Skip to main content

Search

Morton v. Queensland Police Service (2010)

Legal Legal
Friday 14 December, 2012

COURT OF APPEAL
SUPREME COURT OF
QUEENSLAND

Morton v. Queensland Police Service

SUBMISSIONS OF THE AUSTRALIAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION

10 February 2010


Download


COURT OF APPEAL
SUPREME COURT OF
QUEENSLAND

CA NUMBER: 178/09

NUMBER: D75/08

APPELLANT: FLORENCE MAY MORTON

AND

RESPONDENT: QUEENSLAND POLICE SERVICE

SUBMISSIONS OF THE AUSTRALIAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION


  1. The Australian Human Rights Commission (‘the Commission’) has
    sought leave to appear as amicus curiae in these appeal proceedings. The
    Commission does not argue for a particular outcome in the appeal, but rather
    seeks to identify the relevant principles of law for the assistance of the
    Court.

  2. These submissions address the following issues:

    • (a) the proper construction of s 10 of the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) (‘RDA’) based on the text of the International
      Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination
      (‘CERD’);[1]

    • (b) the recent decision of the Full Court of the Federal Court in Bropho
      v State of Western Australia
      (2008) 169 FCR 59 (‘Bropho’) which considered the proper construction of s 10 of the RDA and the
      application of CERD rights;

    • (c) the application of the relevant principles to this appeal; and

    • (d) the proper construction of s 8 of the RDA with respect to ‘special
      measures’.

ISSUE TO BE DETERMINED

  1. The relevant effects of the Liquor Act 1992 (Qld)
    (‘Liquor Act’) and the Liquor Regulation 2002 (Qld)
    (‘the Regulations’) are to make it an offence for a person to
    possess on Palm Island more than one case of mid strength or light beer and to
    prohibit the possession of any other form of
    alcohol.[2]

  2. The Regulations also declare 17 other Indigenous communities to be
    restricted areas.[3]

  3. The appellant, who is an Aboriginal woman, was convicted of an offence under
    s 168B(1) of the Liquor Act, having been found in possession of two bottles of
    whiskey on Palm Island.

  4. The appeal poses the question whether the particular provisions of the
    Liquor Act and the Liquor Regulations that operate to restrict the possession of
    alcohol on Palm Island are contrary to the RDA.

OVERVIEW OF RDA AND ITS IMPLEMENTATION OF CERD

  1. CERD aims to eliminate discrimination and achieve equality without
    distinction as to race, colour, descent or national or ethnic origin. These
    objects reflect a longstanding and widely recognised international human right
    of non-discrimination and equality. The RDA gives effect to CERD and the text of
    CERD is set out in the schedule of the RDA.

  2. Section 9(1) of the RDA contains a general provision rendering acts of
    racial discrimination unlawful. The section reproduces the language of article
    1(1) of CERD.

  3. Section 10 of the RDA does not replicate any specific provision of
    CERD;[4] instead, it creates a general
    right to equality before the law. It does not prohibit discrimination per
    se
    but is concerned with ensuring the equal enjoyment of rights of
    all persons under law.[5] Section 10
    operates as a stand-alone provision in the RDA in the sense that it does not
    require the Court to determine whether the impugned law contravenes s 9(1)
    and/or (1A) of the RDA.[6]Further, s
    10(1) does not require an impugned law to make an explicit distinction based on
    race: it is directed at ‘the practical operation and effect
    of the impugned legislation and is ‘concerned not merely with matters
    of form but with matters of
    substance
    .[7]

  4. Sections 9 and 10 of the RDA engage a wide range of human rights and
    freedoms, which are not limited to the human rights described in article 5 of
    CERD.[8]

  5. Sections 11 to 15 of the RDA proscribe race discrimination in specific areas
    of public life, including access to places and facilities and the provision of
    goods and services. Those sections do not limit the generality of s 9 and have
    been described as ‘amplifying and applying to particular cases the
    provisions of s 9’
    .[9]

  6. The RDA provides very limited exceptions to race discrimination. Relevantly,
    there is an exception to discrimination if the conduct is a special measure: see
    s 8 of the RDA.

PRINCIPLES OF INTERPRETATION RELEVANT TO RDA

  1. The following principles of interpretation are relevant to these
    proceedings:

    1. where the RDA uses the same language as CERD, the provisions of the RDA
      should be construed in the same way as the relevant provision of CERD is
      construed;[10]

    2. when ascertaining the meaning of CERD, primacy should be given to the text
      of CERD with consideration of the context, objects and purposes of
      CERD;[11]

    3. the manner of interpreting an international treaty is one which is more
      liberal than that ordinarily adopted by a court construing exclusively domestic
      statutes. It is undertaken in a manner unconstrained by technical local rules or
      precedent, but on broad principles of ‘general
      acceptation’;[12 ]

    4. there is a presumption that Parliament intended to legislate in accordance
      with its international
      obligations;[13] and

    5. a court should not impute to the legislature an intention to abrogate or
      curtail fundamental rights or freedoms unless such an intention is clearly
      manifested by unmistakable and unambiguous
      language.[14]

PROPER CONSTRUCTION OF SECTION
10 OF THE RDA

  1. Section 10 of the RDA relevantly provides:

    (1) If, by reason of, or of a provision of, a law of the
    Commonwealth or of a State or Territory, persons of a particular race, colour or
    national or ethnic origin do not enjoy a right that is enjoyed by persons of
    another race, colour or national or ethnic origin, or enjoy a right to a more
    limited extent than persons of another race, colour or national or ethnic
    origin, then, notwithstanding anything in that law, persons of the
    first-mentioned race, colour or national or ethnic origin shall, by force of
    this section, enjoy that right to the same extent as persons of that other race,
    colour or national or ethnic origin.

    (2) A reference in subsection (1) to a right includes a reference to a right
    of a kind referred to in Article 5 of the Convention.

  1. As the Full Court of the Federal Court observed in Bropho v State of
    Western Australia
    (2008) 169 FCR 59 at 83 [81] – [83], the application
    of s 10 of the RDA requires the Court to consider:

    (a) whether there
    is a relevant ‘right’ or ‘rights’ that are affected by
    the impugned law; and

    (b) if so, whether persons of a particular race do not enjoy that right or
    enjoy it to a more limited extent than persons of another race by reason of the
    impugned law.

  2. This second step requires the Court to ask:

    (a) whether there is
    a limitation upon the enjoyment of a right by people of a particular race by
    reason of law; and

    (b) whether any limitation upon the right is a legitimate one, intended to
    achieve a non-discriminatory purpose.

(a) What are the relevant ‘right’ or ‘rights’ that
are affected?

  1. It is necessary to approach the meaning of ‘rights’ in a broad
    way to avoid undermining the purpose of s 10(1) of the RDA. As its title makes
    clear, s 10 is intended to guarantee equality before the law. Such purpose is
    also clear from the second reading speech of the Racial Discrimination Bill
    1975: ‘The Bill will guarantee equality before the law without
    distinction as to
    race.
    [15]

  2. The ‘rights’ protected by s 10(1) are not limited to the rights
    set out in CERD. It is also clear that the term ‘right’ as used in
    s 10(1) does not necessarily refer to a legal right recognised in domestic
    law.[16]

Equality before the law generally

  1. The impugned provisions of the Liquor Act and the Regulations have
    the practical effect of making a distinction between Indigenous and
    non-Indigenous people in Queensland. The distinction - which in practical terms
    imposes a different regime of alcohol regulation for the Appellant and other
    Indigenous people when compared to non-Indigenous people - is sufficient to
    engage the human right of equality and non-discrimination.

Access to goods

  1. The Commission agrees with the Appellant’s identification of this
    right and the submissions made by the Appellant about the
    right.[17]

  2. The Commission submits that the Liquor Act and Regulations engage the right
    of access to goods. That right includes the terms and conditions upon which a
    person may access those goods – including limitations on the ability to
    possess them.

The right to engage freely in public activity

  1. The Commission agrees with the Appellant’s identification of this
    right and the submissions made by the Appellant about the
    right.[18]

(b) Is there a limitation on the enjoyment of the right by
Indigenous people?

  1. The Commission agrees with Appellant’s submissions to the effect that
    there is a limitation on the rights of Indigenous people arising from the Liquor
    Act and Regulations.[19]

(c) Permissible limitations on rights – Bropho decision

  1. The Commission submits that whilst the Appellant’s submissions address
    the identification of the rights in question, they do not consider the
    application of the rights and the extent to which those rights may be limited.

  2. Very few human rights have an absolute character, in the sense that there
    may be no limitation or restriction of the right. Where there are claims of
    competing rights or interests, a court may be called on to strike a balance
    between the competing claims and determine when and how certain rights may be
    limited. In Bropho, the Full Court accepted that some forms of
    differential treatment resulting from the operation or effect of a State law are
    permissible if the law has a legitimate and non-discriminatory public
    goal.[20]

  3. In Bropho the Court identified the permissible limits could be placed
    upon the right to property at international law. The Court held that ‘a
    State has a right to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use
    of property in accordance with the general
    interest
    ’.[21] The Court
    also held that ‘no invalid diminution of property rights occurs where
    the State acts in order to achieve a legitimate and non-discriminatory public
    goal
    ’.[22] The Court found
    that the laws in that case interfered with the rights of the Indigenous
    residents, but did so for the purpose of protecting the safety and welfare of
    the residents, particularly women and children. They were therefore not
    invalidated by s 10(1) of the RDA.

(d) Applying Bropho

  1. A number of points may be noted in applying the decision in Brophoand determining what will constitute a
    ‘legitimate’ interference with
    rights.[23] The Commission submits
    that the following steps should be considered.

  2. First, when determining the legitimacy of a limitation of a right, the
    assessment is an objective one—it is not sufficient, for example, that the
    legislature lacked a discriminatory motive or
    intention.[24]

  3. Second, proportionality will be a vital factor in making assessments of what
    is ‘legitimate’, ‘reasonable’ or
    ‘justifiable’—a measure will not be legitimate if its impact
    upon rights is disproportionate to the claimed purpose or benefit of the
    measure. In considering proportionality, the Court should consider the
    following:

    • Is the measure applied only for a specific purpose and directly related to a
      specific need?

    • Is the regime the least restrictive one available to achieve the lawful
      objectives pursued? The court should consider whether the measure can reasonably
      be said to involve the least possible interference with the right to be free
      from race discrimination.

  4. Third, the legitimacy of any limitation upon a right must be assessed in the
    context of the right in question: not all rights can necessarily be limited in
    the same ways.[25]

  5. Fourth, because the ‘balancing’ of rights is taking place in the
    context of the right to racial equality before the law and non-discrimination,
    legitimacy should be judged against the objectives and purposes of CERD and
    another relevant human rights instrument such as the
    ICCPR.[26]

(e) Are any limitations upon the rights in this case legitimate?

  1. In this matter, it is important to consider the reasons for the limitation
    of the relevant rights. Judge Durward noted that the provisions of the Liquor
    Act and the Regulations reflected the recommendations in the Cape York Justice
    Study Report in 2001 (‘the Report’). This highlighted the
    seriousness of the alcohol problem in Indigenous communities in unequivocal
    terms.[27]

  2. Further, it appears that the Legislature’s objective was to
    ‘prevent harm in community areas caused by alcohol abuse and misuse and
    associated violence’.[28] The explanatory notes to the Indigenous Communities Liquor Licences Bill
    2002 noted that the Report had recommended immediate Government intervention and
    that unless the epidemic of alcohol abuse in Indigenous communities was
    addressed, reforms in social and economic development and education would not be
    sustainable.[29] The Report
    recommended that Government should first seek to work with and empower
    Indigenous communities to take action to address alcohol, but that if this
    community based approach did not result in improvements within three years, the
    Government should consider prohibiting alcohol
    altogether.[30]

  3. The key mechanisms in the Bill were described as the ability to declare
    limits on carrying and possessing alcohol in restricted areas and the ability to
    impose new licence conditions on licensed premises in and adjacent to Indigenous
    communities. The advice of community justice groups was said to be
    ‘central in determining the particular controls that will be put in
    place’. It was anticipated that that Alcohol Management Plans developed by
    community justice groups in conjunction with members of their communities would
    be the primary source of guidance in implementing the alcohol
    controls.[31]

  4. The Commission submits that the objectives of eliminating alcohol-related
    harm and violence against women and children are legitimate reasons for limiting
    the rights in question. Governments have an obligation to protect the right to
    security of the person[3] and to
    protect and care for the wellbeing of
    children.[32] They also have an
    obligation to protect the right to the ‘highest attainable standard of
    physical and mental
    health’[33] and ‘to
    ensure to the maximum extent possible the survival and development of the
    child’.[34]

  5. The critical question, however, is whether the
    legislative changes are a proportionate response. This involves the Court asking
    whether the relevant provisions of the Liquor Act can reasonably be
    considered to involve the least possible interference with the rights outlined
    in order to achieve their stated purpose. Relevant to this question is what
    other measures could have been implemented on Palm Island to deal with issues
    surrounding the abuse/misuse of alcohol and/or the prevention of alcohol-related
    disturbances and violence.

  6. Also relevant to the question of determining whether the limitations upon
    rights in the present case are legitimate are the wishes of Indigenous people in
    relation to measures affecting them, reflecting the right of Indigenous people
    to self-determination.[35] In this
    regard, the Commission notes that the Liquor Act provides for consultation with
    a community justice group for a particular community
    area.[36] The Minister must consult
    with the community justice group and consider any recommendations made by the
    community justice group[37] but a
    failure to do so does not affect the validity of a
    regulation.[38]

SPECIAL MEASURES

  1. The expression ‘special measures’ is not defined in s 8 of the
    RDA and it takes its meaning directly from article 1(4) of CERD. In Gerhardy, Brennan J identified the criteria of a special measure
    as follows:[39]

    A special measure (1) confers a benefit on some or all members of a
    class (2) the membership of which is based on race, colour, descent, or national
    or ethnic origin (3) for the sole purpose of securing adequate advancement of
    the beneficiaries in order that they may enjoy and exercise equally with others
    human rights and fundamental freedoms (4) in circumstances where the protection
    given to the beneficiaries by the special measure is necessary in order that
    they may enjoy and exercise equally with others human rights and fundamental
    freedoms.

  1. In the same case, Mason J and Deane J indicated that the special measure had
    to be reasonably ‘appropriate and adapted’ to achieving the sole
    purpose of advancing a particular
    group.[40]

  2. While it is appropriate to consider the legislation as a whole when
    determining whether it is a ‘special measure’, the individual parts
    must still be ‘appropriate and adapted’ to the permissible purpose.
    In Vanstone v Clark,[41] Weinberg J (with whose reasons Black CJ agreed) considered a submission that all
    legislative provisions forming part of a special measure were incapable of being
    racially discriminatory under the RDA. His Honour did not accept the submission,
    and observed that if it were correct then ‘any provision of an ancillary
    nature that inflicted disadvantage upon the group protected under a
    “special measure” would itself be immune from the operation of the
    RDA simply by reason of it being attached to that special
    measure.’[42] Consistently
    with this authority, it was necessary for the Court to consider whether the
    declaration of Palm Island as a restricted area satisfied the test for a special
    measure, as opposed to the introduction of the general provisions of the Liquor
    Act and the Regulations and their application to Indigenous communities
    generally.

  3. It was also necessary to consider the wishes of the particular beneficiaries
    of the special measure. In Gerhardy, Brennan J highlighted the importance
    of consultation with the prospective beneficiaries in this
    way:[43]

    The purpose of securing advancement for a racial group is not
    established by showing that the branch of government or the person who takes the
    measure does so for the purpose of conferring what it or he regards as a benefit
    for the group if the group does not seek or wish to have the benefit. The
    wishes of the beneficiaries for the measure are of great importance (perhaps
    essential) in determining whether a measure is taken for the purpose of securing
    their advancement.
    The dignity of the beneficiaries is impaired and they are
    not advanced by having an unwanted material benefit foisted on them.

  1. His Honour’s approach is consistent with general principles of
    international law and the circumstances in which special measures should
    apply.[44] The Commission submits if
    a measure must be ‘appropriate and adapted’ to the purpose of
    advancing a particular group, then it is impossible to form a view as to whether
    a measure is ‘appropriate and adapted’ to the relevant purpose of
    advancing the particular group[45] without considering the wishes of the group.

  2. In this case, the legislation is intended to benefit a racial group or
    members of it, but it does so by limiting certain rights of some, or all, of
    that group. In these circumstances, the consent of the group is of heightened
    importance and any failure to seek or obtain such consent is of particular
    significance. This approach is required to adequately protect the rights of
    minorities and the right of Indigenous peoples to
    self-determination.[46]

STATUTORY FACTS

  1. In Gerhardy, Brennan J indicated that in determining whether a law
    was inconsistent with a Commonwealth law for the purpose of s 109 of the
    Constitution, the Court was not limited to the facts placed before it by the
    parties.[47] That position is
    consistent with earlier and later authorities on constitutional
    fact-finding.[48] Subject to
    affording the parties the opportunity to respond to the material upon which the
    Court proposes to rely,[49] the
    Court can take into account matters relevant to the validity of the impugned
    legislation. That includes the extent and adequacy of consultation with the
    proposed beneficiaries.

G Del Villar
Counsel for the Commission 10 February 2010


[1]International Convention on
the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination
, opened for signature
21 December 1965, 660 UNTS 195 (entered into force 4 January 1969). CERD entered
into force for Australia on 30 October 1975.

[2] Section 168B of the Liquor
Act
1992 (Qld) makes it an offence to possess more than a prescribed
quantity of a type of liquor in a restricted area. Restricted areas are declared
by regulation pursuant to ss 173G and 173H. Schedule 1R of the Liquor
Regulations
2002 (Qld) declares Palm Island to be a restricted area.
Paragraph 2 of sch 1R provides that the prescribed quantity of alcohol is 11.25
litres of beer less than 4% alcohol and for any other liquor zero.

[3] See Schedules 1A-R of the Liquor Regulations 2002 (Qld).

[4]Gerhardy v Brown (1985)
159 CLR 70, 99 (Mason J) (‘Gerhardy’). See also Macabenta
v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs
(1998) 154 ALR
591,[599].

[5]Gerhardy (1985) 159 CLR
70, 99 (Mason J); Ward v Western Australia (2002) 213 CLR 1, 99 [105]
(Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ) (‘Ward’).

[6]Gerhardy (1985) 159 CLR
70, 99 (Mason J); Ward (2002) 213 CLR 1, 98 [101]-[103] (Gleeson CJ,
Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ); Vanstone v Clark (2005) 147 FCR 299, 352
[197] (Weinberg J).

[7]Mabo v Queensland (No 1) (1998) 166 CLR 186, 230 (Deane J) (‘Mabo No 1)’); Jango v Northern Territory (2006) 152 FCR 150, 234 [667]; Ward (2002) 213 CLR 1, 103 [115] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ); Gerhardy (1985) 159 CLR 70, 99 (Mason J).

[8]Gerhardy (1985) 159 CLR
70, 101-2 (Mason J), 125-6 (Brennan J).

[9] Ibid, 85 (Gibbs CJ).

[10]Applicant A v Minister
for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs
(1997) 190 CLR 225, 230-31 (Brennan
CJ).

[11]Pilkington (Australia)
Ltd v Minister of State for Justice & Customs
(2002) 127 FCR 92, 100
[26].

[12 ]Ibid, 100 [26] and
authorities cited therein.

[13]Polites v
Commonwealth
(1945) 70 CLR 60, 68-69 (Latham CJ), 77 (Dixon J), 80-81
(Williams J); Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade v Magno (1992) 37
FCR 298, 304 (Gummow J).

[14]Coco v The
Queen
(1994) (1994) 179 CLR 427, 437 (Mason CJ, Brennan, Gaudron and McHugh
JJ); S157/2002 v Commonwealth (2003) 211 CLR 476, 492 [30] (Gleeson CJ)
and see also Phipps v Australian Leisure and Hospitality Group Ltd & Anor [2007] QCA 130, [79] (Phillip McMurdo J).

[15] Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 15 April 1975, 999 (the Hon Mr JJ
McClelland, Minister for Manufacturing Industry).

[16]Mabo (No 1) (1988)
166 CLR 186, 217 (Brennan, Toohey and Gaudron JJ). See also Gerhardy (1985) 159 CLR 70,126 (Brennan J).

[17] See Appellant’s
Outline of Argument ([24]) which largely reflects the Commission’s
submission on this issue in the District Court appeal (AB 400, [33]-[35]).

[18] See Appellant’s
Outline of Argument ([25]) which largely reflects the Commission’s
submission on this issue in the District Court appeal (AB 400, [36]).

[19] See Appellant’s
Outline of Argument ([28]) which largely reflects the Commission’s
submission on this issue in the District Court appeal (AB 400, [43]-[48]).

[20]Bropho v State of
Western Australia
(2008) 169 FCR 59,[83] (‘Bropho’).
Mason J took a similar approach to the right to freedom of movement in Gerhardy (1985) 159 CLR 70,
102-4.

[21]Bropho (2008) 169 FCR 59, 82
[80].
[22] Ibid, [83].

[23] See United Nations
Commission on Human Rights, The Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and
Derogation Provisions in the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights
, UN Doc E/CN.4/1985/4, Annex (1985) (‘Siracusa
Principles’).

[24] This is consistent with the High Court’s decision in Ward (2002)
213 CLR 1, 103 [115] (Gleeson, Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne
JJ).
[25] Siracusa Principles,
[4].

[26] Committee on the
Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD Committee), General Recommendation
14: Definition of Racial Discrimination
, 42nd sess, UN Doc
A/48/18 at 114 (1994), [2] and Human Rights Committee General Comment 18:
Non-discrimination
, 37th sess, UN Doc A/45/40 [13] (1989).

[27] See para [14] of the
reasons for judgment.

[28] Explanatory notes to Indigenous Communities Liquor Licences Bill 2002, 1.

[29] Explanatory notes to Indigenous Communities Liquor Licences Bill 2002, 2.

[30] Explanatory notes to Indigenous Communities Liquor Licences Bill 2002, 2.

[31] Explanatory notes to Indigenous Communities Liquor Licences Bill 2002, 2.

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for
signature 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171, art 9 (entered into force
2[3] March 1976) (‘ICCPR’).

[32]Convention on the
Rights of the Child,
opened for signature 20 November 1989, 1577 UNTS 3
(entered into force 2 September 1990) (‘CRC’).

[33]International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
, opened for signature 16 December
1966, 993 UNTS 3, art 12(1) (entered into force 3 January 1976)
(‘ICESCR’).

[34] CRC, art 6(2).

[35] Reflected in art 1 of both
the ICCPR and ICESCR. The Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (adopted by GA Res 295, UN GAOR, 61st sess, 107th plen
mtg, UN Doc A/Res/61/295 (2007)) affirms this right and art 19 endorses the
standard of ‘free, prior and informed consent’ in dealings with
Indigenous peoples.

[36]Liquor Act 1992 (Qld), s 173I.

[37]Liquor Act 1992 (Qld), s 173I(2).

[38]Liquor Act 1992 (Qld), s 173I(4).
[39]Gerhardy (1985) 159 CLR 70, 133 (Brennan J).

[40]Gerhardy (1985) 159
CLR 70, 105 (Mason J), 149 (Deane J).

[41] (2005) 147 FCR 299.

[42] Ibid, 354 [209].
[43]Gerhardy (1985) 159
CLR 70, 135 (emphasis added).

[44] CERD Committee, General
Recommendation 32: The meaning and scope of special measures in the
International Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination
,
75th sess, UN Doc CERD/C/GC/32 [18] (2009); CERD Committee, General Recommendation 23 concerning Indigenous Peoples,
51stsess, UN Doc A/52/18 [4(d)] (1992). See also CERD Committee, General recommendation 21 on the Right to Self-Determination,
48thsess, UN Doc A/51/18 [2] (1996). The European Union’s
Racial Equality Directive 2000/43/EC provides for special measures (art 5) and
the concept of social dialogue (art 11) wherein all interested parties engage in
a dialogue.

[45]Gerhardy (1985) 159
CLR 70, 105 (Mason J), 149 (Deane
J).

[46] ICCPR, arts 27
and 1 respectively; ICESCR, art 1; United Nations Declaration on the
Rights of Indigenous People
, art 19; CERD Committee, General
Recommendation 23 concerning Indigenous Peoples
: States parties are to
ensure that members of indigenous peoples have equal rights in respect
of effective participation in public life, and that no decision directly
relating to their rights and interests are taken without their informed
consent...
’ [4(d)].

[47]Gerhardy (1985) 159
CLR 70, 141-142.

[48] See, for example, Commonwealth Freighters Pty Ltd v Sneddon (1959) 102 CLR 280, 292 (Dixon
CJ); Breen v Sneddon (1961) 106 CLR 406, 411 (Dixon CJ); North Eastern
Dairy Co Ltd v Dairy Industry Authority of NSW
(1975) 134 CLR 559, 622
(Jacobs J); Thomas v Mowbray (2007) 233 CLR 307, 514-522 [620]-[637]
(Heydon J).

[49]Thomas v Mowbray (2007) 233 CLR 307, 513 [618], 521 [637] (Heydon J).