protect the interest of the accused." (23)

    2. There is in that approach some flexibility for States in the PG and JH decision by reason of the wordsas far as possible", and some protection for accused persons inadequate safeguards". Of course, conclusive, abstract assessment of any discrete proposal to modify criminal procedure is difficult and HREOC merely seeks to draw attention to these general principles which should be considered.

    Question 71. Should the protections afforded to accused people in criminal trials involving classified or security sensitive information-including the right to be tried in their presence, to defend themselves personally or through legal assistance of their choosing, and to examine the witnesses against them-extend to people facing all, or particular, types of immigration and similar hearings involving such information?

    1. See response to question 34, above.

    Question 77. Does the protection of classified and security sensitive information require Australia to consider creating or adapting specialist tribunals or military commissions such as those in the United States of America?

    1. Since in most countries military courts are empowered to decide on military offences by soldiers, and since Article 2(1) does not expressly proscribe distinctions between civil and military persons, the existence of military courts does not violate Article 14 when the other guarantees under this provision are observed. More difficult to answer is whether military courts may decide on charges against civilians. The Human Rights Committee has noted that this could be justified only in exceptional cases under conditions which genuinely afford the full guarantee of a fair trial.(24)
    2. The most fundamental change a country can make to its justice system is to create a separate system of courts or tribunals to try certain offenders. A further question will be whether these courts are "independent and impartial" under Article 14(1), or whether, in actuality or appearance, members of them are susceptible to executive influence.
    3. In Incal v Turkey(25), the ECHR found that the National Security Courts in Turkey did not satisfy the standards of independence and objective impartiality because of the presence of a military legal officer as one of the judges of the three-judge court. The ECHR noted that the defendant could reasonably be suspicious about the role of the military judge, given that he remained a serving soldier and his future career prospects were dependent on decisions of his military superiors, and the military had an interest in the decisions of the special National Security Courts.(26) Although the judgement is very sparse, the ECHR said that Mr Incal did have objective grounds for doubting the independence and impartiality of the court before which he was tried.
    4. Even where special courts do satisfy the standards of Article 14, the question remains as to what protection an individual is entitled to when the decision is made that their case will go before a special tribunal rather than an ordinary criminal court (there is a hint in Incal that the ECHR has concerns about inappropriate cases being heard by special courts).(27) The Human Rights Committee has decided that the decision must be made on the basis of reasonable and objective grounds communicated to the individual, so that the special power cannot be abused by sending ordinary criminal suspects to the special jurisdiction.(28)

    Conclusion

    1. Given that Australia has not declared a public emergency under Article 4 of the ICCPR, it is not able to invoke the limited derogation procedure which that article provides. Therefore, to the extent any proposals are made for new regulatory measures to protect classified information or security sensitive information in the course of investigations and court and tribunal proceedings, these measures must conform to the human rights principles set out in the ICCPR.
    2. The balance between implementing measures for the protection of national security and the protection of human rights has been the subject of much thought and jurisprudence in the Western world, particularly in Europe. That experience shows that when measures are proposed that may infringe human rights, then great care should be taken in framing and implementing those measures.

    1. Human Rights Committee, General Comment 29, States of Emergency (article 4), U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11 (2001) at paragraph 3.
    2. Ibid, paragraph 16.
    3. Human Rights Committee, General Comment 29, States of Emergency (article 4), U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11 (2001) at paragraphs 11 and 16. See also the Human Rights Committee's concluding observations on Israel in 1998:. The Committee considers the present application of administrative detention to be incompatible with articles 7 and 16 of the Covenant, neither of which allows for derogation in times of public emergency . The Committee stresses, however, that a State party may not depart from the requirement of effective judicial review of detention."
    4. Human Rights Committee, General Comment 29, op.cit, paragraph 5.
    5. Fox, Campbell and Hartley v United Kingdom (A/182) (1988), paragraph 42.
    6. Klass v Germany (A/28) (1978), paragraph 48.
    7. See http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/1373/, Briefings, 24 September 2002.
    8. (A/RES/57/219).
    9. Joseph S,A Rights Analysis of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights" (1999) 5 Journal of International Legal Studies 57 at 79-80.
    10. Joseph S, "A Rights Analysis of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights" (1999) 5 Journal of International Legal Studies 57 at 78. The principle of proportionality in relation to the limitations in certain ICCPR rights was considered in Faurisson v France (550/93). The author was a professor of literature at the Sorbonne University who was removed from his chair and convicted under France's Gayssot Act which prohibited the publication of opinions that denied the occurrence of the Holocaust. He argued that his right to freedom of expression had been curtailed. The Committee found that his conviction was justifiable under the limitation to Article 19, as it was a necessary and proportionate measure (under Article 19(3)(a), which permits restrictions on the right to freedom of expressionfor respect of the rights and reputations of others").
    11. Weissbrodt D, The Right to a Fair Trial: Articles 8, 10 and 11 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Kluwer Law International, The Hague, The Netherlands: 2001) at 125.
    12. See Weissbrodt D, op. cit. at 139; see also Y.L. v Canada (112/81) and Casanovas v France (441/90).
    13. The Human Rights Committee noted in that case: "With respect to article 14, the Committee notes that even if immigration hearings and deportation proceedings were to be deemed to constitutesuits at law" within the meaning of article 14, paragraph 1, of the Covenant, as the author contends, a thorough examination of the communication has not revealed any facts in substantiation of the author's claim that he is the victim of a violation of this article."
    14. Weissbrodt D, op.cit. at 146.
    15. General Comment 29, op. cit., paragraph 6.
    16. Human Rights Committee, General Comment 13, Article 14, paragraph 8.
    17. Ibid.
    18. Edwards v United Kingdom (A/247B) (1992) at paragraph 36.
    19. Rowe and Davis v United Kingdom (16/02/2000) at paragraphs 60-67.
    20. Van Mechaln v Netherlands (1997-III) 691 at paragraph 58.
    21. Doorson v Netherlands (1997) (1996-II) 446 at paragraph 72.
    22. Rowe and Davis v United Kingdom (16/02/2000) at paragraph 62.
    23. (25/09/2001) at paragraph 73.
    24. Human Rights Committee, General Comment 13, Equality before the courts and the right to a fair and public hearing by an independent court established by law (Art. 14) 13/04/84. CCPR General comment 13, paragraph 4.
    25. (1998-IV) 1547.
    26. Ibid, paragraph 72.
    27. Ibid.
    28. Kavanagh v Ireland (819/1998).
    Last updated 19 September 2003.